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SANCTIONING A TYRANNY
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.
-Chief Justice John Marshall'
They made many promises to us, but they only kept one: they
promised to take our land, and they took it.
2
-Oglala Lakota Chief Red Cloud

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has issued opinions in
federal Indian law cases signaling a dramatic retreat from the Court's historic
role as protector of the rights of Indian Tribes under the Constitution, laws
and treaties of the United States and as a function of inherent tribal
sovereignty. 3 Prior to 1986, when President Reagan appointed thenAssociate Justice William H. Rehnquist to the office of Chief Justice of the
United States, Indian Tribes' interests prevailed in most of the Supreme
Since 1986, and inversely
Court's modem Indian law decisions. 4

1.
2.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
Oglala Lakota Chief Red Cloud, quoted in REX WEYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND 65

(1982).
3.
See generally David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier:
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
Getches writes:

The New
Professor

[Tihe courts have generally served as the conscience of federal Indian law,
protecting tribal powers and rights at least against state action, unless and until
Congress clearly states a contrary intention. The Supreme Court has recently
begun to depart from this traditional standard, abandoning entrenched

principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends tribal sovereignty to
fit the Court's perceptions of non-Indian interests.
Id. at 1573-74.

4.

See Robert N. Clinton, The DormantIndian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,

1056-57 (1995).

Professor Clinton points out that "[tihe overall success rate of tribal claims in

cases decided with opinions by the Supreme Court since 1959 is close to fifty percent, with those
asserting tribal claims winning approximately 51 out of the 103 cases decided since 1959." Id.
Moreover, as Professor Clinton notes further, "for most five year periods between 1959 and 1986,
tribal success rates generally averaged over sixty percent, in some cases reaching nearly seventy
percent." Id.
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proportional to the rise of "States' rights" activism on the high court, 5 the
percentage of Supreme Court decisions favorable to Tribes' interests in
Indian law cases has fallen steadily, year after year.6
Today, this striking trend of anti-tribal adjudication by the Rehnquist
Court has engendered great consternation and dismay among tribal leaders
and Indian law scholars. These observers discern in the Court's disregard of
longstanding legal principles protective of Tribes' most elemental rights a
return to federal policy themes dominant during the devastating
"termination" era of the 1950s, when Congress embarked on a nefarious
mission to deprive Indian Tribes of all federal protection by unilaterally
declaring an end to the federal government's historic guardianship
responsibilities toward Indian Tribes and Indian people. 7 Historically, of
5.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar provides provocative commentary on the modem Supreme
Court's elaboration of its "States' rights" ideology under the rubric of "Our Federalism":
Victims of government-sponsored lawlessness have come to dread the
word 'federalism.' Whether emblazoned on the simple banner of 'Our
Federalism' or invoked in some grander phrase, the word is now regularly
deployed to thwart full remedies for violations of constitutional rights....
Today's Court seems to have lost sight of the People-and so it has
transmogrified doctrines of federalism and sovereignty into their very
antitheses. Sovereign immunity allows "sentinels" hired to uphold the law to
become gunmen who are a law unto themselves. And "Our Federalism"
perverts a structure designed to assure full remedies for constitutional wrongs
into a system that regularly frustrates the remedial imperative. Whenever the
rhetoric of "states' rights" is deployed to defend states' wrongs, our servants
have become our masters; our rescuers, our captors.
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425, 1520 (1987)
(footnotes omitted); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499,
540 (1995) ("During the 1950s and 1960s, objections to federal civil rights efforts were phrased
primarily in terms of federalism. Rather than defend discrimination and government-mandated
segregation, opponents of civil rights reforms cloaked their arguments in the rhetoric of states'
rights. Efforts to use federalism to mask the real issue are not a thing of the past.").
6.
See Clinton, supra note 4, at 1057. Professor Clinton writes: "In the period between
1986 and 1990 tribal interests won in the Supreme Court only twenty percent of the time and since
1990 tribal claims have prevailed in only fourteen percent of the cases." Id.
7.
In this regard, Professor Ralph Johnson and Berrie Martinis point out that
[t]he federal government has experimented with termination before, with
devastating results for Indian tribes. Despite the lessons the government
learned through its historical policy vacillations, and despite its current
commitment to tribal sovereignty and self-determination, Rehnquist is
advocating and implementing a judicial termination policy.
One can only hope that Rehnquist loses his majority before his judicial
agenda completely devastates tribal sovereignty.
Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PuB. LAND
L. REV. 1, 24, 24-25 (1995) (footnote omitted).

31:787]

SANCTIONING A TYRANNY

course, it has been Congress which has had the greatest impact of the three
branches of the federal government on the political destiny of Indian Tribes,
arrogating to itself, with the Supreme Court's approval, a "plenary power"
over Indian affairs, exercised at times with the most brutal consequences for
the Tribes.8 Because of this historic dominance by Congress in regulating
the relationship between Indian Tribes and the United States government, one

might have supposed that worries over a proliferating "judicialtermination" 9
of Indian Tribes through the exercise of "judicial plenary power"' l were

8.
The watershed case declaring an expansive congressional "plenary power" over Indian
affairs is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Lone Wolf Court wrote:
When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a
tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in
Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be availed of from
considerations of governmental policy ....
. . . If injury was occasioned . . .by the use made by Congress of its
power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to
the courts.
Id. at 566, 568.
9.
Johnson & Martinis, supra note 7, at 7, 24 (emphasis added). The authors use the phrase
"judicial termination" to identify a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court's approach to the rights of
Indian Tribes. They point out that
[a]lthough Congress has rejected the policy of termination, Rehnquist and the
Court seem to have adopted it. Chief Justice Rehnquist has made it his policy
to chip away at the sovereignty of Indian nations. His policy contradicts not
only the will of Congress, but also a long line of Supreme Court decisions
affirming inherent tribal sovereignty.
Id. at7.
10. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and
Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 327-28 (1997) (emphasis
added).
Professor Pommersheim uses the phrase "judicial plenary power" in criticizing the
Rehnquist Court's innovation of "claim[ing] for itself the unfettered power to determine the
substantive reach of tribal court authority," explaining further that "even if Congress has not
acted-where one would normally presuppose an unimpaired tribal sovereignty-the Court now
recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the limits of tribal court authority based on federal
common law." Id.
In a similar vein, Curtis Berkey uses the phrase "judicial plenary power" to characterize the
Supreme Court's "implicit divestiture" theory itself, as devised by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Berkey writes:
In addition to the threat of congressional extinguishment via plenary power,
Indian sovereignty is subject to judicial abrogation. In Oliphant . . . the
Supreme Court expanded congressional plenary power doctrine to include a
measure of judicial plenary power over Indian sovereignty. The Court ruled
that the Suquamish Tribe had no inherent authority to try and punish nonIndians who violate tribal criminal laws. To reach this result, the Court
fashioned an entirely new doctrine of Indian sovereignty, the "implicit
divestiture" rule. This rule may prove to be a greater threat to Indian tribal
power than acts of Congress.
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somewhat exaggerated. However, given the Supreme Court's recurring
inclination in recent Indian law cases" effectively to displace Congress's role
in Indian affairs with the Court's own innovative, "States' rights"-oriented
judicial policymaking,' 2 such fears about an impending torrent of irreparable
. . . Under the [implicit divestiture] doctrine, tribes cannot exercise any
power inconsistent with their status as subjugated sovereigns, and the federal
judiciary is empowered to survey the political and historical landscape to
determine whether or not Indian sovereign powers have been implicitly
divested.
Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 70-71 (1992).
11.
See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999) (9-0 decision)
(declining to apply tribal court exhaustion doctrine to enable tribal jurisdiction over personal injury
and wrongful death claims arising from nuclear accidents and brought against uranium mining
corporations pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act, notwithstanding the absence of language in the
Act forbidding such jurisdiction); Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze, 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999) (9-0
decision) (declining to recognize federal preemption of a state tax as applied to contract between the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and a business privately owned by a member of, and incorporated by, a
Montana Tribe to improve roads on Indian reservations in Arizona); Cass County v. Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (9-0 decision) (holding that land alienated from
tribal ownership pursuant to the Nelson Act of 1889, but subsequently reacquired by the Tribe, is
subject to state taxation, without addressing the Nelson Act's non-incorporation of the General
Allotment Act with respect to the parcels at issue and its absence of any mention of congressional
intent to permit state taxation of lands initially distributed under the Act's provisions but later
reacquired by Tribes in fee); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (9-0
decision) (holding that lands belonging to Alaska Native Villages and governed by the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 are not "Indian country" within the meaning of federal law,
notwithstanding Congress's express inclusion of "all dependent Indian communities" as "Indian
country," and despite the absence of any language in the 1971 Act expressly divesting Alaska
Native Villages' lands of "Indian country" status); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.
329 (1998) (9-0 decision) (holding that the Yankton Sioux Reservation was diminished by an 1894
Act of Congress opening the Reservation to settlement by non-Indians, notwithstanding a savings
clause stating that nothing in the statute "shall be construed to abrogate" the Tribe's rights under a
prior treaty and that "all provisions of the said treaty . . . shall be in full force and effect, as
though this agreement had not been made"); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458 (1997)
(9-0 decision) (holding that absent congressional authorization, a tribal court has no civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers on a state highway running through the
Tribe's reservation pursuant to a federally granted right-of-way, without addressing the absence of
any language in the grant expressly divesting the Tribe of such jurisdiction and despite the fact that
the conduct at issue "jeopardize[s] the safety of tribal members"); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234
(1997) (8-1 decision) (striking down as an unconstitutional taking a provision of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act which permitted very small fractionated interests in allotted lands to escheat to
Indian Tribes).
12.
Professor Getches characterizes the Rehnquist Court's tendency to engage in judicial
policymaking when deciding Indian law cases as a "subjectivist trend" that threatens to subvert the
"[b]edrock principles of Indian law . . . [that] left Indian country largely to tribal governance,
except to the extent that Congress expressly extended federal or state jurisdiction or limited tribal
powers." Getches, supra note 3, at 1575, 1654. Professor Getches is careful to note, however,
that this subversive development in Indian law yet may be arrested, since "the newer members of
the Court are in a position to determine whether Indian law is brought back on course with
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harm issuing from the Indian law decisions of the Rehnquist Court seem
well-founded indeed.
This Article analyzes a recent decision of the Supreme Court that
illustrates the enormous destructive power of the Rehnquist Court's peculiar
brand of anti-tribal activism, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 3 Ostensibly,
Coeur d'Alene Tribe is an elaboration of the Court's "pernicious"' 4 and
"'egregiously incorrect""' Eleventh Amendment doctrine-one of the latest
in a series of judicial missteps and "wrong tum[s]" 6 along a perilous road
that the Court itself has paved by means of "misconceived history and
misguided logic' 17 beginning in 1890 with the Court's grossly erroneous
8
post-Reconstruction era decision in Hans v. Louisiana.1
As yet another
badly decided Eleventh Amendment case, Coeur d'Alene Tribe is likely to
heighten the urgency with which Eleventh Amendment scholars have called
for an overruling of Hans '9 to ameliorate the damage that Hans and its
fundamental principles, or whether it will continue as a rudderless exercise in judicial
subjectivism." Id. at 1576.
13.
521 U.S. 261 (1997). For additional discussions of Coeur d'Alene Tribe, see Patricia L.
Barsalou & Scott A. Stengel, Ex parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 455,
487-96 (1998); Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 769-72,
784-91, 814-15, 850-51, 858-59 (1998); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: JurisdictionalSelfDealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407, 408-10, 416-18, 465-87 (1999); Vicki C.
Jackson, Coeur d'Alene, Federal Courts and the Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing
Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 301 (1998);
Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discrimination
Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 49, 60-67 (1998); Elizabeth C. Price,
Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 139, 145-46, 211-14, 221-26 (1998); Carlos Manuel VAzquez, Night and Day:
Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-RetrospectiveDistinction in Eleventh
Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-8, 40-51, 83-94, 100-101 (1998). Except for Professor
Price's article, all of these scholarly discussions are highly critical of Coeur d'Alene Tribe.
14. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15.
Id. at 304 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
16. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (quoting David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 61 (1984)).
17.
Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18.
134 U.S. 1 (1890). For a discussion of Hans, see infra notes 49-70 and accompanying
text.
19. Critics of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine have included the Justices
themselves as well as academic commentators. In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987), Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in an
Eleventh Amendment case expressing the conviction of four Justices that Hans should be overruled:
"[I1t is time to begin a fresh examination of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence without the weight
of that mistaken precedent." Id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.); see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) ("I would accept Respondent Muth's invitation to
overrule Hans v. Louisiana, . . . as that case has been interpreted in this Court's recent
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progeny already have done to the regime of federally protected rights under
the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States-a regime at the core
of the Framers' vision of paramount federal law and essential to securing

true liberty for all Americans in a constitutional democracy.
However, Coeur d'Alene Tribe is not exclusively, or even primarily, a
case about the Supreme Court's profound misconceptions concerning the
Eleventh Amendment and the nature and structure of federalism within the
framework of the United States Constitution. More importantly, Coeur
d'Alene Tribe is a case about the United States government's systematic
betrayal of Indian Tribes and Indian people, and thus it evinces a story of
affliction, duplicity and treachery that is as old and enduring as the United
States government itself.'
And for those observers of American
constitutional law who may be inclined to dismiss the Supreme Court's
Indian law cases as of little importance in the larger scheme of things,2 an

decisions."); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ.) ("IT]he current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting
the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct."); id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
am now persuaded that a fresh examination of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will
produce benefits that far outweigh 'the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of stare
decisis' in this area of the law.") (quoting Florida Dep't of Health, 450 U.S. at 155 (Stevens, J.
concurring)).
As for academic criticism of the Court's Hans-based Eleventh Amendment doctrine, Professor
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez has identified the following partial list of critical books and articles:
CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); JOHN V.
ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN

AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); Amar, supra note 5; David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability
for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033

(1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The
Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260

(1990). See Carlos Manuel Vzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1685 n.7, 1694 n.42 (1997).
20. For an excellent discussion of "legal genocide" as imposed by American law on Indian
Tribes in the nineteenth century, see Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and
Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986).
21. Professor Philip Frickey underscores the importance of acquiring a working knowledge
of Indian law in cultivating an informed understanding of American constitutionalism:
Federal Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law
inhabited by impenetrably complex and dull issues. From the standpoint of
scholarly interest, few areas, if any, are more fundamental to an assessment of
the normative and institutional components of American law. Indeed, federal
Indian law is rooted in the most basic of propositions about the American
constitutional system: it is inescapably the product of both the colonization of
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examination of Coeur d'Alene Tribe should serve as a sobering reminder of
the dire implications for constitutional democracy that necessarily arise
whenever Indian Tribes are made to suffer a great injustice at the hands of
the United States legal system. For, as Felix Cohen pointed out a half
century ago in perhaps the most famous passage in all federal Indian law
scholarship,
the Indian plays much the same role in our American society that
the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the Indian
marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith. 22

II. THE COEUR D ALENE TRIBE LITIGATION IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

A. The Birth and Sudden Death of a Tribe's Request for Justice
The legal dispute that culminated in the Supreme Court's Coeur d'Alene
Tribe decision began in 1991, when the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho and
some of its individual tribal members filed a suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho against the State of Idaho and several state
agencies and officers. 23 The Tribe24 claimed that it retained unextinguished
aboriginal title to the banks and beds of the navigable waterways located
within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation as
established by Executive Order in 1873.26 The Tribe asserted further that
the western hemisphere by European sovereigns and of the corresponding
displacement of indigenous peoples.
Philip S. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 383 (1993).
22. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
23. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Idaho 1992), rev'd in part,
42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
24. Following the convention adopted by the federal district court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
see id., this Article hereinafter refers to the plaintiffs collectively as the "Tribe."
25. The specific submerged lands implicated in the Tribe's claims were the beds and banks of
Lake Coeur d'Alene and of portions of the Coeur d'Alene, St. Joe, and Spokane rivers.
Respondent's Brief at 1, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (No. 94-1474),
available in 1996 WL 380391, at *1-2 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
26. Executive Order of November 8, 1873, Index to the Executive Documents of the House
of Representatives for the Third Session of the Forty-Fifth Congress, 1878-1879, at 266-67,
reprinted in Respondent's Brief, supra note 25, at App. 6.
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pursuant to Congress's acquiescence in the establishment of the reservation,
as well as Congress's subsequent further recognition of the reservation by
statutory enactments, the Tribe was entitled to the exclusive use and
enjoyment of the disputed lands.27 The Tribe asked the federal court to
secure the Tribe's federal rights to these submerged lands by quieting title to
them; declaring them to be for the Tribe's "exclusive use, occupancy, and
enjoyment"; declaring invalid all the defendants' ongoing regulatory actions
purporting to impose state dominion over these submerged lands; and
enjoining Idaho, its agencies and its officers from any further attempts at
regulating these lands and waters or otherwise interfering with the Tribe's
exclusive rights to them. 28
Instead of answering the Tribe's complaint, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,29
arguing that all of the defendants-the State and its agencies, as well as the
individually named state officers-were immune from federal suit pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and thlit the
Tribe had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.3"
Propelled by these initial filings by the parties, the district court proceeded to
give its attention exclusively to the defendants' threshold challenges to the
court's jurisdiction, leaving the substantive allegations in the Tribe's
complaint in a permanently underdeveloped, "preliminary" state for the
duration of the litigation.3' Yet, despite the Tribe's preliminary claims being
27.
See Respondent's Brief, supra note 25, at 29-46; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)
(No. 94-1474), availablein 1996 WL 376983 at *18-21.
28.
See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.
29.
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that "the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . ..(1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter .
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b).
30.
See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.
31.
For a series of exchanges between the Supreme Court Justices and the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's counsel during oral argument concerning the Tribe's frustration for having been denied an
opportunity throughout the litigation adequately to present and develop its claims, see United States
Supreme Court Official Transcript, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)
(No. 94-1474), available in 1996 WL 604993.
One particular exchange demonstrates this
frustration:
QUESTION: . . . Does [the complaint] set forth with any specificity, or do
other pleadings, supplemental pleadings set forth with any specificity exactly
what these officers are doing that is inconsistent with the ownership that you
allege?
MR. GIVENS: The short answer is no, there are no supplemental pleadings,
Your Honor, and that's part of the difficulty of the whole case . . . . [Tihis
case stems from the most preliminary procedures.
Id. at *26-27.
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thus forcibly suspended in a perpetual state of procedural "limbo," neither
the district court nor the Supreme Court subsequently showed any
compunction about condemning the merits of the Tribe's claims while
the Tribe's every effort to present those claims in a
simultaneously blocking
32
form.
developed
B. The District Court Decision
The Federal District Court in Idaho ruled against the Tribe and in favor
of the defendants' motion to dismiss. 3 In concluding that the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe was prohibited as a matter of law from seeking redress in federal court
against the State of Idaho, the state agencies, or the individually named
officers for ongoing violations of the Tribe's federal rights, the district court
divided its analysis into two primary inquiries: (1) whether the Tribe could
sue the State or the state agencies in federal court; and (2) whether the Tribe
could sue the individually named state officers in federal court. To each of
these inquiries, the district court responded in the negative. 34
1. Shielding in Hans/BlatchfordImmunity States' Violations of
Tribes' Federally Protected Rights
The district court first determined that, in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,35 the Tribe's claims
against the State of Idaho and the state agencies were completely barred "by
operation of the Eleventh Amendment."36 In Blatchford, the Supreme Court
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds a complaint filed in federal court
by three Inupiat Indian Villages in Alaska." The Native Villages had alleged
that a state commissioner had engaged in racially discriminatory conduct to
the Villages' detriment by classifying them as "racially exclusive group[s]"
or "racially exclusive organization[s]" and by refusing to deal with them as

32.
For a discussion of this effective condemnation of the merits of the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's claims "at the threshold" by the district court and the Supreme Court, see infra notes 83125 and accompanying text, and notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
33. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1446.
34.
See id. at 1446-52.
35.
501 U.S. 775 (1991).
36.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1448.
37. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 788 (reversing the determination of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals that the Eleventh Amendment affords States no immunity from suits brought by Indian
Tribes).
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The Blatchford Court treated the

Native Villages' allegation that the commissioner's allegedly racially
discriminatory treatment had deprived them of a legislatively authorized

revenue-sharing entitlement as a claim for damages against the State of
Alaska itself, and held that, even assuming Alaska Native Villages are Indian
Tribes for purposes of federal law,39 the Eleventh Amendment nevertheless
"operates to bar suits by Indian tribes against States without their consent. "40
In the Blatchford Court's reasoning, the Native Villages' claim for damages
was prohibited because (1) the Eleventh Amendment implicitly immunizes
States from suits initiated by Indian Tribes; 4' and (2) in specifically

38. Id. at 777-78; see also Brief for Respondent Native Village of Noatak at 1-2, Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (No. 89-1782), available in 1990 WL 505717 at
*1-2. The Supreme Court provided a concise summary of the complex controversy that led to the
Blatchford decision:
In 1980, Alaska enacted a revenue-sharing statute that provided annual
payments of $25,000 to each "Native village government" located in a
community without a state-chartered municipal corporation.
The State's
attorney general believed the statute to be unconstitutional. In his view, Native
village governments were "racially exclusive groups" or "racially exclusive
organizations" whose status turned exclusively on the racial ancestry of their
members; therefore, the attorney general believed, funding these groups would
violate the equal protection clause of Alaska's Constitution. Acting on the
attorney general's advice, the Commissioner of Alaska's Department of
Community and Regional Affairs . . . enlarged the program to include all

unincorporated communities, whether administered by Native governments or
not....

The legislature repealed the revenue-sharing statute in 1985, and replaced
it with one that matched the program as expanded by the commissioner. In the
same year, respondent[] [Native Villages] filed this suit, challenging the
commissioner's action on federal equal protection grounds, and seeking an
order requiring the commissioner to pay them the money that they would have
received had the commissioner not enlarged the program.
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777-78 (citations omitted).
39. In that portion of the majority opinion discussing whether suits against States brought by
Indian Tribes generally are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court did not address the issue
of whether Alaska Native Villages are Indian Tribes. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775-82.
However, in its subsequent discussion of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1362 constitutes either a
congressional delegation to Indian Tribes of the United States' exemption from the "bar" of the
Eleventh Amendment, or else a congressional abrogation of the States' immunity from suits brought
by Tribes, the Court wrote, in a footnote: "Because we find that § 1362 does not enable tribes to
overcome Alaska's sovereign immunity, we express no view on whether these respondents qualify
as 'tribes' within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 788 n.5.
40. Id. at 782-83.
41. See id. at 781-82. The Court asserted that "with regard to Indian tribes, there is no
compelling evidence that the Founders thought . . . a surrender [of state sovereign immunity]
inherent in the constitutional compact." Id. at 781. The Blatchford Court also posited the
following Eleventh Amendment doctrine rationale, repeated by the district court in the

31:787]

SANCTIONING A TYRANNY

799

authorizing federal jurisdiction over "all civil actions, brought by any Indian
tribe . . . wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States," 42 Congress did not thereby abrogate
"by a clear legislative statement" the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.43
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, Justice

Blackmun criticized the Blatchford majority for "compound[ing] the error of
Hans v. Louisiana . . . and its progeny" by expanding, to include Indian
Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation, for preventing foreign nations and Indian Tribes from suing States in
federal court, while permitting States to sue one another in federal court:
What makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit plausible is the
mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with either foreign
sovereigns or Indian tribes . ...
[I]f the convention could not surrender the
tribes' immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it
surrendered the States' immunity for the benefit of the tribes.
Id. at 782; see also Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1447. This "mutuality of concession"
rationale for subjecting States-notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment doctrine-to federal court
suits brought by other States stands in sharp contrast to the rationale for this exemption as put
forward in South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904), the only case cited by Justice
Scalia for the existence of the exemption. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782. In South Dakota, the
Supreme Court, quoting from Chief Justice Marshall, indicated that the reason federal courts may
have jurisdiction over suits brought by States against other States, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, is that such jurisdiction "might be essential to the preservation of peace."
South Dakota, 192 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821)).
In the brief it submitted to the Supreme Court, Circle Village provided additional argumentation
for doubting the validity of what emerged from Blatchford as a revisionist quid-pro-quo rationale
for recognizing federal court jurisdiction over suits against States brought by other States, but not
by Indian Tribes:
[The states surrendered a portion of their historic sovereignty upon admission
to the Union. Part of that surrender involved a surrender of such immunity as
necessary to permit suits by and among the states and federal government to
resolve controversies in a manner consistent with the essential need for the
peace of the Union....
Similarly, upon association with the Union, Indian tribes either
surrendered or involuntarily lost a portion of their historic sovereignty. Unlike
the states, however, the tribes entered the Union upon decidedly unequal
terms. . . . In this day and age the suggestion that Indian tribes must resort to
war to seek redress of their complaints is simply bad policy and contrary to the
peace of the Union. It therefore follows that Indians should have redress of
their political rights in disinterested forums for the same reasons that the
state[s] have such access.
Brief for Respondent Circle Village, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775
(No. 89-1782), availablein 1990 WL 505716 at *41 (citations omitted).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
43.
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786; see also id. (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228
(1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) ("[Section] 1362
does not reflect an 'unmistakably clear' intent to abrogate immunity, made plain 'in the language of
the statute.'").
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Tribes, the classes of plaintiffs "implicitly" prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment from suing States in federal court." Justice Blackmun further
denounced the Blatchford majority for deploying against Indian Tribes the
Court's newly invented "clear statement rule," which denies the
effectiveness of congressional abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity unless Congress declares its intent to abrogate in the text of a
statute. 5 Quoting from a dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan in a previous
case, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the "clear statement rule" functions
as a "hurdle[ ] designed to keep . . . disfavored suits out of the federal
courts. "46

As Justice Blackmun recognized, the Court's decision in Blatchford to
immunize lawbreaking conduct by the States from accountability in federal
court via suits initiated by Indian Tribes was an exacerbation of the Hans
Court's essentially flawed and politically motivated interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment in 1890. 47 While a detailed exploration of Hans is
beyond the scope of the present Article, a brief discussion of the meaning of
Hans will help underscore the gravity attending the Rehnquist Court's
elaboration of the Hans doctrine in modem Indian law cases. For the
crosscurrents represented by the Rehnquist Court's aggrandizement of its
ersatz Eleventh Amendment doctrine48 together with its subversion of the
Court's own historic Indian law jurisprudence give rise to ominous
44. Id. at 789-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
45.
See id. at 790-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Blatchford majority opinion implies
that there is authority for the "clear statement rule" from as early as the Court's decision in
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786. However, as a rule requiring that
"evidence of congressional intent [to abrogate state sovereign immunity] must be both unequivocal
and textual," Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added), the rule was not invented until the
Rehnquist Court's Dellmuth decision in 1989. Moreover, both Atascadero and Dellmuth-like
virtually every Eleventh Amendment decision of the modem Supreme Court, including
Coeur d'Alene Tribe-sharply divided the Court, with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens filing or joining dissenting opinions in both cases. See supra note 19.
46. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 790 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
254 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47.
See id. at 789-90 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
48. Justice Stevens has referred to the Supreme Court's "two Eleventh Amendments," the
first one enacted by the ratifiers and adopters of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and the second one an ill-conceived product of the Court's own "Hans immunity"
doctrine:
It is important to emphasize the distinction between our two Eleventh
Amendments. There is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain
language of the Eleventh Amendment ....
In addition, there is the defense of
sovereign immunity that the Court has added to the text of the Amendment in
cases like Hans ....
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by
Seminole Tribe 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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implications for accelerating the erosion of core principles of federal Indian
law. Indeed, the crosscurrents so starkly manifested in both Blatchford and
Coeur d'Alene Tribe threaten the ability of the United States Constitution to
protect the American people from tyranny emanating from state governments
and state officials. With so much at stake for Indian people and non-Indians
alike in the Rehnquist Court's exacerbation of Hans, appreciating the
implications of this case becomes all the more important for Americans

today, more than a century after that jurisprudential fiasco was inaugurated.
In Hans, the Supreme Court decided that the United States Constitution
insulates a resisting State from being sued in federal court by a citizen of that
same State for allegedly violating that citizen's federal rights. 9 The Hans
Court characterized this proposition for sanctioning illegal state action as a
logically necessary implication of the Eleventh Amendment, 50 which had
been ratified and made part of the Constitution a century earlier. 5 ' However,
there is a more accurate way to understand the Amendment.
In its entirety, the Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
52
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
49.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Bradley purported to discern in the Constitution a
rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of
individuals" and to "declare [the rule's] existence." Hans, 134 U.S. at 21. In a brief concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan clarified the majority opinion as "holding that a suit directly against a state
by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial power of the United States extends." Id.
(Harlan, J., concurring).
50.
The Hans Court insisted that unless the Eleventh Amendment were read as protecting a
State from a federal question suit brought by a citizen of that same State,
we should have this anomalous result, that in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal
courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action
by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in
the federal courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.
Id. at 10.
51.
Professor John Orth elaborates on the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, as
prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
discussed infra at note 58. Professor Orth writes:
Because of delays, judgment for Chisholm was not entered until
February 14, 1794. By March 4, 1794, Congress by two-thirds majorities in
both houses had proposed the amendment, and by February, 1795, the
legislatures of three-fourths of the states had ratified it.
Although the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution, article V, were then satisfied, the
President did not notify Congress that the amendment was in effect until
January 8, 1798. The latter date is the one commonly given for ratification.
John V. Orth, The Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial
Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 428 n.41 (1983) (citations omitted).
52.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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There is nothing in the text of the Eleventh Amendment that could be read as
generally limiting the power of federal courts to hear suits against States (or
any other defendants) accused of violating federal law-a power expressly
granted the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution. 3 Rather, a
literal or "plain meaning" interpretation of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is that the Amendment ensures only that a State cannot be sued
in federal court by either (1) a "Citizen[] of another State," or (2) a
"Citizen[ I or Subject[ ] of [a] Foreign State," i.e., an alien.54 Moreover,
since this language closely tracks the grants of such "state-citizen diversity"
and "state-alien diversity" jurisdiction under Article II, it is reasonable to
conclude that the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment intended nothing
more than to require that those specific diversity clauses be construed to
confer federal jurisdiction only where the State is plaintiff.5 6
The
Amendment's precisely targeted instruction for construing the state-citizen
and state-alien diversity clauses leaves untouched and intact all the other,
independent heads of federal jurisdiction available under Article IIIincluding, of course, that most important type of subject matter jurisdiction
known as federal question jurisdiction."

53.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. The Constitution's grant of federal question or
"arising under" jurisdiction to the federal courts consists of the following language from Article III:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.. . ." Id.

54. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see supra text accompanying note 52.
55. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XI, quoted in full supra at text accompanying note 52,
with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1 (granting the respective types of diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts by means of the following language: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies .. .between a State and Citizens of another State

. .

.and between a State

...

and

foreign.. .Citizens or Subjects.").
56. For elaboration on the "diversity explanation" of the Eleventh Amendment, see, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76-100 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100-68
(Souter, J., dissenting); Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,
483 U.S. 468, 504-16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 258-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Fletcher, supra note 19 at
1130 (suggesting "that the adopters of the [Eleventh] amendment originally had the more modest
purpose of requiring that the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts only when a state sued an out-of-state citizen"); Gibbons, supra
note 19,at 2004 (urging "astrict construction of the eleventh amendment . . . that takes full account
of its text and actual legislative history," and thus "acknowledge[s] that the eleventh amendment
applies only to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depends solely upon party status"

rather than the assertion of a federal question).
57.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1; supra note 53.
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Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of this "diversity" view of the
Eleventh Amendment's meaning,58 the Hans Court chose instead to proclaim
the existence of a new and expansive immunity insulating States from
accountability in federal court for violating their own citizens' federal
rights. 59 Specifically, the Hans Court granted the State of Louisiana
immunity, under the Eleventh Amendment, from federal suit by a Louisiana
citizen for nonpayment of state bonds in violation of his federal rights under
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. Although the Hans
Court purported to deduce this immunity directly from the contents of the
Eleventh Amendment,' the advent of this so-called "Hans immunity"61 is
58.
William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1989). As Professor Fletcher and others have pointed
out, this "diversity explanation" of the Eleventh Amendment's meaning is particularly compelling
in view of the historic origin of the Amendment as a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). In Chisholm, the Court construed the grants of
federal jurisdiction under Article III as permitting the Supreme Court to hear a suit brought by a
citizen of South Carolina alleging a state common law violation by the State of Georgia. See id. at
420-21. Chisholm, in other words, was strictly a state-citizen diversity case-not a federal question
case-since the plaintiff in Chisholm asserted only a state-law cause of action. See id. at 429-30
(Iredell, J. dissenting) (pointing out that "[tihe action is an action for assumpsit"). Hence, the
Eleventh Amendment, as a reaction to the Chisholm Court's controversial affirmation of
constitutional power for a federal court to adjudicate a state-law-based suit raised against a State by
a citizen of a different State, presumably was drafted to effectuate a narrow overturning of
Chisholm by specifically forbidding federal courts from ever again hearing such a suit premised
strictly on the grant of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction under Article II. As Professor Fletcher
suggests,
Under this interpretation, the adopters of the amendment were following the
traditions of common law lawyers in solving only the problem in front of them
by requiring a limiting construction of the state-citizen diversity clause....
[Tihe adopters did not intend it to prohibit a broad range of cases with which
they had so far had little or no experience and as to many of which they could
then have had little clear idea.
Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1063.
59. The Hans Court purported to rely on Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm in
inventing this new sanction for state defiance of federal law:
[O]n this question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest
authority of this country was in accord rather with the minority than with the
majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and
this fact lends additional interest to the able opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell on
that occasion.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890). Ironically, Justice Iredell had insisted in his Chisholm
dissent that "the application of law, not the making of it, is the sole province of the Court."
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
For an excerpt from the Hans Court's avowed rationale, see supra note 50. Professor
60.
Fletcher points out that an obvious flaw of logic in the Hans Court's effort to avoid the "anomalous
result" of a State being subjected to federal question suits if brought by state citizens while being
insulated from such suits if brought by citizens of other States is the Court's presumption of its
conclusion-that the Eleventh Amendment addresses federal questions suits. See Fletcher, supra
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properly explained in terms of certain covert political pressures influencing
the Court's jurisprudence in post-Reconstruction America of the late
nineteenth century. In his dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,62
Justice Souter reflected on the era-specific politics that spawned the advent of
Hans immunity:
Hans was one episode in a long story of debt repudiation by the
States of the former Confederacy after the end of Reconstruction.
The turning point in the States' favor came with the Compromise
of 1877, when the Republican Party agreed effectively to end
Reconstruction and to withdraw federal troops from the South in
return for Southern acquiescence in the decision of the Electoral
Commission that awarded the disputed 1876 presidential election to
Rutherford B. Hayes. The troop withdrawal, of course, left the
federal judiciary "effectively without power to resist the rapidly
coalescing repudiation movement." Contract Clause suits like the
one brought by Hans thus presented this Court with "a draconian
choice between repudiation of some of its most inviolable
constitutional doctrines and the humiliation of seeing its political
authority compromised as its judgments met the resistance of
hostile state governments."

.

. . Given the likelihood that a

judgment against the State could not be enforced, it is not wholly

note 19, at 1060-61. In this regard, Professor Fletcher suggests how common sense provides a
.way out" of the obfuscation that the Hans Court has infused into the Eleventh Amendment:
If one reads the amendment literally, and if one assumes it was intended to
forbid federal question suits, one is led to the following unlikely result: All
suits brought against a state by an out-of-state citizen are prohibited regardless
of the existence of a federal question, but at the same time any suit brought
against a state by a citizen of that state is permitted, provided a federal question
exists. This result appears so unlikely that one must suspect the adopters did
not intend the amendment to prohibit federal question suits against the states,
for if this was their intent they would have prohibited suits by all private
citizens, not merely those by out-of-state citizens.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Likewise, in his Seminole Tribe dissent, Justice Souter criticized the Hans
Court's "logic" as follows:
The Court rested its opinion on avoiding the supposed anomaly of recognizing
jurisdiction to entertain a citizen's federal question suit, but not one brought by
a noncitizen. There was, however, no such anomaly at all. . . . [F]ederalquestion cases are not touched by the Eleventh Amendment, which leaves a
State open to federal-question suits by citizens and noncitizens alike.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 119 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
61. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 126 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
.many ... [Supreme Court] opinions . . . have suggested that the Hans immunity is not of
constitutional stature").
62. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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surprising that the Hans63Court found a way to avoid the certainty
of the State's contempt.

Thus viewed in light of American legal and political history,' Hans
immunity stands exposed, not only as a reflection of grave deficiencies in the
Supreme Court's logical reasoning and conceptual appreciation of the

Constitution's textual and structural guarantees of federal supremacy, but
also as an ignoble capitulation by the Court to base political pressures
presumably emanating from-to borrow Alexander Hamilton's phrase"[t]he most bigoted idolizers of State authority. "65
Despite these problems manifested in the judicial creation of the doctrine
of Hans immunity in 1890, the Supreme Court since that time has refused to
repudiate this device for countenancing state violations of federal law. On
the contrary, the Court periodically has infused Hans immunity with even
greater destructive potency and reach. Thus, in 1921, the Court extended
Hans immunity to insulate States from accountability in federal court for
violating the rights of individuals asserted in federal admiralty proceedings.6
And in 1934, the Court again extended Hans immunity to shield States from
63. Id. at 120-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Gibbons, supra note 19,
at 1974, 1981).
64.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court majority in Seminole Tribe expressed disdain for Justice
Souter's efforts at illuminating the political and historical dimensions of the Court's 1890 Hans
decision, lambasting Souter's critique as an "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal
explanation of the decision in Hans" and "a disservice to the Court's traditional method of
adjudication." Id. at 68-69. In response, Justice Souter defended his analysis of the political and
historical events bearing on the Hans decision by pointing out that "it is just because Hans is so
utterly indefensible on the merits of its legal analysis that one is forced to look elsewhere in order to
understand how the Court could have gone so far wrong." Id. at 122-23 n.17 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
65.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton used the phrase to stress the importance of the Constitution's extension of federal judicial
power "[t]o cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Id. at 480. As Hamilton put it, "[t]he
most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national
judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes." Id. at 478.
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the universally understood importance of the
Constitution's authorization of federal jurisdiction over admiralty proceedings-an issue which,
according to Hamilton, "seems scarcely to admit of controversy," id. at 475-the Supreme Court in
1921 extended its Hans immunity doctrine to insulate States even from federal court actions
sounding in admiralty. See Ex parte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921) ("[Ilt seems to
us equally clear that [the Eleventh Amendment] cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a
suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its own citizens or not.").
However, in the recent case of California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., the Court appears to have
withdrawn a portion of its presumed conferral of Hans immunity in admiralty cases, perhaps in
strategic preparation for a collateral withdrawal of Ex parte Young relief with respect to any case in
which state officials are in possession of property to which a plaintiff asserts colorable title under
federal law. 523 U.S. 491 (1998); see also infra notes 234-74 and accompanying text.
66.
See Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). But see supra note 65.
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federal court suits brought by foreign nations as distinguished from
individuals. 67 The Court's 1991 Blatchford decision constituted yet another
entrenchment of the error-laden Hans immunity doctrine, with the Court
"compound[ing] the error of Hans . . . and its progeny by extending the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity to bar suits by tribal entities, which are
neither 'Citizens of another State,' nor 'Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.' "68 Hence, with this broad shield of immunity from federal suits by
Indian Tribes recently fashioned in Blatchford,69 the federal district court in
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation was freshly licensed to view itself as
bound by precedent to "find[ ] that this action is completely barred as against

67. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In Monaco, the
Principality of Monaco argued that federal jurisdiction over that foreign nation's claim against the
State of Mississippi for nonpayment of state bonds was available under the Constitution's extension
of federal judicial power "to Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign States," see

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 320-21. The Monaco Court rejected
that argument: "As to suits brought by a foreign State, we think that the States of the Union retain
the same immunity that they enjoy with respect to suits by individuals whether citizens of the United
States or citizens or subjects of a foreign State." Id. at 330.
68. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 789-90 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
69. In fact, the Blatchford decision was doubly instrumental in effectively sanctioning state
violations of Indian Tribes' federal rights, including the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's federally protected
rights to submerged lands within reservation boundaries. For, as mentioned previously, see supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text, in addition to holding that the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment
"state sovereign immunity," as invented in Hans, attaches generally when an Indian Tribe sues a
State in federal court, the Blatchford majority also held that in expressly conferring federal court
jurisdiction over "all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe . . . wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1994), Congress thereby did not intend to abrogate the States' Hans immunity with respect to
actions brought by Indian Tribes, since the text of Section 1362 fails to qualify as an abrogation of
that immunity under the "clear statement rule" that the Court had announced two years before the
Blatchford decision, in Delbnuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at
786-88; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Blatchford dissent, the Court's cavalier application of
this "clear statement rule" in the context of Tribe-State disputes on the unremarkable premise that
"Congress does not casually alter the 'balance of power' between the Federal Government and the
States" is especially troubling. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 790 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For, as
Blackmun noted,
in this area, the pertinent "balance of power" is between the Federal
Government and the tribes, with the States playing only a subsidiary role.
Because spheres of activity otherwise susceptible to state regulation are,
"according to the settled principles of our Constitution . . . committed

exclusively to the government of the Union" where Native American affairs
are concerned, the presumptions underlying the clear-statement rule, and thus
the rule itself, have no place in interpreting statutes pertaining to the tribes.
Id. at 792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)).
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the State of Idaho itself, as well as its agencies, by operation of the Eleventh
Amendment. "70
2. Rendering Irrebuttable Montana's Erroneous Rebuttable
Presumption
While the district court apparently found itself compelled by Hans and
Blatchford to dismiss the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's efforts to seek a federal
court remedy against Idaho and its agencies for the State's allegedly illegal
appropriation of the Tribe's property, the court assumed a decidedly more
activist posture in dismissing the Tribe's claims against the defendant state
officials, who the Tribe alleged were engaged in an ongoing violation of
federal law by regulating submerged lands committed to the Tribe's
exclusive ownership and use by a combination of federal executive and
congressional action. 7 As the court recognized, suits brought in federal
court for prospective relief against state officials who violate federal law long
have been understood as permitted under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,72
even where Hans immunity is deemed to have placed the State itself beyond
federal court accountability. 73 Thus the district court intimated that under the
Young doctrine, "a federal court may issue an injunction to prohibit a state
official from violating federal law," and that "such an injunction may govern
an official's future conduct, but may not attempt to award retroactive
relief."74 In reaching its extreme conclusion that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
may not seek any relief in federal court under the Young doctrine for the
alleged ongoing violation of the Tribe's federally protected rights by Idaho
officials, the district court distinguished and analyzed separately the Tribe's
claims for (1) declaratoryrelief and (2) injunctive relief.75
The district court determined that the Tribe's claims against Idaho
officials for declaratoryrelief were beyond the court's jurisdiction because of
the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment-i.e., that the Tribe
would not be permitted to pursue these claims in federal court pursuant to the
70. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Idaho 1992). The district
court did not address the Tribe's further contention that, assuming States are generally immune
from suits brought in federal court by Indian Tribes, and assuming further that Congress did not

abrogate such immunity, the Tribe nevertheless could proceed to the merits of its federal court
claim against Idaho since Idaho waived its immunity. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d

1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994); see also infra note 131 and accompanying text.
71.
72.
73.

See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.

74.
75.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1448.
See id. at 1448-52.
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Young doctrine because the declaratory relief sought by the Tribe was, in
effect, retrospective rather than prospective in nature.76 Quoting from a 1985
Supreme Court opinion reflecting the prevailing trend of modem Court
decisions narrowing the scope of relief available under Young, the district
court reiterated that "declaratory relief is impermissible where such relief
would 'have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or
restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.' 77 With respect to the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's claims, the district court held that
the declaratory relief sought by the Tribe would have the same
effect as an award of damages or restitution by the court, which is
not allowed under the Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]he Tribe is
essentially attempting to execute an "end run" around the rule in
Edelman v. Jordan... which prohibits suits in federal court
against state officials for money damages or the equivalent, under
78
the Eleventh Amendment.
By thus characterizing the Tribe's request for declaratory relief against the
defendant Idaho officials as "essentially" a claim for "money damages or the
equivalent," the district court concluded that-as with the Tribe's claims
against the State itself-"the claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet
title against the
individual state officials also are barred by the Eleventh
79
Amendment. ,
Having relied on the modem Supreme Court's expansion of Hans
immunity to dismiss all the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims against Idaho and
its agencies, and having characterized the Tribe's quiet title action and
request for declaratory judgment against the defendant state officials as
"really" claims for retrospective relief forbidden, as such, under the
expanded Hans immunity doctrine, the federal district court next addressed
the question whether the Tribe's remaining claims for injunctive relief
against the state officers could be maintained in federal court.8' The court's
answer was that even as to the requested injunctive relief-that is, even as to
the Tribe's legal efforts to prevent Idaho officials from continuing to violate

76.
77.
(1985)).
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 1448-49.
Id. at 1448 (internal quotation marks added) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73
Id. (citation omitted) (adverting to Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
Id. at 1448-49.
See id. at 1449-52.
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the Tribe's federal rights in the future-the Tribe's suit must be dismissed
summarily from federal court as a matter of law."
As it did with the Tribe's claims for declaratory relief, the district court
characterized the Tribe's claims for injunctive relief against the defendant
Idaho officials as falling outside the reach of federal court jurisdiction
permitted pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.' Here, however, the
district court considered the Tribe's claims for Young relief flawed, not
because those claims were deemed to be retrospective rather than prospective
in nature, but because, in the court's estimation, the Tribe did not and could
not sufficiently allege that the defendant state officials in fact were violating
federal law-a requirement for accessing the federal courts under the Young
doctrine .83 In the blunt judgment of the court-a judgment necessarily
devoid of illumination or support from any developed evidentiary record,
since no such record as yet existed at this stage of the litigation'-"the State
of Idaho has been in rightful possession of all of the lands and waters at issue
in this case since it entered the Union in 1890. " 5
This remarkable fiat of the federal district court in Idaho-this summary
condemnation, in the name of a threshold jurisdictional determination, of the
merits of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's preliminary and yet-to-be-developed
request for injunctive relief-was, in essence, an attempt to expand a flawed
ruling from one of the most corrosive decisions in all federal Indian law
jurisprudence, the 1981 Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United
States.8 6 The Montana Court addressed the question, inter alia, of whether
the Crow Tribe owned the bed of the Big Horn River within the boundaries
of the Crow Reservation in Montana. 7 Despite language from the Fort
81.
See id. at 1452 ("[T]he Tribe is not entitled to an injunction against the individual
defendants in either their official or individual capacities.").
82.
See id. at 1449 (denying Young relief because the Tribe failed to "show that the
injunction is necessary to prevent the state officials from continuing to violate rights secured and
protected by federal law").
83.
See id. (asserting that the Tribe's claims for injunctive relief against Idaho officials were
without foundation" by force of "the court's finding . . . that . . . these state officials are not
violating any federal law").
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
84.
85.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1452.
86.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
87.
See id. at 547. In addition to ruling on the ownership of the on-reservation segment of

the Big Horn River, the Montana Court rendered a second holding that likewise has impaired tribal
sovereignty. Concluding that the Crow Tribe lacked inherent authority "to regulate non-Indian
fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe," id. at 557, the
Court stated:
[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express delegation. ...
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Laramie Treaty of 1868 solemnly promising "that the reservation 'shall
be ...set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation' of the
Crow Tribe,' '"8 the Supreme Court voted six to three in favor of the
conclusion "that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of

Montana upon its admission into the Union" in 1889.89
In rationalizing what was, in effect, a judicial assignment to the State of
Montana of Indian reservation lands expressly protected under a federal
treaty for the Crow Tribe's exclusive ownership and use, the Montana Court
inserted an unprecedented fiction into the field of federal Indian law: that
even with respect to an Indian reservation specially set apart by the United
States during the territorial period as an exclusive homeland for an Indian
Tribe, a "strong presumption" exists that all the navigable lakes, rivers and
other watercourses within the boundaries of such reservation were not
included as a part of the reservation, but instead were held continuously by
the United States alone, acting as trustee for future States, for automatic
conveyance to a State at the moment the State entered the Union.'
This
"strong presumption," the Montana Court posited, is compelled by the
judicially created "equal footing doctrine": "[T]he ownership of land under
navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty. As a general principle, the
Federal Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be granted
. .m
The inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate...
the activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members ..

.

. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise

civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Id. at 564-66 (citations omitted). With this language, the Montana Court subverted the core
principle of Indian law that Indian Tribes retain all sovereign authority except for what is expressly
divested, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 7 § 1, at 122 (1942 ed.)

("What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty."). In place of that
principle, the Montana Court erected the antithetical presumption that, with respect to nonmembers'
activities within reservation boundaries, Indian Tribes lack all authority except for what is expressly
granted. This presumption is rooted in the conviction "that Indian tribes cannot exercise power
inconsistent with their diminished status." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. Hence, both of these
"Montana presumptions"-the one described in this note, and the one discussed infra at notes 90111 and accompanying text-are projections of anti-tribal prejudice that operate to erode tribal
sovereignty for the benefit of the States.
88. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548 (quoting from the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7,
1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 649, 650).
89. Id. at 556-57.
90. See id. at 551-52 ("A court deciding a question of title to the bed of navigable water
must ...

begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the United States . .

").
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to such States when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an
'equal footing' with the established States." 9' By force of this "general
principle," according to the Montana Court, federal instruments of the
nineteenth century establishing Indian reservations must be construed in light
of a "strong presumption" that those reservations did not include any of the
navigable waterways enclosed within reservation boundaries.' Applying this
"strong presumption" in its analysis of the Crow Tribe's treaty-based rights,
the Montana majority concluded that "[tihe Crow treaties in this
case ... fail to overcome the established presumption that the beds of
navigable waters remain in trust for future States and pass to the new States
when they assume sovereignty.""
But the Montana Court's declaration of the existence of this "strong
presumption" in favor of States' claims to submerged lands located within
the boundaries of Indian reservations represents a projection of multiple
prejudices and errors in the Court's analysis. For instance, the Montana
Court erred in suggesting that any such general "presumption" existed at all
during the nineteenth century, so as to function as a kind of States' rights
"backdrop" for the federal government's pre-statehood disposals of
submerged lands. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "[tihere
is no evidence . . . that the presumption against pre-statehood federal grants
of land under navigable waters had been established" prior to the Court's
first articulation of that "presumption" in 1926." 4 Indeed, the Court's early
submerged lands/"equal footing doctrine" cases of Martin v. Waddell
(1842) 9' and Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan (1845) 96-cases the Montana Court

91.

Id. at 551 (citations omitted).

92. See id. at 552-53.
93. Id. at 553.
94. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 961 n.27 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)). The Ninth Circuit pointed
out that "the earliest statement of the presumption appeared [in Holt in 1926]: '[D]isposals [of
submerged lands] by the United States during the territorial period are not lightly to be inferred,
and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise

made very plain.'"

Id. (quoting Holt, 270 U.S. at 55) (first alteration in original).

But, as

explained infra at note 111, Holt itself involved only a post-statehood disposal of submerged lands
by the federal government, notwithstanding the Holt Court's erroneous belief, apparently, that a
pre-statehood disposal of submerged lands was at issue in that case., Hence, the Supreme Court's

first articulation in 1926 of its general "presumption" favoring state ownership of submerged lands
located within the boundaries of pre-statehood federal disposals of land was, in essence, nothing
more than misplaced dicta.
95.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (holding that private land located in New Jersey that
originally had been granted via a 17th century British royal charter to the Duke of York in his
political capacity gave the successor no title to the enclosed land underlying navigable waters,

which title instead was retained by the British Crown as an incident of sovereignty and passed to the
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relied on in insisting, in effect, that the Court's "strong presumption"
favoring state ownership of on-reservation submerged lands was at large
during nineteenth century negotiations between Indian Tribes and the federal
government9-in fact did not involve pre-statehood disposals of submerged
lands at all. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, those cases
do not articulate any presumption concerning federal grants of land
under navigable waters before a state is admitted to the Union.
That presumption is said to flow from the "equal footing
doctrine"-that new states enter the Union on an equal footing with
the original states, all of which entered the Union owning the land
under navigable waters within their borders. But Pollard'sLessee
v. Hagan, generally regarded as the source of the equal footing
doctrine, dealt with a purported federal grant of land years after
Alabama had been admitted to the Union. And Martin v. Waddell,
cited for the proposition that ownership of the land under navigable
waters is an incident of sovereignty, involved land in one of the
original thirteen states. The case required "clear and especial
words" in a patent by the English Crown to a private individual
because such a patent would transform a portion of the public
domain into the individual's private property. The requirement
was explicitly characterized as dictum. Moreover, the underlying
rationale for this requirement is of doubtful relevance to a
reservation of land by a sovereign Indian tribe. Such a reservation
does not, properly speaking, involve a "grant" of public land. Nor
does it convert public domain into an individual's private
property_98
State of New Jersey when the American colonies became sovereign States at the advent of the
American Revolution).
96.
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) (holding that a federal land grant executed poststatehood to an individual did not include the lands below navigable waters, title to which had

passed previously to Alabama, when Alabama was admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with
the original [thirteen] States").
97. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 551.
98. Namen, 665 F.2d at 961 n.27 (citations omitted). As the Namen court pointed out, the
passage in Waddell suggesting a requirement that a grant from a sovereign to an individual of lands
underlying navigable waters must contain "clear and especial words" in order to be construed as
conveying title to those lands was strictly dictum. See id. Thus, the Waddell Court wrote:
Neither is it necessary to examine the many cases . . . [that] show the

degree of strictness with which grants of the king are to be construed. The
decisions and authorities referred to apply more properly to a grant of some
prerogative right to an individual to be held by him as a franchise, and which is
intended to become private property in his hands. The dominion and property
in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, being held by the king as a
public trust, the grant to an individual of an exclusive fishery in any portion of
it, is so much taken from the common fund intrusted to his care for the
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In view of the fact that the Supreme Court did not posit the existence of a
general "presumption" in favor of States' rights to navigable waterways
within pre-statehood federal disposals of land until 1926, the Montana
Court's assertion that "Congress was . . . aware of this presumption once it
was established by this Court" 99 can mean only that Congress entertained no
such "presumption" sixty years earlier, when the Fort Laramie Treaty
establishing the Crow Reservation was negotiated and ratified. Hence, it was

error for the Montana Court to make any such "presumption" controlling in
the Court's adjudication of the ownership of submerged lands located within
the boundaries of the Crow Reservation as established by treaty in 1868,
more than two decades before Montana became a State.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's invention and application of its "Montana
presumption" for depriving Indian tribes of on-reservation submerged lands
is radically inconsistent with Worcester v. Georgia,"° the foundational Indian
law decision prohibiting the operation of state law within the boundaries of
federally protected Indian lands. In Worcester, the Supreme Court rebuked
the State of Georgia for purporting to abolish legislatively the government of
the Cherokee Nation and distribute Cherokee sovereign lands-upon which
gold had been discovered-among five Georgia counties. ° The Court
common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant, still
remains in the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.
Grants of that description are therefore construed strictly-and it will not be
presumed that he intended to part from any portion of the public domain,
unless clear and especial words are used to denote it.
The questions upon this charter are very different ones. They are:
Whether the dominion and propriety in the navigable waters, and in the soils
under them, passed as a part of the prerogative rights annexed to the political
powers conferred on the [Diuke [of York]? . . .[in deciding a question like
this, we must not look merely to the strict technical meaning of the words of the
letters patent. . . .It is not a deed conveying private property to be interpreted
by the rules applicable to cases of that description. It was an instrument upon
which was to be founded the institutions of a great political community; and in
that light it should be regarded and construed.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411-12 (emphases added).
99.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 552 n.2. Significantly, the Montana majority opinion gives no
indication of when "this presumption" was "established by this Court." Id.; see also Namen,
665 U.S. at 961 n.27. Moreover, this failure to indicate when the purported "presumption" became
.established by this Court" is effectively exacerbated by Justice Stewart's provision of no dates for
any of the cases referenced in the majority opinion. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544-67.
100. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
101. See id. at 539. As reproduced by Chief Justice Marshall, one of the Georgia statutes at
issue was
entitled an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power, by all
persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians, and their laws,
and to prevent white persons from residing within that part of the chartered
limits of Georgia occupied by the Cherokee Indians, and to provide a guard for

814
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grounded its repudiation of Georgia's attempted confiscation of Cherokee
lands in the "universal conviction" that lands located within the territorial
boundaries of Indian nations, as described and protected pursuant to
instruments of federal law, are lands over which States have no jurisdiction
at all: "The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian
territory as completely separatedfrom that of the states; and provide that all
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of
the union."'02 Applying this foundational principle of federal Indian law
prohibiting the operation of state law within the boundaries of federally
protected Indian lands, the Court upbraided Georgia for attempting to defy
and subvert
the universal conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full
right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be
extinguished by the United States, with their consent: that their
territory was separated from that of any state within whose
chartered limits they might reside, by a boundary line, established
by treaties: that, within their boundary, they possessed rights with
which no state could interfere; and that the whole power of
regulating the intercourse with them was vested in the United
States. 0 3
With its strong condemnation of Georgia's attempted seizure of Cherokee
lands and destruction of Cherokee sovereignty thus recently announced, the
Supreme Court in 1842 doubtless understood its dictum in Waddellsuggesting that land grants from a sovereign to an individual should not be
construed as including public domain lands "unless clear and especial words
are used to denote" such inclusionl°4-as inapplicable to the resolution of title
disputes involving lands, submerged or otherwise, located within the
boundaries of federally protected Indian territories, i.e., lands specifically
safeguarded, as such, from any "state sovereignty"-based claims to those
federally protected areas. Likewise, in invoking an "equal footing doctrine"
rationale in Pollard'sLessee for favoring the claims of States other than the
original thirteen States to submerged lands alleged to have been granted postthe protection of the gold mines, and to enforce the laws of the state within the
aforesaid territory.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Marshall elaborated that "the acts of the legislature of
Georgia seize on the whole Cherokee country, parcel it out among the neighbouring counties of the
state, extend her code over the whole country, abolish its institutions and its laws, and annihilate its
political existence." Id. at 542.
102. Id. at 557, 560 (emphasis added).

103. Id. at 560.
104. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842); see also supra notes 95, 98.
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statehood to individuals by the federal government, °5 the Supreme Court in
1845 surely would have accepted that rationale as leading inexorably to the
conclusion, in light of Worcester, that submerged lands located within the
boundaries of federally protected Indian reservations are, consistent with the
"equal footing doctrine," entirely free from "state sovereignty"-based claims
of title asserted by late-entering States-just as the Cherokee Nation's
federally protected lands were free from the "state sovereignty"-based claims
asserted by Georgia, one of the original thirteen States."
The "States' rights" decisions of Waddell and Pollard's Lessee thus
provide no justification for the Supreme Court's invocation in Montana of a
"presumption" that States own all the navigable waterways within the
boundaries of federally protected Indian reservations.
Those early
submerged lands/"equal footing doctrine" cases were decided subsequent to,
and in light of, the Supreme Court's strongly stated view in Worcester that
"[tihe treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory
as completely separated from that of the states." 10 7 Hence, the only
"presumption" with respect to disputes over submerged lands located within
the boundaries of federally protected Indian reservations that might have lain
dormant in the Court's analysis in Waddell and Pollard'sLessee is that state
claims to any such "completely separated" Indian lands must be repudiated
and declared invalid for being-in Worcester's forceful language"repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States."
Thus it was astonishing that the Montana majority applied the Court's
general "presumption" concerning States' rights to submerged lands located
within the boundaries of pre-statehood federal disposals of land-a
"presumption" first "established" in dicta from a 1926 Supreme Court
105. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845); see also supra note 96
and accompanying text.
106. See Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230.

That the holding of Pollard's Lessee

never was presumed to apply to disputes concerning submerged lands within the boundaries of
federally protected Indian reservations may be inferred from the Court's underlying concern in
Pollard's Lessee about federal interference with the States' "right of eminent domain over the
shores and the soils under the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes." Id. But where States
have no jurisdiction to impose general police powers-i.e., within the boundaries of federally

protected Indian reservations, as commanded by Worcester, see supra text accompanying note
103-a rationale declaring state ownership of submerged lands as essential to the States' "eminent
domain" in exercising general police powers compels the conclusion that this "States' rights"
principle does not apply to the construction of federal instruments specially affirming and

safeguarding tribal property interest in lands within the boundaries of Indian reservations.
107. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note
102.
108. Id. at 561 (holding Georgia's acts purporting to destroy the Cherokee Nation and
confiscate Cherokee lands "repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States").
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opinionl 9-to the special context of a dispute concerning submerged lands
located within the boundaries of an Indian reservation set apart and
safeguarded under federal law for an Indian tribe's exclusive use. Prior to
Montana, no Supreme Court decision ever had suggested that this gradually
devised "general principle" favoring States' claims to submerged lands
pursuant :to the judicially created "equal footing doctrine" applied to disputes
involving federally protected Indian lands; for application of that "general
principle" would subvert the fundamental rule of federal Indian law,
recognized from the time of Worcester onward, that States generally have no
jurisdiction over the "completely separated" lands located within the
boundaries of Indian reservations. "
In forcing its "general principle"
favoring States' claims to submerged lands to control an adjudication
implicating a sovereign Indian Tribe's rights to a segment of a river located
within the boundaries of the Tribe's own reservation, the Montana Court
forged a doctrinal innovation acutely corrosive of Indian rights."'
109. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 102 and 107.
111. For an incisive examination of the numerous errors of law, misstatements of fact, and
general carelessness with precedent manifested in the Supreme Court's decision to vest ownership
of the Crow Tribe's treaty-protected submerged lands in the State of Montana, see Russel Lawrence
Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable
Waterways Before and After Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627 (1981). One
example of what the authors call the Montana Court's "legal contrariness" is the Court's misplaced
reliance on United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926), an obscure case of little previous
doctrinal significance in the field of federal Indian law. See Barsh & Henderson, supra, at 669. As
Barsh and Henderson point out, the Montana Court described Holt as a case that involved "an
Indian tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake" that "lay wholly within the boundaries of
the Red Lake Indian Reservation, which had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota
joined the Union." Montana, 450 U.S. at 552. But, as Barsh and Henderson explain further, this
characterization of Holt by the Montana Court embodies a number of critical misstatements of fact.
See Barsh & Henderson, supra, at 676-78.
First, Holt did not involve any "Indian tribe's claim" at all, but instead consisted solely of a
dispute between the United States as plaintiff laying claim to a piece of land on a theory of federal
title, and a private bank and other riparian landowners as defendants asserting title to the same land
under a state-law theory of accretion. See Holt, 270 U.S. at 51, 52, 54. Second, Holt did not
involve land that ever had been contained "wholly within the boundaries" of any Indian reservation
specially set apart and recognized as such; rather, the disputed land in Holt consisted of a drained
and reclaimed lakebed, once known as Mud Lake, located within an area of aboriginal Indian
territory that the Red Lake Band of Chippewas had ceded to the United States in 1889 and that had
never been specially set apartand affirmed as an Indian reservation-by treaty, by executive order,
or pursuant to any other federal law. See Barsh & Henderson, supra, at 668 ("In 1858, [when
Minnesota became a State,] the Red Lake Band was without treaty relations with the United States
and Mud Lake lay within unceded, original tribal territory.") And third, the pre-statehood treaties
cited by the Montana Court in insisting that the land at issue in Holt had been federally set apart and
recognized as the Red Lake Band's "reservation" in fact did not involve the Red Lake Band at all,
as erroneously adverted to in Montana and as misleadingly insinuated in Holt. See Montana, 450
U.S. at 552 (stating "[Mud L]ake lay wholly within the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian
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Although widely regarded as a travesty of judicial decisionmaking in the
field of Indian law, Montana v. United States did not close off all hope for
Reservation, which had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota joined the Union");
Holt, 270 U.S. at 58 (stating "[tihe [Red Lake] reservation came into being through a succession of
treaties with the Chippewas whereby they ceded to the United States their aboriginal right of
occupancy to the surrounding lands. The last treaties preceding the admission of the State were
concluded September 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109, and February 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165."). Rather, as
Barsh and Henderson explain,
the Red Lake Band . . . did not treat with the United States until 1863, [five
years after Minnesota achieved statehood in 1858,] at which time the Band
ceded a large tract of northern Minnesota. As the [Holt] Court observed
correctly of this 1863 treaty, albeit citing erroneously the 1854 and 1855
treaties [which did not involve the Red Lake Band at all], "[t]here was no
formal setting apart of what was not ceded, nor affirmative declaration of the
rights of the Indians therein, nor any attempted exclusion of others from the
use of navigable waters." The Red Lake Band's [1863] treaty was exceptional
in this regard, as the [Holt] Court commented:
"Other reservations for
particular bands [of Chippewas] were specially set apart, but those reservations
. . . are not to be confused with the Red Lake Reservation . ... "
Barsh & Henderson, supra, at 667 n.249 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). It is ironic, of
course-disturbingly so-that the Holt Court, adverting to the 1863 Red Lake Band treaty,
cautioned readers not to confuse the Red Lake Reservation with "specially set apart" reservations,
while the Court itself propagated that very same confusion by insinuating, erroneously, that "[t]he
[Red Lake] reservation came into being through a succession of treaties" that included the 1854 and
1855 treaties with bands of Chippewa Indians other than the Red Lake Band. Holt, 270 U.S. at 58.
But it is even more unsettling that the Montana Court, building on Holt's confusion, suppressed any
mention of the Red Lake Band's post-statehood 1863 treaty when purporting to describe how "the
Red Lake Indian Reservation . . . had been created," citing instead only those same pre-statehood
1854 and 1855 treaties, see Montana, 450 U.S. at 552, which, as must be reiterated, did not involve
the Red Lake Band at all.
Holt thus was not a case about "an Indian tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake"
that "lay wholly within the boundaries" of an Indian reservation that had been set apart and
affirmed as such pursuant to pre-statehood federal law. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552. Instead, as
Barsh and Henderson point out, "the Holt decision was limited to lands claimed by tribes but never
recognized by the United States." Barsh & Henderson, supra, at 678 (emphasis added). As such,
Holt could not serve as a legitimate precedent for resolving an Indian Tribe's claim of ownership of
submerged lands located within the boundaries of that Tribe's own federally set-apart and affirmed
reservation-i.e., a claim like the one brought by the Crow Tribe in Montana. As Barsh and
Henderson point out, "[tihere was no possible argument in Montana that the Crow reservation had
lacked federal recognition prior to statehood, for it had been expressly confirmed to the Crows in
their 1868 treaty." Id.
The significance of the Montana Court's erroneous portrayal of Holt as a case about an Indian
Tribe claiming ownership of submerged lands located within the boundaries of the Tribe's federally
set-apart and recognized reservation cannot be overstated. Without mischaracterizing Holt in just
this way-that is, as a case factually indistinguishable from Montana itself-the Supreme Court
would have had no precedent for applying its "general principle" about state ownership of lands
underlying navigable waters to effectively dispossess an Indian Tribe of submerged lands located on
an Indian reservation that had been specially set apart and recognized under pre-statehood federal
law as belonging exclusively to the Tribe. Lacking any such precedent in Holt, the Montana Court
simply distorted the factual circumstances of Holt to create the illusion that Holt constitutes such a
precedent.
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Indian Tribes desiring to secure their, rights to on-reservation navigable

lakes, rivers and other watercourses, for in the final analysis, Montana's
"strong presumption" 1 2 against tribal ownership of those submerged lands
remained rebuttable."3 Indeed, much of Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion in Montana consists of an argument that, assuming the applicability
of the Court's "strong presumption," the Crow Tribe rebutted that
presumption." 4 Moreover, in the aftermath of Montana, some plaintiffs
have succeeded in lower federal court proceedings in rebutting the Montana
presumption, thereby securing tribal ownership of on-reservation submerged
lands." 5 In these cases, the deciding courts have emphasized the prevailing
Tribes' historic and traditional dependence on the disputed waterways, and
have identified and relied on special "compelling" indicators of congressional
intent in concluding that Congress in fact had intended to "convey"
submerged lands to these Tribes in establishing the Tribes' reservations. 6
Thus, even in the absence of an overruling of Montana, some Tribes, at
least, should be able to prevail against the marauding Montana presumption
and thereby escape a judicial extinguishment of tribal title to the lakes and
rivers on Indian reservations.
However, in order to maintain even a hope of rebutting the Montana
presumption, an Indian Tribe whose navigable waterways are threatened by
112. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 554 (implying the possibility of "overcom[ing] the
presumption against... conveyance" of on-reservation submerged lands to an Indian Tribe).
114. See id. at 570-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress had intended
to convey to the Crow Tribe the bed of the Big Horn River within Crow Reservation boundaries in
order to fulfill the dual public purposes of providing for the Crow Indians and obtaining a cession of
aboriginal Crow lands outside the Reservation's boundaries).
115. See, e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the United States conveyed title
to a section of the bed of the Puyallup River to the
Puyallup Tribe through a pre-statehood executive order enlarging the Puyallup Reservation);
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enters., 713 F.2d 455, 456 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the United States conveyed title
to on-reservation sections of the bed of the White River to the
Muckleshoot Tribe through a pre-statehood executive order expanding the Muckleshoot
Reservation); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 960-61 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that the United States conveyed beneficial title
to the on-reservation portion of the
bed of Flathead Lake to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes through a pre-statehood treaty
establishing the Flathead Reservation); see also infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
116. See United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist, No. 1, 926 F.2d 1502, 1510-11 (9th
Cir. 1991) (collecting and summarizing cases). Among the "compelling factors" identified by the
Ninth Circuit that militate in favor of a finding of congressional "conveyance" of an on-reservation
navigable watercourse to an Indian Tribe despite the Montana presumption are (1) the Tribe's
"specific insistence upon inclusion of the [watercourse]"; (2) "[t]he existence of hostilities between
the [Tribe] and non-Indian settlers relating to [a] dispute [concerning the watercourse]"; and (3) the
presence of "a conveying instrument ...that by its terms grants the bed of the [watercourse] to the
Tribe." Id.
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the kind of de facto confiscation that Montana generally sanctions must be
permitted to argue fully the merits of its case in federal court.
By
adjudicating "at the threshold," as a matter of law, the undeveloped merits of
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claim for injunctive relief against Idaho officials
allegedly engaged in an ongoing violation of the Tribe's federal rights to
submerged lands, the federal district court in Idaho effectively rendered the
notorious Montana presumption irrebuttable.' '7 In the district court's view,
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims for injunctive relief were foreclosed by the
formal similarity between the language of the instruments establishing and
confirming the Coeur d'Alene Reservation and describing its boundaries, and
the language of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 describing the boundaries of
the Crow Reservation:
The court is bound to interpret the 1873 agreement and the formal
agreement ratified in 1891, which extended one boundary of the
reservation to the center of a portion of the Spokane River, the
same way that the Supreme Court interpreted the treaty with the
Crow tribe in the Montana case, which had similar provisions.
Therefore, because the agreements with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
made no express conveyance of the beds and banks of navigable
waters within the reservation, or any other references which could
be construed as having done so, the court finds that there is nothing
in the agreements which overcomes the strong presumption that
these lands were held in trust by the United States and conveyed to
the State of Idaho upon its admission to the Union on an "equal
footing" with the other States." 8
Thus, on the basis of observing a formal similarity between isolated phrases
in the respective instruments confirming the reservations at issue in the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation and Montana, the district court held that the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe's request for injunctive relief against Idaho officials
allegedly engaged in an ongoing violation of the Tribe's federal rights was
inadequate as a matter of law. " 9
In so ruling, the district court disregarded clear and directly controlling
precedents that establish a comprehensive legal framework for determining
whether a rebuttal of the Montana presumption is valid. 2 ° Recently, that
117. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1449-52 (D. Idaho 1992).
118. Id. at 1451-52.
119. See id. at 1452.
120. The relevant Ninth Circuit decisions establishing a legal framework for determining
whether a rebuttal of the Montana presumption is valid-cases whose precedential value the district
court in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation had no discretion to ignore-are Pend Oreille, 926 F.2d
at 1502; United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989); Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at

820
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legal framework was summarized and utilized in a 1998 decision, United
States v. Idaho, 2' rendered by a different judge of the Federal District Court
for the District of Idaho, in which the court held that the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe is indeed the rightful owner under federal law of all the submerged
lands located within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in
Idaho, since Congress intended to defeat Idaho's "equal footing" claim by
confirming pre-statehood agreements permanently safeguarding the Tribe's
exclusive rights to those lands. 2 In view of the importance of Federal
District Court Judge Edward J. Lodge's decision in United States v. Idaho
that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe owns all the navigable waterways within the
Coeur d'Alene Reservation at issue," 3 the court's explanation of the proper

1251; Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 713 F.2d at 455; United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1983); and Namen, 665 F.2d at 951. But in fact, the district court mentioned none of these cases in
dismissing the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims for injunctive relief as insufficient for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1449-52.
121. United States v. Idaho, No. CV 94-328-N-EJL (D. Idaho July 28, 1998) (visited
Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.id.uscourts.gov>. As of the time this Article went to press, this
case was unreported and available on neither the Westlaw nor LEXIS electronic databases. The
indicated internet site, however, allows for a downloading of a facsimile reproduction the court's
Memorandum Decision and Order.
122. See id. at *33-34. The court explained:
By explicitly recognizing, prior to Idaho's statehood, an Executive
reservation that included submerged lands, Congress demonstrated the clear
intent to defeat the State's equal footing title. Retention of the submerged
lands was necessary to achieve the United States' objective, and Congress
clearly contemplated continued federal ownership of those lands. The 1889
agreement bY its terms anticipates that the Tribe will remain the beneficial
owner of the southern third of the Lake. The northern boundary line of the
diminished reservation was drawn so as to bisect the Lake, and the minutes of
the 1889 negotiations confirm that the placement of the boundary line was for
the purpose of establishing the Tribe's rights to the Lake and rivers. This is
.compelling evidence" that the United States intended for the Tribe to hold a
beneficial interest in the submerged lands under the southern third of the Lake.
Congress could not have carried into effect the terms of the 1889 agreement
without retaining title to the submerged lands. Congress clearly demonstrated
its intent to reserve the submerged lands . . . within the 1873 reservation.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. The district court in United States v. Idaho was able to resolve the issue of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's beneficial ownership of the submerged lands within the boundaries of the presentday Coeur d'Alene Reservation because resolution of that issue was germane to the United States'
own claim to those lands on behalf of the Tribe, as the Tribe's trustee. Unlike Indian Tribes, the
United States is considered to be not prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment from suing a State.
See infra note 467. It should be noted, however, that the United States' successful claim in United
States v. Idaho did not encompass all the submerged lands within the boundaries of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's 1873 executive order reservation, i.e., all the lands at issue in the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe litigation. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 266 (1997) (stating "[a]fter
issuance of the District Court's opinion the United States filed suit against the State of Idaho on
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legal framework for analyzing a rebuttal of the Montana presumption is
worth excerpting at length:
[Tihe question of "[w]hether title to submerged lands rests with a
State is ultimately a matter of federal intent." . . . When the
pertinent documents do not make express reference to the bed and
banks, a conveyance or reservation may be implied but a court
.will not infer an intent to defeat a future State's title to inland
submerged lands 'unless the intention was definitely declared or
otherwise made very plain.'" Thus, the intent of the Federal
Government to retain submerged lands may be demonstrated by an
express statement or may be inferred from relevant evidence.
In a case such as this one, where it is alleged that the
submerged lands were included within an Executive reservation,
the inquiry as to federal intent involves three distinct questions.
First, whether the actions of the Executive reflected a clear intent
Second,
to include submerged lands within the reservation.
whether Congress authorized the Executive retention of the
submerged lands or ratified the same. Third, and finally, whether
Congress intended to defeat the future State's title to those lands.
Evidence that bears directly on the resolution of these three
(1) the language of the relevant
questions includes
documents, (2) the location of the reservation boundaries in
relation to the submerged lands, and (3) the purpose of the
reservation....
Special evidentiary considerations apply when it is alleged that
an Executive reservation implements an agreement between the
United States and a tribe. Specifically, Ninth Circuit cases have
formulated a three-part test that bears on the ...

inquiry

. . .

as to

whether the Executive intended to include submerged lands within
the reservation. In an effort to give effect to the "principle of
construction resolving any ambiguities in agreements with the
United States in favor of the Indian tribes," Ninth Circuit decisions
have allowed a plaintiff to establish federal intent on this issue by
showing (1) the reservation included "within its boundaries a
navigable water," (2) the tribe depended on the watercourse for a
significant portion of the tribe's needs; and (3) the "Government
was plainly aware of the vital importance of the submerged lands
and the water resource to the tribe at the time of the [reservation]."

behalf of the Tribe seeking to quiet title to approximately a third of the land covered by this suit.
The Government's separate suit is still pending and is not implicated here.").
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Even if successful in satisfying the three-part test, and
therefore demonstrating the Executive intent to reserve submerged
lands, the plaintiff also must show that Congress authorized or
ratified the Executive reservation and that Congress24 intended to
defeat the future State's title to the submerged lands. 1
Had the district court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe discerned from controlling
precedents-as Judge Lodge subsequently did-the legal framework for
determining whether the Montana presumption has been rebutted, the court
could not summarily have declared itself "bound" to reject the Tribe's
officer suit; that is, it could not have dismissed the action for failure to state
a claim, based on nothing more than the court's detection of a formal
similarity between isolated phrases in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 and in
the federal instruments establishing and confirming the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation.
Instead, the court would have found itself "bound" by
controlling law to acknowledge that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe clearly had
stated a legally sufficient claim against Idaho officials for those officials'
ongoing violation of the Tribe's federally protected rights to on-reservation
submerged lands. Further, had the court evaluated the Tribe's complaint and
ensuing arguments in light of the controlling post-Montana legal criteria, the
court would have been "bound" to rule in favor of the Tribe not only on the
issue of the legal sufficiency of the Tribe's complaint at the "threshold," but
also, ultimately, on the factual and legal merits of the Tribe's claims, as
evinced by Judge Lodge's 1998 decision in United States v. Idaho affirming
the Tribe's exclusive rights of beneficial ownership in the disputed onreservation navigable waterways."as
124. United States v. Idaho, No. CV 94-328-N-EJL, at *6-8 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34, 41-46 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554 (1981));
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202 (1987); Aranson, 696 F.2d at 664
(citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 552); Muckleshoot, 713 F.2d at 457 (quoting Puyallup, 717 F.2d at
1258); Aam, 887 F.2d at 194, 196-97; Pend Oreille, 926 F.2d at 1510-11).
125. See id. at *36. In relevant part, the court's order states the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Title is quieted in favor of the United States, as trustee, and the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, as the beneficially interested party of the trusteeship,
to the bed and banks of the Coeur d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River lying
within the current boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation;
2. The United States, as trustee, and the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,
as the beneficially interested party of the trusteeship, are entitled to the
exclusive use, occupancy and right to the quiet enjoyment of the bed and banks
of the Coeur d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River lying within the current
boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation; and
3. The State of Idaho is permanently enjoined from asserting any right,
title or otherwise interest in or to the bed and banks of the Coeur d'Alene Lake
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In the end, the district court in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation gave
itself license to ignore squarely controlling law for analyzing a rebuttal of the
Montana presumption and for applying the doctrine of Ex parte Young
because the court allowed two erroneous legal fictions to run riot: (1) the
Rehnquist Court's newly announced Blatchford "presupposition" that States
are immune from suits initiated by Indian Tribes; 126 and (2) the Montana
"presumption," invented by the Court a decade earlier, that States own all
the navigable waterways on Indian reservations.127 Emboldened by these
anti-tribal fictions of the modem Supreme Court, the district court itself
could "presuppose" that an Indian Tribe should be barred from presenting in
a federal forum the merits of its injunctive suit against state officials alleged
to be engaged in an ongoing, unlawful appropriation of the Tribe's federally
protected on-reservation submerged lands. So, too, could the district court
casually "presume" to rebuff the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's officer suit with a
summary merits defeat posing as a threshold jurisdictional ruling, thereby
handing Idaho and its officers a windfall award of all the Tribe's navigable
2
waterways.

and the St. Joe River lying within the current boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene
Indian Reservation.
Id.
126. Prefacing the Rehnquist Court's unprecedented decision in 1991 to extend a new form of
Hans immunity to States sued in federal court by sovereign Indian Tribes, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Blatchford majority, stated:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana, we have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that
the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty ....
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted); see supra notes 35-70 and accompanying text; infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
128. The district court also dismissed a civil rights claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the
Tribe and individual members of the Tribe had raised against Idaho, its agencies and its officers,
pursuant to the following reasoning: (1) the Eleventh Amendment shields States and state agencies
against such a claim, absent either a State's consent or a valid, express congressional abrogation of
the state's immunity to such a claim; (2) "the Tribe [itself] may not bring a Section 1983 action
because it is not a 'citizen of the United States or other person' for purposes of Section 1983"; and
(3) the individual tribal member plaintiffs are unable to state a claim for which relief may be
granted since "[tihe court has determined that the State of Idaho is and always has been in rightful
possession of the beds, banks and waters of all of the navigable watercourses at issue in this case."
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1452 (D. Idaho 1992).
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C. The Ninth CircuitDecision: Salvaging FederalRightsfrom the
Wreckage of the Supremacy Clause
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe appealed the district court's decision to dismiss
all the Tribe's claims for relief. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal of "all claims against the State and the
Agencies, as well as the quiet title claim against the Officials," but reversed
the district court's dismissal of the Tribe's "claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against the Officials [which] seek only to preclude future
violations of federal law. "129
In affirming the district court's dismissal of all the Tribe's claims against
the State and the state agencies, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the district
court's invocation of HanslBlatchford immunity as a broad shield for States
and state agencies engaged in conduct that allegedly violates the rights of
Indian Tribes under federal law."30 The Ninth Circuit also addressed and
dismissed the Tribe's argument that Idaho effectively had waived its
sovereign immunity, and thus had consented to the Tribe's quiet title suit,
through various rulings
of the Idaho Supreme Court and provisions of the
Idaho constitution. 3 1 With respect to the district court's dismissal of all the
Tribe's claims against the defendant state officials, however, the Ninth
Circuit discerned significant error in the district court's analysis. The
appellate court ruled that, contrary to the district court's assertions, the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe had raised claims against Idaho officials which were not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment,13 ' and which could not be dismissed as
a
1 33
matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In the Ninth Circuit's view, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims against
Idaho officials, alleging continuing violations of the Tribe's federal rights to
submerged lands, fell squarely within the class of claims that qualify for
federal court adjudication under the doctrine of Ex parte Young," and thus
129. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994).

130. See id. at 1248-49.
131. See id. at 1249-50. According to the Tribe, the State's waiver of its immunity was
manifested in (1) Idaho Supreme Court decisions "ruling that actions against the state to quiet title

are not claims against the sovereign"; and (2) provisions in the State's constitution wherein the State
"disclaims any interest in Indian lands within the state" and proclaims that "Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States . . . ." Id. at
1249 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting IDAHO CONST. art. 21, § 19). Subsequently, the

United States Supreme Court denied the Tribe's cross-petition for certiorari with respect to the
Ninth Circuit's rejection of this waiver theory. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1133 (1996); see also infra text accompanying note 174.
132. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1254-55.

133. See id. at 1255-57.
134. 209 U.S. 123, (1908).

31:7871

SANCTIONING A TYRANNY

were not barred by the Supreme Court's countervailing Eleventh Amendment
doctrine.135 In assessing the propriety of the Tribe's officer suit, the Ninth
Circuit applied a test developed by a plurality of Justices in the 1979 case of
FloridaDepartment of State v. Treasure Salvors 136 for determining whether
state officials-who "[g]enerally ... are considered to be acting on behalf of
the state, and . . . therefore [are] shield[ed] . . . from suit"-are immune
from federal court suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, or else are
37
susceptible to federal court accountability by virtue of the Young doctrine. 1
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the Treasure Salvors test consists of three
interrelated inquiries: (1) whether the claim is against state officials rather
than the State itself; (2) whether the claim asserts conduct by state officials
that "either violates federal law, or is wholly unauthorized by state law,"
rather than conduct that is "merely tortious, and . . . protected by the
Eleventh Amendment"; and (3) whether the relief sought is prospective
rather than retrospective in nature. 13 Applying this three-prong test, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that because the Coeur d'Alene Tribe had raised
claims against state officials that (1) must be deemed, pursuant to the Young
doctrine, as not raised against the State of Idaho itself; (2) implicated
ongoing violations of federal law; and (3) were prospective in nature, these
and the federal district
claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
39
court thus was obligated to adjudicate them.
Central to the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Tribe's claims for
injunctive relief and prospective declaratory relief against state officials were
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment was the court's emphasis on a crucial
point ignored by the district court-the indispensable role of Young suits in
ensuring the supremacy of federal law under the constitutional plan."4 As
the Ninth Circuit noted:
Under our federalist system, the states are considered unable
to act in a manner contrary to federal law. Thus any action on the
135. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1254-55.
136. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
137. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1250.
138. Id. at 1250-51.
139. See id. at 1250-55.
140. See id. at 1251; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Clause provides:

The Constitution's Supremacy

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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part of state officials that violates federal law cannot be attributed
to the state. Because federal law preempts state law, if the
property at issue in this case belongs to the Tribe pursuant to
federal law, the Officials must conform their actions to that federal
law in spite of state statutes that purport to regulate the property as
belonging to the state. If the Officials do not act in accordance
with federal law, the state's claim of ownership cannot clothe the
Officials in Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 141
Since the Coeur d'Alene Tribe clearly had "alleged that the actions of the
Officials in exercising control over the property at issue violate
federal

. . .

law," the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[tihis case fits within

the [Young] exception. " 142 And, since the Young doctrine so clearly applied
to the Tribe's efforts to obtain injunctive relief and prospective declaratory
relief in federal court, "the [Idaho] Officials must be considered the real
parties in interest in the claims against them."143 The first prong of the
TreasureSalvors test thus was satisfied.
By virtue of the same observation about the undeniably federal nature of
the Tribe's claims, the Ninth Circuit determined further that the second
prong of the Treasure Salvors test also was satisfied.'44 As the court pointed
out, "a plaintiff need only adequately allege an ongoing violation of a federal
right to meet this prong of the test. .

.

. The Tribe adequately alleges an

ongoing violation of a federal right and, thus, meets this prong of the test. ""
Applying the third and final prong of the Treasure Salvors test-the
requirement that, in order for a plaintiff to proceed with a proffered Young
suit, the relief sought must be prospective rather than retrospective in
nature-the Ninth Circuit found the requirement satisfied with respect to all
the Tribe's claims for injunctive relief and prospective declaratory relief
against the state officers.'"6 In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
Tribe's quiet title claim, which the court determined had been properly
dismissed by the district court. 47 In explaining the difference between its
disposal of the Tribe's quiet title claim and its disposal of the Tribe's claims
for injunctive relief and prospective declaratory relief against Idaho officers,
the Ninth Circuit confronted what it termed the "conundrum"'" created by
141.
142.
143.
144.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1251 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
See id.

145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 1254.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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the crosscurrents in the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence-a "conundrum" which the district court had evaded by
disposing of the Tribe's claims for quiet title and declaratory relief as a unit,
equating these claims, on the basis of virtually no analysis, to a claim for "an
award of damages or restitution... which is not allowed under the Eleventh
Amendment. "49
The Ninth Circuit explained that the Eleventh Amendment "conundrum"
had arisen because of the emergence of two seemingly conflicting rules
governing any federal court disposal of claims against state officials that
implicate questions of property ownership:
First, federal courts may not hear actions to quiet title to property
in which the state claims an interest, without the state's consent.
Second, declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials
to foreclose future violations of federal law is available even if that
the plaintiff in possession of property also
relief works to put 50
claimed by the state. 1

Confronted with these facially conflicting rules-the first, the product of the
modern Supreme Court's expansion of Hans immunity, and the second, the
essential proposition of the Young doctrine-the Ninth Circuit settled upon a
"middle ground" approach 51 that the court detected in addressing, in view of
Supreme Court precedents, 52 the decisions of lower federal courts invoked
by the Idaho officials.' 53 Acknowledging these discrepant decisions, the
149. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1448-49 (D. Idaho 1992); see also
supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
150. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1252 (citations omitted).
Elaborating on this resort to a doctrinal "middle ground" for
151. See id. at 1253-54.
resolving the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Idaho
officials, the Ninth Circuit explained: "The Supreme Court has charted a middle ground between
the necessarily conflicting doctrines of state sovereign immunity and the supremacy of federal law.
It should come as no surprise that that middle ground does not wholly conform to either doctrine."
Id.
152. The Supreme Court precedents that compelled the Ninth Circuit to acknowledge a
"middle ground" approach-notwithstanding contrary rulings by other circuit courts, see infra note
153-for determining federal jurisdiction with respect to claims for injunctive relief against state
officials that implicate questions of property ownership are FloridaDepartment of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Exparte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897); Exparte yler, 149 U.S. 164 (1893);
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); and Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824). See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1252-54. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
subsequent refusal to follow this "middle ground" approach in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation,
see infra notes 213-74 and accompanying text.
153. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1252-54. Of the lower federal court decisions relied
on by the Idaho officials, the Ninth Circuit distinguished outright Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347
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Ninth Circuit discerned that this "middle ground" approach consists of
"allow[ing] all relief other than relief that would foreclose the State's claim
in future judicial proceedings." 154 Adhering to this judicially mandated
doctrinal compromise, the Ninth Circuit was compelled to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the Tribe's quiet title claim, since that claim would have
to be viewed as running afoul of the modem Court's extension of the Hans
immunity doctrine, by force of which States themselves "apparently can
claim title to property in derogation of federal law."5'
However, this same "middle ground" approach likewise compelled the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that the Tribe must be permitted to go forward in
federal court with its property-ownership-related claims for injunctive relief
and prospective declaratory relief against state officials, as required by virtue

(9th Cir. 1993); Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. v. IllinoisDepartmentt of Transportation,744 F.2d
1296 (7th Cir. 1984); and Aquilar v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 433 (D. Alaska 1976). See Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1253. As the Ninth Circuit explained, "Toledo, Peoria & Western held
only that '[t]he eleventh amendment bars a federal action against state officials based on state law
when the relief sought directly impacts the state,'" and entailed no holding relevant to a suit based
on federal law (like the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit) against state officials for those officials'
allegedly illegal appropriation of property claimed by the plaintiff. Id. at 1253 (quoting Toledo,
Peoria & Western, 744 F.2d at 1299) (emphasis added by Coeur d'Alene Tribe). The Ninth Circuit
explained further that Harrison and Aquilar are distinguished because in view of Supreme Court
affirmations of the doctrine of Exparte Young, those cases "mean only that an action that would
conclusively adjudicate the state's title to property cannot be brought without the state's consent,"
whereas the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's injunctive suit would have no such preclusive effect on Idaho's
ability subsequently to adjudicate its asserted interest in the disputed submerged lands. Id. (citing
Harrison, 6 F.3d at 1348; Aquilar, 424 F. Supp. at 437).
Acknowledging that two other cases relied on by the state officials, John G. & Marie Stella
Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1994), and Fitzgerald v.
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 866 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1989), were "more difficult to
reconcile," the Ninth Circuit effectively rejected those cases as erroneously decided in view of
Supreme Court precedents affirming the Young doctrine. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at
1253-54. As the Ninth Circuit explained, in Fitzgerald the First Circuit "appear[ed] to hold that
when an action includes the state and state agencies as defendants, and seeks an adjudication of the
state's interest in property, that portion of the action that is against state officials for injunctive and
declaratory relief is also directed against the state itself, and is therefore barred." Id. at 1253
(citing Fitzgerald, 866 F.2d at 18). Likewise, in Mauro the Fifth Circuit "refused to hear the
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against ... state official[s] [alleged to be depriving the
plaintiff of property without due process of law] because it believed that to do so it would have to
adjudicate the state's interest in the property."
Id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that these
decisions of other circuit courts could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision in
Treasure Salvors, in which the Court held that a federal court claim requesting prospective relief
effectively against state officials and implicating an alleged ongoing violation of a plaintiff's
entitlement to property under federal law is permitted pursuant to the Young doctrine. See id.; see
also infra text accompanying notes 213-20.
154. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1254.
155. Id.
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of the presumably still-viable Young doctrine. 116 The Ninth Circuit's
explanation for its conclusion that Young relief is available to the Tribe-a
reverslal of the district court's contrary disposal of this issue1 7-deserves
careful attention:
[Biecause the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by the Tribe
would not compensate for past violations of federal law, but would
instead preclude future violations, we conclude that this portion of
the action is not barred by the state's immunity. The Tribe is not
seeking to have any past violations of its federal rights redressed in
any way. It is not seeking damages or restitution for past wrongs,
nor is it seeking to rescind a past transfer of property. Rather, it
seeks a determination under federal law of the Tribe's right to
possess, use, and control the beds, banks, and waters of navigable
waterways within the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in the future.
Thus to the extent that the declaratory and injunctive relief binds
state officials in accordance with what the district court finds to be
the Tribe's right to the property, it is allowable. Because the state
is unable to act in violation of federal law, declaratory relief that
determines what federal law is and requires state officials to act
accordingly cannot be considered relief against the state. .

.

. [Ihf

the district court finds that the property at issue belongs to the
Tribe pursuant to federal law, it may decree the Tribe to be the
owner of the property against all claimants except the State of
Idaho and its agencies.

18

The Ninth Circuit recognized that in making allowance under this "middle
ground" approach for the Tribe's federal court claims for injunctive relief
and prospective declaratory relief against state officials while forbidding the
Tribe's quiet title action, the practical consequence of any subsequent victory
for the Tribe on the merits of its claims would be that "neither Idaho nor the
Tribe will hold unclouded title to the property."' 59 Once again, however, the
Ninth Circuit saw this "problem" as unavoidable in view of the Supreme
Court's conflicting allegiances to the Hans immunity doctrine, on the one
hand, and to the requirements of the Constitution's guarantee of the
supremacy of federal law, on the other:
[J]ust as we may not exercise jurisdiction over the state to more
fully resolve this controversy, we may not decline jurisdiction to
the extent that it exists. We will not refuse to enforce the federal
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. at 1254-55.
See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1254-55 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1255.
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rights of Indian tribes against action by state officials merely
because we cannot afford them complete relief. 160
Having thus clarified that the injunctive relief and prospective declaratory
relief sought by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe were remedies that were
prospective in nature, the Ninth Circuit effectively determined that the third
and final prong of the Treasure Salvors test was satisfied. With all three
prongs of that test thus satisfied, the extended Hans immunity of the modem
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence could not legitimately
be interposed to prevent the Tribe from proceeding to the merits of the
Tribe's federal court action against those Idaho officials.
In controverting the district court's Eleventh Amendment/Hans immunitybased rationale for dismissing all the Tribe's claims, the Ninth Circuit also
addressed the district court's argument that the Tribe's claims for injunctive
relief should be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 6 ' Here, the Ninth Ciricuit took pains to
emphasize another crucial point ignored in the district court's analysis of the
Tribe's claims:
That notwithstanding the "strong presumption" under
Montana v. United States that the United States did not "convey" submerged
lands to an Indian Tribe during the relevant territorial, pre-statehood
period, 62 "that presumption is rebuttable."163 Moreover, as the Ninth
Circuit pointed out, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe arguably could rebut that
presumption at trial, "[a]s it is conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts
that would entitle it to the relief sought. " " Hence, the Ninth Circuit
160. Id. (citation omitted).
161. See id.at 1255-57.
162. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
163. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1255 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 1257. In emphasizing that the Tribe could not be viewed as legally incapable of
proving that recognized title to the disputed submerged lands had vested in the Tribe prior to
Idaho's admission to the Union, the Ninth Circuit refuted two novel and expansive arguments put
forward by Idaho: (1) "that the federal government [may never] 'reserve' submerged lands in a
manner sufficient to withstand the 'equal footing doctrine'"; and (2) "that executive orders creating
an interest in bedlands must be issued with explicit prior congressional approval or subsequent
ratification," whereas the Tribe's recognized title claim rested on a theory of subsequent implied
congressional authorization of a pre-statehood executive order reserving the disputed submerged
lands. Id. at 1256. The Ninth Circuit rejected these sweeping arguments because (1) Idaho had
misread the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S.
193 (1987), in which the Court held that congressional language purporting to "reserve" public
lands for the United States alone was "insufficient to create a 'reservation' of interest in submerged
land"; and (2) Idaho had failed to note that the Ninth Circuit in Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Port of
Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), already had found recognized Indian title on the sole basis
of implied congressional acquiescence. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1256-57. In invoking
Puyallup Indian Tribe, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of adhering to the controlling
legal framework for determining whether a party might be able to rebut the Montana presumption-
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concluded, the district court's "dismissal for failure to state a claim was
error. "I65
Thus did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals navigate a narrow course
through the hazardous straits of the Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment/Hans immunity doctrine in an effort to salvage for the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe an opportunity to obtain vindication in federal court of the
Tribe's federal rights to its submerged lands. In embarking on this
expedition, the Ninth Circuit in effect attempted to preserve the vitality of the
Ex parte Young doctrine, which long has been understood as essential to
actualizing the Constitution's guarantee of the supremacy of federal law.'
As Justice Brennan has indicated, the Young doctrine is essential for
"provid[ing] a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and
enforcement of the supreme law of the land" and-in the wake of the Court's
misguided expansion of Hans immunity in the modem era-for
"circumvent[ing] the intolerable constriction of federal jurisdiction that
would otherwise occur." 67 As the Hans-embracing majority of the modem
Court itself conceded in 1985-ironically, in an opinion denying Young
relief, authored by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist"-"the availability of
a legal framework whose relevance and binding effect the district court had ignored.
notes 117-25 and accompanying text.

See supra

165. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1257. As had the district court, the Ninth Circuit also
addressed the civil rights claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that had been raised by the Tribe and
individual tribal members. See id. at 1255; see also supra note 128. By virtue of its determination
that the Tribe was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking prospective relief against

state officials alleged to be violating the Tribe's federally protected rights to property, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "[i]njunctive relief is available against state officials in their individual
capacities under section 1983." Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1255.
166. In his dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Justice Souter explained that the
doctrine of Ex parte Young "provide[s] . . . a sensible way to reconcile the Court's expansive view
of immunity expressed in Hans with the principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article
III," and that it thus embodies a vital and indispensable limitation on the powers of a sovereign that
is of ancient lineage:

[T]he rule we speak of under the name of Young is so far inherent in the
jurisdictional limitation imposed by sovereign immunity as to have been
recognized since the Middle Ages.

For that long it has been settled doctrine

that suit against an officer of the Crown permitted relief against the
government despite the Crown's immunity from suit in its own courts and the

maxim that the King could do no wrong.
517 U.S. 44, 170-71 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261, 308 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to "a history of officer
liability . . . extending back to the Middle Ages").
167. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255-56 (1985) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
168. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1985) (holding that federal court process for
'notice relief" relating solely to state officials' past violations of plaintiffs'
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment absent the State's consent).

federal rights is

832

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of
federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law." 6 9 In a similar vein, Justice Souter has observed:
Ex parte Young, and the historic doctrine it embodies . . . plays a
foundational role in American constitutionalism, and while the
doctrine is sometimes called a "fiction," the long history of its felt
necessity shows it to be something much more estimable .... The
doctrine we call Ex parte Young is nothing short of "indispensable
to the 70establishment of constitutional government and the rule of
law. "1
Nevertheless, despite its wise obedience to constitutional principle in
affirming the Young doctrine and thereby endeavoring to spare an Indian
Tribe from subjugation to despotism, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ultimately was forced to abandon its salvaging expedition at the command of
a different court on a different mission.

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S COEUR D 'ALENE TRIBE DECISION
The Idaho officials petitioned the Supreme Court for review of that part
of the Ninth Circuit's decision recognizing federal court jurisdiction over the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Ex parte Young action for injunctive relief and
prospective declaratory relief against the ongoing conduct of those officials
allegedly in violation of federal law. 17 ' The Coeur d'Alene Tribe crosspetitioned the Court for review of the Ninth Circuit's determination that the
State of Idaho had not waived its immunity to suit. 172 The Supreme Court
granted the state officials' request for review, 173 and denied the Tribe's.' 74
Five of the Court's nine members-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas-voted to reverse the Ninth
Circuit's ruling on the availability of Young relief, and thus to forbid
altogether federal court adjudication of the merits of the Coeur d'Alene

169. Id. at 68.

170. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 174 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983)).

171. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 266.
172. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 25, at *3 n.3.

173. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v.Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 517 U.S.
1132 (1996).
174. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1133 (1996).
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Tribe's request for justice against the Idaho officials. 75 Justice Kennedy
authored the "principal opinion," a portion of which reflects the views of the
five-member Court majority,176 and a separate portion of which expresses the
views of only two members, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist.'"
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 78 And Justice Souter
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg. and Breyer
joined. 179
The varying viewpoints of the Supreme Court Justices in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe may be analyzed according to two emergent themes: (1) the specific
attack on Indian rights manifested in the Court's decision to deny Indian
Tribes access to the federal courts for suing state officials who continue to
violate Tribes' federally protected rights to on-reservation navigable
waterways; and (2) the general threat to the Constitution and the people's
liberty posed by the Court's efforts to dismantle the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.
A. Closing the Federal Courts to Indian Tribes Seeking Justice Against State
Officials Who Illegally Appropriate On-Reservation Submerged Lands

1. The Charge of the Straw Brigade
In that portion of the "principal opinion" reflecting the views of the
Court,' 80 Justice Kennedy inaugurated his analysis with a ringing affirmation

of the majority's allegiance to the Hans immunity doctrine.18 ' Kennedy
suggested that the Hans doctrine's conferral of immunity on a State faced
with a federal court suit alleging the State's defiance of federal law is
necessitated by "the dignity and respect afforded a State. " 1s2 Kennedy
frankly acknowledged that "[t]he Court's recognition of sovereign immunity
has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh

175. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 287 (finding "the Young exception inapplicable").
176. See id. at 264-70, 281-88 (Parts I, I-A and III).
177. See id. at 271-80 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (Parts II-B, II-C
and II-D).
178. See id. at 288-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
179. See id. at 297-319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 264-70, 281-88 (Parts I, I-A and III).
181. See id. at 267-69.
182. Id. at 268.
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Amendment." t" 3
Indeed, Kennedy even conceded that the majority's
embrace of Hans has been subjected to "extended criticisms," and that
"various dissenting and concurring opinions have urged a change in
direction."'" Kennedy continued:
Were we to abandon our understanding of the Eleventh
Amendment as reflecting a broader principle of sovereign
immunity, the Tribe's suit, which is based on its purported federal
property rights, might proceed. These criticisms and proposed
doctrinal revisions, however, have not found acceptance
with a
5
majority of the Court. We adhere to our precedent.'1
Apart from typifying the Court's tendency to deflect scholarly criticism of
the Hans doctrine with a "flexing of muscle," 8 6 this pledge of loyalty to
Hans mischaracterizes by implication the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's litigation
theory, for the Tribe had never asked the Court to "abandon" the Hans
doctrine. Rather, the Tribe had argued from the start that despite the Court's
general embrace of Hans immunity, the Tribe's claims against Idaho, its
agencies and its officials nevertheless were cognizable in federal court
pursuant to the Court's own established exceptions to the reach of Hansi.e., the theories of (1) state consent to suit, and (2) Ex parte Young." s
183. Id. at 267.
184. Id. at 268.
185. Id.
186. The Court's "brawny" reaction to the ubiquitous criticisms of the Hans immunity
doctrine is reminiscent of the same five-member majority's derisive dismissal of Justice Souter's
observation in his dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), that "[tihe
great weight of scholarly commentary agrees" that the Hans doctrine is indefensible in view of
"Itihe history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 110 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(collecting articles). Writing for the Seminole Tribe Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist ridiculed the
dissent for questioning the validity of "this century-old [Hans] doctrine" by means of "a theory
cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events." Id. at 68; see
also supra note 64.
In the recently decided case of College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), this same majority continued its habit of
resorting to ridicule to condemn the dissenting Justices' criticism of the Hans doctrine. See, e.g.,
id. at 2231-32 (stating "Justice Breyer reiterates (but only in outline form, thankfully) the nowfashionable revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a degree
of repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods").
187. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Idaho 1992), aff'd in partand
rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). The fact that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe was not asking
the Court to overrule Hans or otherwise "abandon" the status quo as represented by the Hans
doctrine is also clear from the cautious references to the "balance of sovereignties" demarcated by
Hans and Ex pane Young in the brief that the Tribe submitted to the Supreme Court:
The Eleventh Amendment caselaw developed during the past century by
this Court serves a critical purpose in this nation's Constitutional government.
The thoughtfully crafted approach embodied in Ex parte Young and its progeny
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Hence, Justice Kennedy's prefatory admonishment about the Court's intent to
hold fast to Hans while disposing of the Tribe's claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against Idaho officials can be understood only as a reproof-

to borrow the Court's phrase-"directed at a straw man.'"8
Next, Justice Kennedy invoked the Court's 1991 Blatchford decision

9

for

the proposition that "States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity" from
suits brought by Indian Tribes. 9° In resurrecting Blatchford's rationale for
expanding Hans immunity to insulate States from suits brought by Tribes,' 9
Kennedy repeated an erroneous and misleading assertion that was first made
by Justice Scalia for the Blatchford Court' 92 and subsequently was
incorporated into the district court's analysis in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
litigation. 9 3 "In Blatchford," insisted Justice Kennedy, "we rejected the
contention that sovereign immunity only restricts suits by individuals against
sovereigns, not by sovereigns against sovereigns." 1" But, in actuality, the
Alaska Native Villages in Blatchford had never made any such "contention"

honors the sovereignty of our states through its narrowly tailored exception to
immunity from suit ....
Without [the Young doctrine], the Hans expansion of the Eleventh
Amendment would be unchecked, posing a serious threat to the delicate
balance of sovereignties that has served this country so well for so long.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 25, at *5, * 12 (emphasis added).
188. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69. In dismissing "[tihe dissent's lengthy analysis of the text
of the Eleventh Amendment" as "directed at a straw man," Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the
fact that, ever since the Hans decision, the Supreme Court has avoided what Rehnquist called
"blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment." Id. In response, Justice Souter
reiterated the importance of the Constitution's "plain text," noting that deference to text is
especially indicated
in construing the jurisdictional provisions of Article III, which speak with a
clarity not to be found in some of the more open-textured provisions of the
Constitution. That the Court thinks otherwise is an indication of just how far it
has strayed beyond the boundaries of traditional constitutional analysis.
Id. at 116 n. 13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
189. Blatchford v.Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); see supra notes 35-70 and
accompanying text.
190. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 268-69.
191. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
192. In Blatchford, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, asserted the following: "In arguing
that sovereign immunity does not restrict suit by Indian tribes, respondents submit, first, that
sovereign immunity only restricts suits by individuals against sovereigns, not by sovereigns against
sovereigns ....
" 501 U.S. at 779-80.
193. The federal district court in Idaho asserted: "The tribes in Blatchford first argued that
sovereign immunity only restricts suits by individuals against sovereigns, not by sovereigns (i.e.,
Indian tribes) against sovereigns." Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1446
(D. Idaho 1992).
194. Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 521 U.S. at 268.
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that the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine would be inapplicable
whenever any sovereign attempted to sue a State in federal court; for such a
"contention" clearly would have run afoul of the Supreme Court's 1934
decision in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi," viz., that a foreign
nation (i.e., a type of "sovereign") is barred by the Eleventh Amendment
from suing a State in federal court.' 96 Indeed, the Alaska Native Villages in
Blatchford had taken pains to distinguish Monaco in their briefs, for the very
purpose of making it clear that the Tribes emphatically were not claiming the
existence of any kind of generic, across-the-board exemption, applicable to
all sovereigns as such, under the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence:
[T]he factors that led this Court in Monaco to find an Eleventh
Amendment bar against suits by foreign countries do not apply to
suits by Indian tribes .... Indian tribes are sovereignties internal,
rather than external, to the United States. Suits by Indian tribes do
not implicate foreign relations and sensitive questions of foreign
policy and negotiations.
...Indian Tribes are domestic sovereigns, existing inside "the
structure of the Union," and should be understood to have the right
to bring suit against a state comparable to the right enjoyed by the
other domestic sovereigns. 197
Despite the Native Villages' careful clarification of their argument, Justice
Scalia apparently chose to ignore the theory specified by the Tribes in
Blatchford, and instead attributed to the Native Villages an argument never
put forward by the Tribes and susceptible to the Court's condemnation in
view of Monaco. This enabled Justice Scalia to portray the Native Villages
as having proposed a jurisdictional theory squarely at odds with Supreme
Court precedent. It also allowed the Blatchford Court to sidestep the real
and compelling arguments actually articulated by the Native Villages for
insisting that Indian Tribes, like the other domestic sovereigns-the fifty
States, and the United States itself-are not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment from suing States in federal court.

195. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
196. See id. at 329-30; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
197. Brief for Respondent Native Village of Noatak, supra note 38, at *37-38.
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2. Condemning Tribes' Young Suits for Failing an "Ordinariness"
Test
After thus slaying both a "straw man" of his own making and a hand-medown one from the Blatchford Court, Justice Kennedy turned his attention to
the jurisdictional issue for which the Court had granted review-whether
"[t]he Tribe's suit . . . is barred by Idaho's Eleventh Amendment
immunity," or whether it "falls within the exception this Court has
recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
In due course, Kennedy
state officers in their individual capacities.""9'
"[W]e find the Young exception
announced the Court's conclusion:
inapplicable. The dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on
its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to these
claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine the case.""'
By this simple pronouncement, the Rehnquist Court closed the doors of
all federal courthouses in the United States to all Indian Tribes seeking
justice against state officials for effectively confiscating the navigable lakes,
rivers and other waterways on Indian reservations in violation of Tribes'
federally protected rights. In effectuating this sweeping repudiation of
Tribes' federal rights, the Court majority necessarily denigrated and
trivialized the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Justice Kennedy derided the
previously settled understanding that Young suits would be universally
available for seeking prospective relief in federal court whenever state
officials are violating plaintiffs' federal rights, discarding this conviction as
mere "adhere[nce] to an empty formalism."2" Kennedy accomplished this
denigration of Young while simultaneously avowing that "[w]e do
not. . . question the validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine.""° Ironically,
this statement appears to illustrate Kennedy's notion of "an empty
formalism. "202
Instead of affirming the applicability of the Young doctrine, the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe majority adopted a new scheme in which the Court itself would
retain an independent veto over officer suits that otherwise clearly would
qualify for federal jurisdiction. Without citing authority, Justice Kennedy
recast the Young criteria as necessary but not sufficient for gaining access to
198. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269.
199. Id. at 287-88.
200. Id. at 270.

201. Id. at 269.
202. See supra text accompanying note 200. Rather tellingly, in the same paragraph wherein
he purported not to question Young, Justice Kennedy adverted to the importance of Young strictly in
the past tense: "The Young exception to sovereign immunity was an important part of our
jurisprudence . . . ." Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added).
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the federal courts: "An allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law
where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the
Young fiction." 20 3 Certainly, if the word "ordinarily" were omitted from this
assertion of Kennedy's, the assertion might pass for a fairly accurate
statement of existing law. However, by inserting the modifier "ordinarily"
into his assertion, Kennedy modified the Young doctrine, generating a
proposition both dangerous and unprecedented-but essential for preventing
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe from presenting its request for justice to the federal
courts.
To be sure, Justice Kennedy was not alone in sanctioning this change of
law regarding the availability of federal court relief under Ex parte Young.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, put
forth essentially the same remarkable proposition not once but twice,' citing
on each occasion the single case of Milliken v. Bradley.2 '5
Milliken,
however, clearly does not support or countenance the majority proposition
announced in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In Milliken, the Supreme Court
permitted a federal district court to award prospective relief against state
officials found to be guilty of racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.2 ' 6 As Justice O'Connor conceded elsewhere in her Coeur
d'Alene Tribe concurrence,2 7 the Milliken Court's determination that the
district court's order did not violate the Eleventh Amendment focused
exclusively on the question of whether the relief awarded-which included a
requirement that the State pay for remedial education programs for
schoolchildren long subjected to illegal racial segregation-was prospective
or retroactive in nature. 20 8 Nowhere in Milliken, either on the pages cited by

203. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added); see also id. at 276-77 (opinion
of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (emphasis added) (stating "where prospective relief is

sought against individual state officers in a federal forum based on a federal right, the Eleventh
Amendment, in most cases, is not a bar").
204. See id. at 288, 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor stated first that "[w]here a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end a state officer's

ongoing violation of federal law, such a claim can ordinarily proceed in federal court." Id. at 288
(O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). She later
reiterated: "When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal rights,
ordinarily the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar." Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
205. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
206. See id. at 282-83.

207. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 295 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he [Milliken] Court upheld the relief.

prospective rather than retrospective.").
208. See Miliken, 433 U.S. at 288-90.

. .

because the remedy was
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Justice O'Connor " 9 or anywhere else, did the Supreme Court suggest that a
Young suit might be prohibited even where Young's requirements of an
alleged ongoing violation of federal law and a request for prospective relief
had been satisfied. Indeed, O'Connor's twice-iterated assertion that Young
suits are merely "ordinarily" available when a plaintiff satisfies the
requirements of the Young doctrine might have seemed somewhat less
assailable had O'Connor simply followed Justice Kennedy's lead and not
purported to support this ipse dixit with any prior holding of the Court.2"'
209. In asserting that Young suits "ordinarily" may proceed where Young's criteria are
satisfied, Justice O'Connor twice cited to pages 289-90 of the Milliken opinion. See Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. at 288, 293 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Later in her Coeur d'Alene Tribe concurrence, in defying the efforts of Justice Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist to turn the Young doctrine into a prescription for a general, discretionary "caseby-case balancing approach" to the availability of Young relief, O'Connor referred once again to
those same pages from Milliken, this time dropping the contrivance of grafting the word
"ordinarily" onto Milliken's holding, and instead pointing out that Milliken and all the rest of the
Court's modern Young cases "establish only that a Young suit is available where a plaintiff alleges
an ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than
retrospective." Id. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter offered the same observation about Milliken: "The sole enquiry
[for applying Young in Milliken] was whether the relief sought was fairly characterized as
prospective." Id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Milliken's exclusive
focus on the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief, see infra text accompanying
notes 534-41.
210. Actually, in that portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy did point out that in the previous Supreme Court Term, "we did not allow a suit raising a
federal question [and seeking prospective relief] to proceed based on Congress' provision of an
alternative review mechanism." Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). Without
identifying the case, Justice Kennedy was referring to Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), in which the Court denied Young relief to a different Indian Tribe. In that case, the
Seminole Tribe had sought, inter alia, a federal court order enjoining Florida officials from
continuing to violate the Tribe's federal rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 2702. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52. The Court held, inter alia, that "[tihe narrow
exception to the Eleventh Amendment provided by the Exparte Young doctrine cannot be used to
enforce [the Act] because Congress enacted a remedial scheme . . . specifically designed for the
enforcement of that right." Id. at 76.
While Seminole Tribe-decided by the same five-member Court majority as Coeur d'Alene
Tribe-certainly does represent a significant encroachment on the safeguarding of federal rights as
afforded by the Young doctrine, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment,
and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 530 (1997), that
opinion purports, at least (albeit by dubious reasoning) to attribute to Congress the foreclosure of
Young relief. Presumably, Seminole Tribe does not commit the prerogative of allowing or denying
Young relief to the Court's own independent policy predilections-which is, of course, the
majority's innovation in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In this regard, Justice Souter's observation in his
Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissent is worth noting:
In Seminole Tribe, the Court declared Ex parte Young inapplicable to the
case before it, having inferred that Congress meant to leave no such avenue of
relief open to those claiming federal rights under the statute then under
consideration. The Court left the basic tenets of Ex parte Young untouched,
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After forging this new methodology for accepting or rejecting a Young
suit based on the Court's assessment of the suit's "ordinariness," the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe majority quickly concluded that the Tribe's suit failed this justannounced "ordinariness" test: "[T]his case is unusual," Justice Kennedy
asserted, "in that the Tribe's suit is the functional equivalent of a quiet title
action which implicates special sovereignty interests." 2"' Concurring in this
finding of a fatal lack of "ordinariness," Justice O'Connor elaborated:
This case is unlike a typical Young action in two respects.
First .... the suit is the functional equivalent of an action to quiet
[the Tribe's] title ....Second, the Tribe does not merely seek to
possess land that would otherwise remain subject to state
regulation, or to bring the State's regulatory scheme into
compliance with federal law. Rather, the Tribe seeks to eliminate
altogether the State's regulatory power over the submerged lands at
issue-to establish not only that the State has no right to possess the
property, but also that the property is not within Idaho's sovereign
jurisdiction at all. 12
Kennedy and O'Connor then devoted several paragraphs of their respective
opinions to evaluating what both opinions conclude were the two
distinguishing and disqualifying characteristics of the Tribe's officer suit:
(1) the fact that the Tribe's claim for prospective relief resembled a quiet title
action; and (2) the fact that the Tribe was challenging the presumption that
States have exclusive dominion over submerged lands.
3. Submerging the "Middle Ground" of Treasure Salvors
With respect to the first disqualifying characteristic of the Tribe's officer
suit-the asserted "functional equivalen[ce]" of the Tribe's request for
declaratory and injunctive relief to a quiet title action 2 13-both Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor attempted to distinguish the case of Florida
Department of State v. Treasure Salvors,214 which had provided a framework
for the Ninth Circuit's earlier determination that the Tribe's claims were

however, and Congress remained free to remove any bar to the invocation of

Young, even in a successive suit by petitioners in Seminole Tribe itself.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
211. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281; see also id. at 282 ("[Tlhe declaratory and
injunctive relief the Tribe seeks is close to the functional equivalent of quiet title . . ").
212. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
213. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
214. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
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cognizable under the doctrine of Ex parte Young."1 5 In Treasure Salvors, the
Supreme Court validated the exercise of federal in rem admiralty jurisdiction
by a federal court issuing a warrant for seizing artifacts from a sunken,
seventeenth-century Spanish galleon in the possession of state officials
allegedly acting ultra vires state law and in violation of the plaintiff salvaging
company's rights to the artifacts under federal law. 216 A plurality of the
Justices held
that the federal court had jurisdiction to secure possession of the
property from the named state officials, since they had no colorable
basis on which to retain possession of the artifacts. The court did
not have power, however, to adjudicate the State's interest in the
property without the State's consent.217
With this holding-or pair of holdings-the Treasure Salvors plurality settled
on the same "middle ground" approach to conflicting property claims that
the Ninth Circuit subsequently recognized in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
litigation.2 8 Justice Souter also commented on this "middle ground"
approach in his Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissent:
[T]his Court has consistently held that a public officer's assertion
of property title in the name of a government immune to suit
cannot defeat federal jurisdiction over an individual's suit to be rid
of interference with the property rights he claims. By a parity of
reasoning, we have of course drawn the jurisdictional line short of
ultimately quieting title (which would run directly against the State
as putative title-holder and not against its officers) or limiting the
affected government in any subsequent title action. "It is a
judgment to the effect only that, as between the plaintiff and the
defendants, the former is entitled to possession of the property, the
latter having shown no valid authority to withhold possession from
the plaintiff."21 9
In view of Treasure Salvors as well as other precedents involving federal
court proceedings implicating conflicting claims of title to property in the

215. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1252-55 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
supra notes 136-60 and accompanying text.

216. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 673-76 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 682 (plurality opinion).
218. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1252-55 (9th Cir. 1994); see also supra notes 14860 and accompanying text.

219. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 305 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (quoting Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1897)).
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possession of governmental officials,2 0 the Coeur d'Alene Tribe confidently
could believe itself to be on firm ground-albeit a "middle ground"-in
asking the Supreme Court to validate federal court jurisdiction over the
Tribe's Young suit against Idaho officials.
Defying that belief, the Court majority decided to remove the ground
from under the Tribe-in more ways than one. In Justice Kennedy's view,
Treasure Salvors was irrelevant to the Tribe's suit against Idaho officials
because "the state officials there were acting beyond the authority conferred
upon them by the State, a theory the Tribe does not even attempt to pursue in
the case before us."" Justice O'Connor purported to distinguish Treasure
Salvors in similar terms:
[T]he plurality in Treasure Salvors would have permitted the suit to
proceed not because the plaintiff's claim of title arguably rested on
federal law, but because state officials were acting beyond the
authority conferred on them by the State, quite apart from whether
their conduct also violated federal law. Because the Tribe does not
pursue such a theory, Treasure Salvors provides little guidance
here 2
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter underscored the revisionism manifest in the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe Court's reading of Treasure Salvors:

[T]he plurality's analysis in Treasure Salvors . . .noted that the
plaintiff salvage company claimed that Florida state officials lacked
authority to retain treasure recovered from the sunken galleon
because the galleon had been found on submerged land belonging
to the United States, not Florida, as determined under the
Submerged Lands Act .... While the plurality noted further that
the company claimed that the state officials lacked authority under
state law to retain the treasure, there was no question that23the
company claimed ownership of the treasure under federal law.2
Depriving the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of its crucial reliance on Treasure
Salvors through a result-driven reading of that plurality opinion, the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe majority "pierce[d] Young's distinction between State and
officer," purporting to discern in the Tribe's suit a request for relief that was
220. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's rejection of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's reliance
on the real property/officer suit cases of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), and Tindal,
167 U.S. at 204, see infra notes 290-313 and accompanying text.
221. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281 (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted).
223. Id. at 307 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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"indistinguishable in practice"-and uniquely so-"from a decree quieting
title."'
But in truth, as Justice Souter, emphasized in dissent, the Tribe's
officer suit was indistinguishable, for purposes of applying the doctrine of
Exparte Young, from the arrest warrant proceeding that Treasure Salvors
had permitted. 225 As Souter pointed out, "[i]f [the majority's] argument were
to the point it would ... render erroneous the holding[ ] in Treasure Salvors
"226

Indeed, Justice O'Connor's argument purporting to distinguish Treasure
Salvors would appear to be more in the nature of a conviction that the
holding in Treasure Salvors recognizing federal jurisdiction for ordering the
arrest of property in the possession of state officials is erroneous and for this
reason, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe duly was prevented from relying on that
holding. O'Connor, after all, had joined Justice White's dissenting position
with respect to the issue of the federal court arrest warrant proceeding in
Treasure Salvors, lamenting as an "aberration" the majority's decision to
permit the proceeding, and complaining further that
the consequences will be unfortunate.

Given that all property of

the State must be held by its officers . . .there is no item within

state possession whose ownership cannot be made the subject of
federal litigation .... The State must then defend on the merits:

it must persuade a federal court that its officers were justified in
be
holding the controverted property. . . . [Tihis inquiry will
227
tantamount to deciding the question of [the State's] title itself.

That Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the arrest warrant holding in
Treasure Salvors may have animated her efforts to "distinguish" that case in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe is further indicated by the doubt O'Connor raised as to
whether Treasure Salvors "remains sound" in light of the Court's intervening
In
decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.228
voted
to
of
the
Court
who
one
of
five
members
O'Connor
was
Pennhurst,
prohibit federal pendent jurisdiction over a suit seeking prospective relief
against state officials operating a state mental hospital in a manner hazardous
to and abusive of the hospital's patients, in clear violation of state statutory
law.229 In the PennhurstCourt's view, "Young . ..[is] inapplicable in a suit
224.

Id. at 306-07 (Souter, J., dissenting).

225. See id. at 306-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 307 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 717 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
228. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, .,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
229. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 92-93, 97, 106.
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against state officials on the basis of state law." 230 Justice O'Connor's
insistence in Coeur d'Alene Tribe that Treasure Salvors is distinguished
because there the validity of federal jurisdiction over the arrest warrant
proceeding rested on an allegation that state officials were acting ultra vires
state law, together with O'Connor's suggestion that Treasure Salvors "was
narrowed" by Pennhurst,23' would seem to indicate that O'Connor believes
that the Treasure Salvors holding no longer is valid. 2 In this regard, the
efforts of a majority of the Justices in Coeur d'Alene Tribe to "distinguish"
the Young-driven arrest warrant holding in Treasure Salvors would appear to
comprise a significant step toward overruling that holding and erecting in its
place the contrary, Young-negating position of the Treasure Salvors dissent,
i.e., that "enforcement of process by arrest of [property]" in the possession
of state officials is "a suit against the State "233-even where a plaintiff claims
to have paramount rights to such property by operation of federal law.
An eventual overruling of the Young-driven holding in Treasure Salvors
may be further anticipated by the Supreme Court's disposal of an Eleventh
Amendment case decided in the aftermath of Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In
California v. Deep Sea Research,' the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar an in rem admiralty action brought in federal court
against property claimed by a State when the res is not in the State's
possession. 235 Like Treasure Salvors, the case of Deep Sea Research
involved a salvaging company's efforts to obtain a federal court adjudication
of the company's claim of title to a sunken ship and its cargo.236 The State of
California made an appearance in the company's federal court in rem
proceeding against the disputed property to file a motion to dismiss the claim
230. Id. at 106.
231. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
232. But if O'Connor and the rest of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe majority are not questioning the
continuing validity of the arrest warrant holding in Treasure Salvors, then the distinction pressed by
both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor would seem strange indeed, for the Court then would
appear to be faulting the Coeur d'Alene Tribe for not coupling its allegation referring to federal law
with an allegation referring to state law that Pennhurst apparently doubted to be a valid basis for
any federal proceeding premised on Young. As such a strange requirement places the Court in an
unstable posture with respect to the validity of Treasure Salvors, one can predict that the Supreme
Court, as presently constituted, eventually will reconsider the type of officer suit permitted in
Treasure Salvors and reject it as an "aberration" that fails the "ordinariness" test of Coeur d'Alene
Tribe. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 227; infra
notes 234-74 and accompanying text.
233. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 702, 703 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
234. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
235. See id. at 494-95.
236. See id.
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on Eleventh Amendment grounds.237
Under the State's theory, the
company's in rem suit against the res was an unconsented suit against the
State itself, since the State asserted title to the ship and its cargo under both
state and federal law, and thus the suit should be barred by the State's Hans
immunity.238 Both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the State had not established by a preponderance of evidence any colorable
claim of title to the ship and its cargo under either state or federal law, and
accordingly dismissed as a matter of law the State's Eleventh Amendmentbased challenge to the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction.139 The
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the State's Eleventh Amendment
challenge, but not on the ground specified by the Ninth Circuit, i.e., that
"the State must prove its claim to the [res] by a preponderance of the
evidence in order to invoke the immunity afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment." 240
Rather, in the Supreme Court's view, the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to federal court in rem admiralty
proceedings where the res is not in the State's possession.24'
In reaching this result, Justice O'Connor distinguished the pair of
Supreme Court precedents-the two Ex parte New York cases 242-that
previously had been read as making Hans immunity as applicable to the
federal courts' Article III admiralty cases as it is to the federal courts' Article
III federal question cases. According to Justice O'Connor, while New York I
"explained that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt
from the operation of the Eleventh Amendment," the case actually concerned
in personam admiralty proceedings against a state official in his official
capacity, rather than in rem admiralty proceedings.24 3 And New York H,
according to Justice O'Connor, could be distinguished from Deep Sea
Research on the ground that in that earlier in rem admiralty suit, the res was
in the State's possession2"-or perhaps on the more tantalizing ground that in
New York II, "the Court did not specifically rely on the Eleventh Amendment
237.

See id. at 494.

238. See id. at 496-97.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id. at 497-98.
Id. at 500.
See id. at 494-95, 502.
Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) [hereinafter New York 1] (holding that

an in personam admiralty proceeding brought by an individual against a state officer in his official
capacity and not involving an allegation that the officer was acting under color of an
unconstitutional law is a suit against the State and thus prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment
absent the State's consent); Ex parte New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) [hereinafter

New York Il] (holding that an in rem admiralty proceeding may not be "based upon the seizure of
property owned by a State and used ... solely for [the State's] governmental uses and purposes").
243.

Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503.

244. See id. at 503-05.
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in its holding."245 Thus, in O'Connor's view, it was proper for the Court in
New York I and New York II to conclude that federal jurisdiction was lacking
with regard to the respective proceedings-by operation of the Eleventh
Amendment or otherwise-whereas the Eleventh Amendment does not
preclude an in rem admiralty action like the one in Deep Sea Research,
where the res is not in the State's possession. 2'
While it may seem odd for a Court as enamored of the Hans immunity
doctrine as the Rehnquist Court to go to such lengths to identify a latent
exception-albeit a narrow one-to the applicability of Hans, the Court's
facially anomalous decision in Deep Sea Research may be understood as a
strategic step toward overruling the Young-driven holding in Treasure
Salvors, and consequently toward further expanding Hans and contracting
Young. Thus, in Deep Sea Research, Justice O'Connor cast ample additional
doubt on whether Treasure Salvors "remains sound":
A plurality of the [Treasure Salvors] Court suggested that
New York H could be distinguished on the ground that, in Treasure
Salvors, the State's possession of maritime artifacts was
unauthorized, and the State therefore could not invoke the Eleventh
Amendment to block their arrest....

In this case, unlike in Treasure Salvors, [the plaintiff]
asserts rights to a res that is not in the possession of the State. The
Eleventh Amendment's role in that type of dispute was not decided
by the plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors ....

It is true that statements in the fractured opinions in Treasure
Salvors might be read to suggest that a federal court may not
undertake in rem adjudication of the State's interest in property
245. Id. at 503. Justice O'Connor did not elaborate on her suggestion that the Court in New
York II did not rely on the Eleventh Amendment in dismissing the plaintiff's in rem admiralty action
on grounds of sovereign immunity. However, the suggestion would appear to be based on the
Court's conclusion in New York H that "[tihe principle so uniformly held to exempt the property of
municipal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes from seizure by admiralty
process in remn, applies with even greater force to exempt public property of a State used and
employed for public and governmental purposes." New York 11, 256 U.S. at 511. With this
conclusion, the New York Ii Court apparently skirted the Eleventh Amendment issue of "whether a
suit in admiralty brought by private parties through process in rem against property owned by a
State is not in effect a suit against the State." Id. at 510.
246. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503-05.
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without the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res.
Those assertions, however, should not be divorced from the
context of Treasure Salvors and reflexively applied to the very
different circumstances presented by this case.
In Treasure
Salvors, the State had possession-albeit unlawfully-of the
artifacts at issue. Also, the opinion addressed the District Court's
authority to issue a warrant to arrest the artifacts, not the
disposition of title to them. .

.

. Thus, any references in Treasure

Salvors to what the lower courts could have done if they had solely
adjudicated title to the artifacts, rather than issued a warrant to
arrest the res, do not control the outcome of this case, particularly
given that it comes before us in a very different posture, i.e., in an
admiralty action in rem where the State makes no claim of actual
possession of the res.
Nor does the fact that Treasure Salvors has been cited for the
general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's
claim of title to property prevent a more nuanced application of
Treasure Salvors in the context of the federal courts' in rem
admiralty jurisdiction. Although the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to State
property interests, it does not necessarily follow that it applies to
in rem admiralty actions, or that in such actions, federal courts
may not exercise jurisdiction over property that the State does not
actually possess.247
In these passages, Justice O'Connor would appear to be questioning
primarily the "soundness" of Treasure Salvors' rationale for holding that, as
a consequence of Florida's Hans immunity, the federal district court lacked
the power "to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the
State's consent."2 4 In O'Connor's view, none of the opinions in Treasure
Salvors gave adequate ventilation to the need for a "more nuanced" approach
to the question of the proper scope of a federal court's jurisdiction, in light
of the Eleventh Amendment, over an in rem admiralty proceeding as such, as
contrasted with a more "typical" federal court proceeding implicating a
plaintiff's claim to property also claimed by a State. 249

247. Id. at 503-06 (citations omitted).
248. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion).
249. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506 (suggesting "a more nuanced application of
Treasure Salvors in the context of the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction"); id. at 510
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am now convinced that we should have affirmed the Treasure Salvors
judgment [recognizing federal jurisdiction for adjudicating the State's interest in the disputed
artifacts, as well as for ordering the arrest of the artifacts in the possession of state officials] in its
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However, dormant in these references to Treasure Salvors in Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Deep Sea Research are new seeds of doubt
concerning the "soundness" of the Young-driven holding in Treasure Salvors
as well-i.e., that "the federal court had jurisdiction to secure possession of
For instance, in
the property from the named state officials." 20
"paraphrasing" Treasure Salvors as having held that "the State's possession
of maritime artifacts was unauthorized, and [that] the State therefore could
not invoke the Eleventh Amendment to block their arrest,""' Deep Sea
Research subtly endorses Justice White's dissenting position in Treasure
Salvors-a dissenting position which Justice O'Connor had joined-that the
federal court arrest warrantproceeding that Treasure Salvors permitted was
really a proceeding against the State itself and thus should have been
prohibited by the State's Eleventh Amendment/Hans immunity. 2 2 In reality,
of course, Treasure Salvors held that the federal court's "execution of the
[arrest] warrant and transfer of the artifacts" to the plaintiff was not barred
by the States' Eleventh Amendment/Hans immunity because the proceeding
was not against the State itself; 3 rather, the proceeding in effect was
directed against state officials who were alleged to be holding the disputed
property in violation of the plaintiff's rights under federal law and who thus,
by virtue of the Young doctrine, had "no colorable basis on which to retain
By recasting Treasure Salvors as
possession of the artifacts. ", 21 4
countenancing a federal court proceeding involving a State's "unauthorized"
possession of property-where, in O'Connor's words, "the State ha[s]
possession[,] albeit unlawfully"2 5 -rather than a proceeding implicating state
officials' possession of property claimed to belong to a plaintiff by operation
of federal law, Deep Sea Research appears to be positioning the Court for
overruling the Young-driven holding in Treasure Salvors.
Moreover, by characterizing Treasure Salvors as having regarded
" 256
possession of the disputed artifacts in that case as merely "unauthorized,
entirety."); id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[it ought to be evident that the issue [of the application
of the Eleventh Amendment in admiralty cases] is open to reconsideration.").
250. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion).
251. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503 (emphases added); supra text accompanying note
247.
252. See TreasureSalvors, 458 U.S. at 705 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part).
253. Id. at 700 (plurality opinion).
254. Id. at 682 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 691 (pluralty opinion) ("It is clear that the
process at issue was directed only at state officials and not at the State itself or any agency of the

State.").
255. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 505; supra text accompanying note 247.
256. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503; supra text accompanying note 247.
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Justice O'Connor glossed over the fact that Treasure Salvors recognized the
federal court arrest warrant proceeding as cognizable under Young because
the plaintiff's claim implicated an ongoing violation by state officials of the
plaintiff's federal rights, not simply because possession of the disputed
property was alleged to be, in a generic sense, "unauthorized." 7 This
obscuring of the full import of Treasure Salvors' Young-driven holding is, of
course, precisely what enabled the majority in Coeur d'Alene Tribe to
"distinguish" Treasure Salvors by insisting that the Treasure Salvors holding
was based exclusively on the theory that there, "state officials were acting
beyond the authority conferred on them by the State. " 8 Given that the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissenters expressly objected to this refusal by the
majority to acknowledge the significance of the fact that Treasure Salvors
implicated a plaintiff's claim of property ownership under federal law, 259 it is
surprising to find those same dissenters signing off on an identical gloss in
Deep Sea Research.2 °
Another foreboding aspect of the Deep Sea Research Court's treatment of
Treasure Salvors is Justice O'Connor's assertion that Treasure Salvors
"addressed the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest the
artifacts, not the disposition of title to them," and O'Connor's further
suggestion that had the federal court "solely adjudicated title to the artifacts,
rather than issued a warrant to arrest the res," the Supreme Court
presumably would have held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the
proceeding. 26' Perhaps this depiction of Treasure Salvors is simply an effort
to reflect, accurately, the two divergent holdings in the case-i.e., that a
federal court arrest warrant proceeding dispossessing state officials of
property allegedly secured to a plaintiff under federal law must be permitted
pursuant to the Young doctrine, while a federal court quiet title adjudication
that pro tanto effectively concludes a State's purported interest in disputed
property is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of the
State's consent.262 Alternatively, however, this depiction may represent a
subtle interposition by Justice O'Connor of her disapproval of the Youngdriven holding in Treasure Salvors.263 This alternative view of the Deep Sea
257. See supra text accompanying note 223.
258. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 290 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment); supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
259. See supra text accompanying note 223.
260. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 493 (syllabus) (noting that Justice O'Connor

"delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court").
261. Id. at 506; supra text accompanying note 247.
262. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion); see also supra text
accompanying note 217.
263. See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
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Research Court's treatment of Treasure Salvors would help explain why
Justice O'Connor abbreviated the Young-driven holding in that earlier case as
simply recognizing the federal court's "authority to issue a warrant to arrest
the artifacts, " ' rather than as authorizing the federal court's "execution of
the warrant and transfer of the artifacts to [the plaintiff],"2 5 2thereby
"secur[ing]possession of the propertyfrom the named state officials." "
Thus, while Deep Sea Research's truncated rendition of the holding
pertaining to state officials in Treasure Salvors may be entirely "innocent," it
also may comprise a strategic distortion of Treasure Salvors with a view
toward "narrowing" that decision by overruling its crucial Young-driven
holding. 267 This alternative view of Deep Sea Research as a "stepping stone"
toward further diminishing Ex parte Young seems to be indicated in Justice
O'Connor's reference in Deep Sea Research to the Court's Eleventh
Amendment doctrine as "bar[ring] federal jurisdiction over general title
disputes relating to State property interests." 26'
Here, O'Connor's
characterization of Hans immunity as generally barring any federal court
proceeding involving a plaintiff's claim of ownership "relating to State
property interests" is compatible, of course, with Justice White's dissenting
position in Treasure Salvors, joined by O'Connor, which would have denied
federal jurisdiction entirely in that case, since to permit the federal
proceeding on the basis of Young, according to White, is to "indulge[ ] in the
fantasy that the enforcement of process by arrest of the [property] is
somehow divorced from the action to determine the State's claim to the
269
[property]. "
However, this "Young-devouring" view of the scope of Hans immunity in
property title cases is not compatible with Supreme Court precedentsincluding Treasure Salvors itself-affirming a "middle ground" approach to
the applicability of Young in such cases. 2 0 As Justice Souter explained in his
Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissent,
264.
265.
266.
267.

Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506; supra text accompanying note 247.
Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 700 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 682 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); supra text accompanying note 217.
An overruling of the Young-driven holding in Treasure Salvors via Deep Sea Research's

subtle distortions of that holding would parallel the Pennhurst Court's distortions of Larson v.

Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), in concluding that "Young ...[is]
inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law." Pennhurst State Sch. and
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); see infra note 303; supra notes 228-33 and
accompanying text.
268. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added); supra text accompanying note
247.
269. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 703 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
270. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 213-20.
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In each of those cases . . . the individual plaintiffs' success against
state officers was an aspersion on the government's claim of title.
But a consideration of the alternatives shows why such aspersion
was rightly accepted as a fair price to pay for the jurisdiction to
consider individual claims of federal right in those . . . cases, as it
has been accepted generally. The one alternative, of settling the
matter of title by compelling the State itself to appear in a federalquestion suit, is barred by Eleventh Amendment doctrine. The
other, of leaving an individual powerless to seek any federal
remedy for violation of a federal right, would deplete the federal
judicial power to a point the Framers could not possibly have
intended, given a history of officer liability riding tandem with
sovereign immunity extending back to the Middle Ages. The
holdings [in the title cases] . . .represent a line drawn short of
such an extreme, and if the Court may curse it as formalistic so
may any line be cursed that must be drawn somewhere between
unacceptable extremes. . . .The line is a fair via media between
the extremes. 27'

In the majority opinion in Deep Sea Research, Justice O'Connor would
appear to be deploying in dicta her view that any claim against state officials
that threatens to bring about an "aspersion on [a State's] claim of title" is a
claim against the State itself-even where the plaintiff alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law, and despite the teaching of Ex parte Young to the
contrary.27 2 Viewed in this way, Deep Sea Research-notwithstanding its
recognition of a limitation on the scope of Hans immunity with respect to a
relatively insignificant class of in rem admiralty proceedings-appears as a
harbinger for the Court's ultimate "narrowing" of Treasure Salvors through
the issuing of a general prohibition on any federal court proceeding against a
state official wherein the plaintiff's action could conclude a State's claim of
title to, or "actualpossession" of, disputed property, regardless of whether
the claim implicates an ongoing violation of federal law.273
It will be ironic indeed should the Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissentersa
Ginsburg
and
Breyer-accede
to
Justices
Souter,
Stevens,
271.

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 307-08 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)

(citations omitted).
272. See infra text accompanying note 404.
273. Deep Sea Research's dictum that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal jurisdiction over
general title disputes relating to State property interests," 523 U.S. at 506; supra text accompanying
note 268, gives added, latent meaning to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe Court's depiction of the Tribe's
suit as "close to the functional equivalent of quiet title" and ipso facto ineligible for Young relief,
521 U.S. at 282 (Souter, J. dissenting); supra note 211. Both of these innovative assertions portend
further activism by the Rehnquist Court in shrinking the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction
by creating a general property exception to Ex parte Young.
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"reconsideration" of Treasure Salvors in the hope of facilitating a bright-line
exception to the applicability of Hans in all in rem admiralty cases (whether
the res is in the State's possession or not),274 only to find Treasure Salvors'
crucial Young-affirming holding overruled by the Court's "States' rights"
majority-nullified by perhaps the most dramatic expansion of Hans
immunity since Hans itself. Yet such is the danger manifested in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe and its aftermath, unloosed by the Young-defying
jurisprudential maneuverings of the Rehnquist Court aimed at permanently
submerging the "middle ground" of Treasure Salvors.
4. The Ghost of Montana Rides Again
Just as critical to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe majority's decision to banish
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit from federal court because of its lack of
"ordinariness" was the Supreme Court's recognition that the Tribe's suit
implicated a challenge to the presumption that the United States conveyed to
Idaho all the waterways within the boundaries of the Tribe's reservation at
the moment Idaho entered the Union. 275 This presumption is, of course, the
one first forged by the Supreme Court in 1981 in Montana v. United
States2-a judicial decision born of the Court's mischaracterization of facts,
misapplication of law, and implicit subversion of the core principles of
federal Indian law, as discussed previously.277 Indeed, this "Montana
presumption" was, without a doubt, driving the Court's analysis from
beginning to end in Coeur d'Alene Tribe; and yet, as readers familiar with
Montana will be amazed to note, nowhere in Coeur d'Alene Tribe-not in the
"principal opinion," not in the concurring opinion, and not in the dissenting
opinion-did the Justices even once mention or cite Montana. Perhaps this
studious avoidance of invoking Montana by name reflects the Court's tacit
recognition of Montana's vulnerability to criticism. Be that as it may, what
remains clear is that in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Supreme Court incorporated
and exacerbated the same errors of reasoning that had become ossified in the
Court's Indian law jurisprudence as a result of Montana.
Thus, Justice Kennedy complained about how the prospective relief
sought by the Tribe controverted the State's presumption of "sovereign
274. See supra note 249.

275. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283 ("The importance of [submerged] lands to
state sovereignty explains our longstanding commitment to the principle that the United States is
presumed to have held navigable waters in acquired territory for the ultimate benefit of future States
276. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
277. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
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control over submerged lands, lands with a unique status in the law and
infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to respect."278 In similar
fashion, Justice O'Connor stated, "We have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of submerged lands to state sovereignty. Control of such lands is
critical to a State's ability to regulate use of its navigable waters." 279 These
assertions about the heightened interest that States have assumed generally in
navigable watercourses within state boundaries impart the Court's continuing
refusal, since 1981, to recognize that such otherwise unremarkable
observations have no legitimate application in the special context of disputes
over submerged lands located within the boundaries of federally protected
Indian reservations, where special rules of federal Indian law apply to
exempt such controversies from the confiscatory effects of those generic
"States' rights" assertions. 280 In this regard, Justice Kennedy's dissertation
on the evolution of general principles of British and American common law
concerning the "status" of navigable watercourses 281 is misplaced in a
discussion of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's rights to submerged lands within the
boundaries of the Tribe's own federally protected reservation-just as Justice
Stewart's comparable generalizations were misplaced in the Montana Court's
discussion of the Crow Tribe's rights to the Big Horn River within the
boundaries of the treaty-protected Crow Reservation.m
But there is something far more disturbing in the Rehnquist Court's
portrayal of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's officer suit as "unusual," and ipso
facto subject to special burdens vis-A-vis the Young doctrine, than simply a
recitation of Montana's multiple errors of analysis with respect to the issue
of Indian Tribes' federally protected rights to submerged lands. 283 The
majority in Coeur d'Alene Tribe went farther than that, and effectively
condemned the merits of the Tribe's claims in the guise of pursuing a
threshold jurisdictional inquiry, implicitly concluding-andon the basis of no
factual record284-that the State of Idaho in fact owned the submerged lands
285
implicated in the Tribe's suit.

The prejudice inherent in the Supreme Court's decision to banish the
Tribe's officer suit from federal court is evident in the controlling statements

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
merits of

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283.
Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283-87.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 551-53.
See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
In the litigation in the lower federal courts, the district court similarly prejudged the
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's claims. See supra notes 83-125 and accompanying text.
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made by both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor in their mutual efforts
at stating a "submerged-lands-specific" rule for removing the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's "unusual" suit beyond the reach of available federal court
jurisdiction. Justice Kennedy, for instance, condemned the Tribe's request
for prospective declaratory relief and injunctive relief by asserting that if the
Tribe were to prevail on the merits
substantially all benefits of ownership and control would shift from
the State to the Tribe. This is especially troubling when coupled
with the far-reaching and invasive relief the Tribe seeks ....

The

suit seeks, in effect, a determination that the lands in question are
not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State. The
requested injunctive relief would bar the State's principal officers
from exercising their governmental powers and authority over the
disputed lands and waters. The suit would diminish, even
extinguish, the State's control over a vast reach of lands and waters
long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory. To
pass this off as a judgment causing little or no offense to Idaho's
sovereign authority and its standing in the Union would be to
ignore the realities of the relief the Tribe demands.

Not only would the relief block all attempts by [state] officials
to exercise jurisdiction over a substantial portion of land but also
would divest the State of its sovereign control over submerged
lands . .m
Clearly, Kennedy was basing his decision to deny Young relief to the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe on Kennedy's own conclusive presumption that the Tribe did
not, in fact, own the submerged lands at issue, but that the State owned them
instead. Moreover, by impliedly maintaining that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
could not possibly be the rightful owner of the submerged lands at issue even
in the event that the Tribe were to prevail in federal court on the merits of its
claims, Justice Kennedy betrayed an unwillingness to entrust the resolution
of disputes involving submerged lands to any court that might adjudicate the
competing claims in a manner inconsistent with Kennedy's own manifest
prejudice against Indian Tribes' asserted rights to those lands. 2 8
286. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 282, 283 (emphases added).
287. The Supreme Court's prejudgment of the merits in banishing the Tribe's officer suit in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe is particularly troubling in view of the subsequent merits decision of a federal
district court in United States v. Idaho that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe-not the State of Idaho-has
beneficial title to the submerged lands within the present-day boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene
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This same prejudice pervades Justice O'Connor's portrayal of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's submerged-lands-centered officer suit as ipso facto fatally
defective. In keeping with Justice Kennedy's characterization of the Tribe's
suit, O'Connor purported to single out one of the "two important respects"
in which the Tribe's suit is "unlike a typical Young action," as follows:
"[T]he Tribe seeks to eliminate altogether the State's regulatory power over
the submerged lands at issue . . . .,;. and again: "[The] plaintiff seeks to
divest the State of all regulatory power over submerged lands .... ,289 Like
Kennedy's portrayal of the Tribe's officer suit, these assertions embody the
prejudicial notion that the Tribe could not possibly have exclusive federal
rights to the submerged lands at issue even if the Tribe were to prevail on the
merits. This prejudgment of the Tribe's claims by both Kennedy and
O'Connor necessarily misrepresents those claims, moreover, as it would
have been absurd for the Tribe to ask a federal court to "eliminate" or
"divest" or "extinguish" or "diminish" a right to the Tribe's on-reservation
submerged lands that no state officer ever had possessed, on behalf of the
State or otherwise, from the moment Idaho entered the Union onward.
5. Retracting the Lifeline of Lee and Tindal
The prejudice implicit in Justice O'Connor's description of the unique
features of the Tribe's officer suit in turn exerted a corrupting influence on
O'Connor's analysis of the Tribe's reliance on "a series of cases in which
plaintiffs successfully pursued in federal court claims that federal and state
Thus, O'Connor
officials wrongfully possessed certain real property." 2'
purported to distinguish United States v. Lee 29' and Tindal v. Wesley, 292 both
celebrated cases involving title suits against federal officers and state
officers, respectively, wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the right of
plaintiffs to vindicate their real property claims against acts of confiscation
by governmental officials attempting to shield their illegal conduct behind a
theory of sovereign immunity. Lee and Tindal were of no help to the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, according to Justice O'Connor, since in those cases
Reservation. See No. CV 94-328-N-EJL (D. Idaho July 28, 1998) (visited Sept. 30, 1999)
< http://www.id.uscourts.gov > ; see supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.

288. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added).

290. Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
291.
292.

106 U.S. 196 (1882).
167 U.S. 204 (1897).
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the Court made clear that the suits could proceed against the
officials because no judgment would bind the State. It was
possible, the Court found, to distinguish between possession of the
property and title to the property. . .. [H]owever, this case does
not concern ownership and possession of an ordinary parcel of real
property. . . .Here, the Tribe seeks a declaration not only that the
State does not own the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene, but also that
the lands are not within the State's sovereign jurisdiction.
Whatever distinction can be drawn between possession and
ownership of real property in other contexts, it is not possible to
make such a distinction for submerged lands. For this reason, Lee,
Tindal, and analogous cases do not control here.293
Justice O'Connor's attempt at distinguishing the real property title cases is
flawed, for several reasons. First, in contrast to O'Connor's myopic focus
on whether the Tribe's suit against Idaho officers could be said to "bind the
State," 294 the Court's overriding concern in both Lee and Tindal was the need
to recognize a remedy against "this evil" 295 of governmental officials
violating the rights of the people as guaranteed by law:
[Wihat reason is there that the... courts shall not give remedy to
the citizen whose property has been seized [by governmental
officers]?
* ., [The question] seems to be opposed to all the principles
upon which the rights of the citizens, when brought in collision
with the acts of the government, must be determined. In such
cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of
the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by the
296
officers of the government, professing to act in its name.
Significantly, the Lee Court went on to suggest that "compared to this evil,"
any concern about whether a court's judgment against governmental officials
"can bind or conclude the government" "will be seen to be small indeed...
and much diminished, if [it does] not wholly disappear" in consideration of
the fact that "the government is always at liberty, notwithstanding any such
judgment, to avail itself of all the remedies which the law allows to every
person, natural or artificial, for the vindication and assertion of its rights."297

293.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 290-91 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
294. Supra text accompanying note 293.
295. Lee, 106 U.S. at 221.
296. Id. at 218-19.
297. Id. at 221, 222.

concurring in part and
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Justice O'Connor's overwrought concern about the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's
officer suit "bind[ing] the State" in fact resonates with a hyperbole
reminiscent of the dissenting opinion in Lee, authored by Justice Gray and
joined by three other members of the Court, including Justice Bradley, who
eight years after Lee would himself write the opinion for the Hans Court:
The sovereign cannot hold property except by agents. To maintain
an action for the recovery of possession of property held by the
sovereign through its agents, not claiming any title or right in
themselves, but only as the representatives of the sovereign and in
its behalf, is to maintain an action to recover possession of the
property against the sovereign; and to invade such possession of
the agents, by execution or other judicial process, is to invade the
possession of the sovereign, and to disregard the fundamental
maxim that the sovereign cannot be sued.
That maxim is not limited to a monarchy, but is of equal force
in a republic. 298
The hostility of the Lee dissenters to any title-related claim against
governmental officials who purport to possess real property in the name of
an immune government rapidly lost favor with the Court's members, so that
when Tindal was decided fifteen years after Lee, the Court unanimously
rejected that sentiment, in a case involving-like Coeur d'Alene Tribe-a suit
against state officials:
The settled doctrine of this court wholly precludes the idea that a
suit against individuals to recover possession of real property is a
suit against the State simply because the defendant holding
possession happens to be an officer of299the State and asserts that he
is lawfully in possession on its behalf.
As the majority did in Lee, the entire Court in Tindal regarded the
governmental officials' lament that "the judgment in this case may conclude
the State" as lacking merit, since "it will be open to the State to bring any
action that may be appropriate to establish and protect whatever claim it has
to the premises in dispute., 300 And, as in Lee, once again, the Tindal Court
saw
fit
to
dispose
of
this
"consideration"
about
the
"judgment . . . conclud[ing] the State" in a manner demonstrating that the
Court viewed this "consideration" as little more than a formalistic objection

298. Id. at 226 (Gray, J., dissenting).
299. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 221 (1897).
300. Id. at 223.
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of de minimis weight 301 in view of the enormity of the "wrong" that the
Court felt compelled to avert:
The Withholding of . . . possession by [the state officials] is

consequently a wrong, but a wrong which, according to the view of
[the officials] cannot be remedied if the [officials] chose to assert
that the State, by them as its agents, is in rightful possession. The
doors of the courts of justice are thus closed against one legally
entitled to possession, by the mere assertion of the [officials] that
they are entitled to possession for the State. But the Eleventh
Amendment gives no immunity to officers or agents of a State in
withholding the property of a citizen without authority of law. And
when such officers or agents assert that they are in rightful
possession, they must make good that assertion when it is made to
that the legal title and
appear in a suit against them as individuals
3°2
right of possession is in the plaintiff.

By positing an exalted "concern" that the Tribe's officer suit in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe would "bind the State," Justice O'Connor in effect was
exhuming the misplaced and exaggerated sentiments of the Lee dissent,
replete with its disregard of the paramount importance of safeguarding the
people's liberty and property from deprivation at the hands of governmental
officials acting in defiance of federal law. In this regard, Justice O'Connor
did not distinguish Lee and Tindal so much as she simply refused to follow
those precedents for lack of any conviction about their continuing vitality. 303
301. That the Tindal Court viewed the state officials' argument about the
"judgment . . . conclud[ing] the State" as relatively unimportant is indicated by the fact that the
Court disposed of that objection in the equivalent of an afterthought, limiting its responsive
comments to a single paragraph at the end of the Court's twenty page opinion. Most of that solitary
paragraph consists, moreover, of an excerpt from Lee, in which the Lee Court summarily rejected
essentially the same argument as put forth there by federal officials. See id. at 223-24.
302. Id. at 222.
303. Justice O'Connor's implicit disapproval of the holdings of Lee and Tindal is reminiscent
of a striking comment appearing in a footnote of Justice Powell's Pennhurst majority opinion,
which O'Connor joined. After referring to Tindal as an "old case[ ]"wherein "the allegation was
that the defendant[ ] had committed [a] common-law tort[ ]," Powell asserted that "[t]ort cases such
as [Tinda/] were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949)." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 110 n. 19 (1984).
But, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent in Pennhurst, see id. at 158 n.42 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Larson did not overrule Tindal-a fact which accounts for Justice Powell's failure to
cite any particular passage from the twenty-three page Larson opinion which accomplished the
supposed overruling. Indeed, Larson cited Tindal with approval, as a case in which the Court
properly permitted the plaintiffs suit against state officials to go forward in federal court. See
Larson, 337 U.S. at 698 n.20. Thus, after explaining that "specific relief in connection with
property held or injured by officers of the sovereign acting in the name of the sovereign" would be
available pursuant to "a claim that the taking of the property or the injury to it was not the action of
the sovereign because unconstitutional," the Larson Court characterized Tindal as standing for the
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Thus, Justice Souter observed that the majority's dismissal of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's officer suit on the argument that "the relief sought would be
proposition-consistentwith Larson's holding-that "a suit to recover possession of property owned
by the plaintiff and withheld by officers of a State [is] analogous to a suit to enjoin the officers from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute." Id. at 698 & n.20.
As Justice Stevens suggested further in his Pennhurst dissent, the Pennhurst majority's
"incorrect" assertion in dicta that Larson had overruled Tindal, see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at
158 n.42 (Stevens, J., dissenting), is perhaps best explained by observing that the Pennhurst
majority itself distorted Larson by taking a key quotation from Larson out of context, "ignor[ing]
sentences immediately preceding and following the quoted passage stating in terms that where an
official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts ultra vires and is not protected by sovereign
immunity"-the very proposition, in other words, that the Pennhurst majority denied. Id. at 157
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Larson, 337 U.S. at 689-90). Criticizing the Pennhurst
majority's distortion of Larson in trying to make it appear as though Pennhurst were compatible
with Larson, Justice Stevens stated:
[W]ithout explanation, the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of Larson
[permitting state-law-based officer suits in federal court where the plaintiff
alleges conduct by state officials that is either (1) beyond the power delegated
by the State, or (2) forbidden by the State; see Larson, 337 U.S. at 689] and
holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has statutorily
prohibited. Thus, contrary to the Court's assertion, Larson is in conflict with
the result reached today.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 157-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
While the particular officer suit barred by the Pennhurst decision did not, of course, implicate
an allegation that federal law-as in Coeur d'Alene Tribe-had been violated, the Pennhurst Court's
willingness to distort precedent in order to make bold, new pronouncements of law in both its
holding and its dicta clearly portended the kind of dangerous recklessness with precedent manifested
in the opinions of both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. More
specifically, Pennhurst's off-hand assertion in dicta that Tindal has been overruled provided a basis,
sub silentio, for Justice O'Connor's disregard of both Tindal and Lee in banishing the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's officer suit. The trajectory created by the juxtaposition of Pennhurst and Coeur
d'Alene Tribe-and perhaps the recently decided Deep Sea Research as well, see supra notes 234-74
and accompanying text-portend that the Rehnquist Court will continue to disregard and distort
precedent to the extent such precedent is incompatible with the Court's own innovative "States'
rights" ideology.
For good measure, it should be noted that a sensible interpretation of the Pennhurst Court's
comment about Tindal having been "explicitly overruled in Larson" is the one put forward by the
Ninth Circuit in a footnote in its opinion in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation. Reflecting on a case
decided by the Fifth Circuit which "held that the Supreme Court overruled Tindal in
Larson . . .and that this line of cases therefore provides no support for the proposition that an
action for an injunction against a state official to deliver possession of property is not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment," the Ninth Circuit stated, "We respectfully disagree. Pennhurst concludes
that to the extent that Tindal was a tort case, it was overruled by Larson. However, to the extent
that Tindal alleged a violation of a federal right, it clearly remains valid." Coeur d'Alene Tribe v.
Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1252 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem.
Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 110 n.19)). Of
course, whether the Supreme Court ultimately approves or rejects this sensible explanation of the
Court's dicta in Pennhurst remains to be seen. But in view of the Rehnquist Court's continuing
efforts at undermining the efficacy of the Tindal line of cases, as evinced in Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
the likelihood of a Young-affirming resolution of the questions raised in Pennhurst about those cases
seems remote indeed.
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indistinguishable in practice from a decree quieting title" in effect "render[s]
erroneous" not only the holding in Treasure Salvors, as discussed
previously, 3" but also "the holding[ ] in . . . Lee (as interpreted by
30 5
Larson)."
A second flaw in Justice O'Connor's efforts at distinguishing on-point
real property title cases like Lee and Tindal is O'Connor's disregard of the
persuasive reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in its decision to allow the Tribe's
suit to proceed to the merits in federal court. 3 ' As the Ninth Circuit pointed
out, "[t]he Supreme Court has long held that an action against state officials
to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law is not precluded by virtue of the
fact that the determination of the controversy necessarily involves a question
of the state ownership of property. "" For the Ninth Circuit, then, the fact
that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's officer suit implicated such a question could
not, consistent with prior Supreme Court holdings, justify a refusal to allow
the Tribe to pursue its claims in federal court. As discussed previously, 0 8
the Ninth Circuit's solution to negotiating the Hans-driven requirement that
an officer suit not (in Justice O'Connor's words) "bind the State "3 9 was to
"allow[ ] all relief other than relief that would foreclose the State's claim in
future judicial proceedings. "310 This, of course, was the same solution
applied by the Supreme Court when the Court confronted identical
"concerns" about "bind[ing] the State" in both Tindal 3l' and Treasure
Salvors.312 In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice O'Connor offered no explanation
for rejecting the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Tribe's officer suit
would not "bind the State" in any dispositively significant manner when
viewed in light of antecedent Eleventh Amendment decisions of the Supreme
Court involving plaintiffs' claims of entitlement to property in the possession
of governmental officials.i 3
304. See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
305. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 307 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)

(adverting to Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
306. See supra notes 134-60 and accompanying text.
307. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1252 (citing inter alia Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204,
213-22 (1897); and Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670, 685-87 (1982)

(plurality opinion)).
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
Supra text accompanying note 293.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 42 F.3d at 1254; supra text accompanying note 154.
See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.

312. See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
313. In a recent article, Professor Vicki Jackson points out another flaw in the majority's
efforts at distinguishing precedent in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Reflecting on the rationale proffered by
Justice O'Connor for distinguishing the Court's title cases, see supra text accompanying note 293,

Professor Jackson writes:
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6. The New Rule for Discriminating Against Young Suits Brought by
Indian Tribes

What Justice O'Connor did explain in connection with the Court's
decision to banish the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's officer suit from federal court
is that "this case does not concern ownership and possession of an ordinary
parcel of real property ....
Here, the Tribe seeks a declaration not only that
the State does not own the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene, but also that the lands
are not within the State's sovereign jurisdiction. " 314 This observation about
the uniqueness of questions concerning land ownership and sovereign
jurisdiction within the boundaries of Indian reservations imparts a third
major flaw in O'Connor's attempts at distinguishing the title cases upon
which the Tribe relied; for, as Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, "[w]hile
[O'Connor's] point is no doubt correct, it has no bearing on Young's
application in this case."3 15 As Souter further explained, the Supreme Court
has validated Young suits in cases with more far-reaching impacts on state
regulatory jurisdiction than the impact implicated by the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's suit:
If . . . there were any doubt that claims implicating state
regulatory jurisdiction are as much subject to Young as cases
contesting the possession of property, the facts of Ex parte Young
itself would suffice to place that doubt to rest. Young was a suit to
enjoin a State's Attorney General from enforcing a state statute
regulating railroad rates and threatening violators with heavy
sanctions. One would have difficulty imagining a state activity any
more central to state sovereignty than such economic regulation or
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion distinguished Lee and Tindal because,
she argued, they did not involve a claim that a state could not exercise

regulatory jurisdiction. It is true that the plaintiff in Lee was a private citizen,
and not an Indian tribe, and therefore his claim to the property did not bring
with it the possibilities for regulatory jurisdiction of Indian tribes as plaintiffs.

But because the lands in question in Lee were then being held by the federal
government, recognition of the Lee claim of private ownership would indeed
have substantial consequences for the regulatory jurisdiction of the government
in possession:
the federal government has power to exercise legislative

jurisdiction over areas within states owned by it, especially for military
purposes, while if the property were privately owned, legislative jurisdiction
(over real property laws, zoning etc.) would fall to the state (not the federal)
government.
The distinction proposed by Justice O'Connor, then, is
illusory ....
Jackson, supra note 13, at 311 n.46 (citations omitted).
314. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 290-91 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
315. Id. at 309 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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any more expressive of its governmental character than the
provision for heavy fines. A State obliged to choose between
power to regulate a lake and lake bed on an Indian reservation and
power to regulate economic affairs and punish offenders would not

(knowing nothing more) choose the lake.
Implications for
regulatory jurisdiction, therefore, do nothing to displace Ex parte
6
Young.

31

Thus, it would be erroneous to say that Justice O'Connor "explained" the
Court's decision to deny the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's request for Young relief.
In truth, what O'Connor did was describe a new rule for discriminating
against claims for relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, forbidding
such relief "[wihere a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all regulatory
power over submerged lands."317
What is most disturbing about this judicial mandate is that notwithstanding
Justice O'Connor's efforts to couch it in ostensibly "neutral" language, this
new rule in fact strategically targets all Indian Tribes in the United States as
the sole recipients of the discriminatory treatment henceforth required. This
is made clear by noting that, as a practical matter, the Court's new rule will
operate only where the plaintiff bringing suit over submerged lands against
state officials happens to be an Indian Tribe, since in such cases only will
regulatory jurisdiction over the lands at issue vary according to whether or
not the plaintiff-i.e., the Tribe-has ownership rights to those lands. 1
Indeed, the fact that the Court's new "submerged-lands-specific" rule will
operate, as a practical matter, against Indian Tribes only appears to be the
316. Id. at 309-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
318. As Professor Jackson explains, Justice O'Connor's rationale for distinguishing
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), in excluding from the scope of Young relief Indian
Tribes' officer suits implicating questions of the ownership of submerged lands is essentially
illusory, since "recognition of the Lee claim of private ownership would indeed have substantial
consequences for the regulatory jurisdiction of the government in possession." Jackson, supra note
13, at 311 n.46; see supra note 313. Professor Jackson's important observation concerning the
weakness of O'Connor's rationale in purporting to distinguish Lee does not, of course, dilute the
point that the rule emerging from Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a rule that places a unique burden on
Indian Tribes vis-A-vis the Young doctrine, since the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
States brought by the United States to vindicate federal interests, whether related to the ownership
and regulation of submerged lands or otherwise. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646
(1892) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought by the United States);
see also infra note 467. Hence, the new rule of Coeur d'Alene Tribe will operate to shield state
officials from a claim of unlawful appropriation and regulation of submerged lands brought in
federal court by an Indian Tribe, where the Tribe's victory on the merits effectively might preclude
state regulatory jurisdiction, but will not impede any comparable federal court claim brought against
a State itself by the United States, where the United States' victory on the merits likewise
effectively might preclude state regulatory jurisdiction.
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The Supreme Court itself has recognized that "[tihe whole intercourse
between the United States and [Indian Tribes] is, by our constitution and
'
laws, vested in the government of the United States,"323
and that "[b]ecause
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where [Indian Tribes] are
found are often their deadliest enemies."324 Congress and the Executive
Branch likewise have recognized the crucial importance of providing Indian
Tribes with a federal forum for the adjudication of Tribes' federally
protected rights. For instance, in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which
authorizes federal court jurisdiction over federal question suits brought by
Indian Tribes, Congress included in its accompanying supportive
documentation the Assistant Secretary of the Interior's observation that with
respect to disputes concerning tribal lands, "[t]he issues involved are Federal
issues and the tribes should not be required to conduct the litigation in State
courts."025

As Professor Vicki Jackson explains:

If there is any kind of case in which federal, rather than state
courts, would seem to be better suited to judicial resolution of a
dispute, it would be in a dispute between a federally protected
Indian tribe, and a state, over the effects of the acts of a president
of the United States in conferring interests on that tribe. Perhaps it
is not a coincidence that the two cases the Court chose to narrow
the availability of relief against officers involved affirmative claims
by Indian tribes.326
The decision of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe Court forcing Indian Tribes to bring
officer suits concerning the ownership of on-reservation submerged lands
only in state courts seriously undermines the federal government's essential
and historic obligation to safeguard tribal lands and jurisdiction under federal
law. 327 And, needless to say, this decision also places an intolerable burden

323. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
324. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
325. H.R. REP. No. 2040 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, 3148 (statement of
Harry R. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior). The legislative history of 28 U.S.C
§ 1362 also includes the following endorsement from the Secretary of the Interior concerning
federal court adjudication of issues pertaining to the federal-tribal relationship: "There is a large
body of Federal law which states the relationship, obligations and duties which exist[ ] between the

United States and the Indian tribes.

The Federal forum is therefore appropriate for litigation

involving such issues." Id. at 3147 (statement of U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the
Secretary).
326. Jackson, supra note 13, at 322-23 (footnotes omitted). The other of the two cases to
which Professor Jackson alludes is Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See infra note
327.
327. Reflecting on the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe to deny Young relief to a
different Indian Tribe, see supra note 210, Professor Jackson provides additional illuminating
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precise reason for Justice O'Connor's satisfaction with the Court's decision
in Coeur d'Alene Tribe; for, as discussed below, O'Connor was loath to
condone the more expansive rule of decision proposed by Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist only, as that proposal would threaten to
strip even non-tribal plaintiffs of an opportunity to vindicate their federal
rights in federal court under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 3 9 Apparently,
denying Young rights to parties other than Indian Tribes was more than
Justice O'Connor was willing to countenance. 2"
The rule of Coeur d'Alene Tribe thus stripping all Indian Tribes of Young
relief against the illegal appropriation of on-reservation submerged lands by
state officials constitutes a discriminatory judicial mandate that is especially
untenable in view of Tribes' clear, long-recognized, continuing, and growing
need to be insulated by the federal government from the destruction of
Tribes' rights by state governments. It must be presumed that all five
members of the Supreme Court who sanctioned the creation of this
discriminatory rule also accepted as credible Justice Kennedy's proposition in
that portion of Kennedy's opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist only,
that "there is neither warrant nor necessity to adopt the Young device to
provide an adequate judicial forum for resolving the dispute between the
Tribe and the State" since "Idaho's courts are open to hear the case." 3 21 This
profession of faith in the sufficiency of state forums for resolving
controversies between Indian Tribes and state governments disregards the
most essential principle of federal Indian law as reflected in acts of Congress
and decisions of the Supreme Court dating back to the very founding of the
United States-the federal government's indispensable obligation to
federal law against illegal and invasive
safeguard Indian rights under
322
encroachments by the States.

319. See infra notes 331-657 and accompanying text.
320. In a recent article, Professor Vizquez speculates that Justice Kennedy's proposal in

Coeur d'Alene Tribe for diminishing the scope of Young may have come close to gaining the
acceptance of five members of the Court:
The structure of Justice Kennedy's "principal" opinion in the case
suggests that he was initially writing for a five-Justice majority but ultimately
lost the votes of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. The portions of
Justice Kennedy's opinion that the three Justices ultimately refused to join
would have drastically revised Ex parte Young doctrine.

V~iluez, supra note 13, at 43 (footnote omitted).
321. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).

322. As the Supreme Court observed in 1945, "[tlhe policy of leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789
(1945).
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B. Toward the Dismantling of Ex parte Young

1. Prohibiting Young When a State Forum is Available
The proposal put forward in Coeur d'Alene Tribe by Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist only, 3 is essentially a scheme for
overhauling and effectively doing away with Ex parte Young entirely,
nullifying that liberty-affirming doctrine through an erroneous, ideologydriven re-interpretation of settled Supreme Court decisions. Under the
Kennedy/Rehnquist view, a plaintiff generally would be forbidden from
seeking prospective relief in federal court against state officials accused of
violating federal law so long as a state court is available to hear the case.
This displacement in toto of the Young doctrine is foreordained, under the
Kennedy/Rehnquist view, by observing that in the past, Young suits were
permitted on the basis of two considerations: (1) the unavailability of state
forums for adjudicating suits against state officials; 332 and (2) the belief that
when governmental officials commit common law torts (to which violations
of federal law purportedly are analogous), they pro tanto are not shielded by
sovereign immunity.33 3 Since both of these considerations long since have
been obviated and rendered moot by intervening developments,334 so too, in
the Kennedy/Rehnquist view, has the general need for the Young doctrine.
The other seven Justices objected to the efforts of Justice Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist to graft onto prior Supreme Court decisions
permitting Young relief an unspoken reliance on the unavailability of a state
forum.33 5 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor pointed out that
Kennedy's opinion "cites not a single case in which the Court expressly
relied on the absence of an available state forum as a rationale for applying
Young. 3 36 O'Connor also criticized Kennedy's invocation of language from
prior decisions in which the Court expressed concern about the lack of a
remedy at law in the granting of Young relief, noting that "the inadequacy of
a legal remedy is a prerequisite for equitable relief in any case. That we
331.
332.
333.
334.

See id. at 270-80 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
See infra notes 335-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 386-446 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 382-85 and accompanying text, and notes 388-404 and accompanying

text.

335. Justice Kennedy identified as an "instance[ ] where Young has been applied" cases
"where there is no state forum available to vindicate federal interests, thereby placing upon Article
III courts the special obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal statutory and constitutional law."
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).

336. Id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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pronounced state legal remedies inadequate before permitting the suit to
proceed is unsurprising, and it is not a sufficient basis for the principal
opinion's broad conclusion.'
Both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Coeur d'Alene Tribe take
exception with the Kennedy/Rehnquist "unavailability-of-a-state-forum"
requirement for Young relief by underscoring the fact that Ex parte Young
itself relies on two late-nineteenth century cases in which the Court permitted
suits against state officers to proceed in federal court notwithstanding the
availability of state forums-Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.338 and
Smyth v. Ames.3 39 Responding to Justice Kennedy's suggestion that in those
older cases, as in Young itself, the Court was "reluctan[t] to place much
reliance on the availability of a state forum" because of "the prevalence of
the [now-abandoned] idea that if a State consented to suit in a state forum it
had consented, by that same act, to suit in a federal forum, " 3 Justice
O'Connor stated:
Both Reagan and Smyth, like Young, involved challenges to state
enforcement of railroad rates. In each case, the Court permitted
the federal suit to proceed in part because state statutes authorized
state court challenges to those rates. As Young made clear,
however, the fact that the States had waived immunity in their own
courts was not the sole basis for permitting the federal suit to
proceed. Discussing Reagan, the Young Court stated: "This court
held that [language authorizing a suit in state court] permitted a suit
in [federal court], but it also held that, irrespective of that consent,
the suit was not in effect a suit against the State (although the
Attorney General was enjoined), and therefore not prohibited under
the [Eleventh] [Almendment.

.

. . Each of these grounds is

effective and both are of equal force." Similarly, the Young Court
emphasized that the decision in Smyth was not based solely on the
state statute authorizing suit in state court; rather, it was based
on
34
the conclusion that the suit "was not a suit against a State. " 1
O'Connor's observation that the Young Court did not rely on the
unavailability of a state forum is supported by the fact that in Smith v.

337. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
infra note 387 and accompanying text.
338. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
339. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
340. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
341. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 153-54 (1908)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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Chief Justice Marshall never suggested that a suit against the
officers "would be barred" [as Justice Kennedy posited in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe] if the State could be named. Instead, he made clear
that since the suit would be allowed to proceed if the State could be
made a party, it should be allowed to proceed in its
absence.... [T]he Court did not suggest that a remedy in state
court was absent, or that any significance attached to the
availability of a state forum.365

The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion likewise misreads the Court's decision in
United States v. Lee. 366 Lee involved a private suit against federal officialsnot state officials-for those officials' unlawful taking of the plaintiff's land
in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 67 The
Lee Court allowed the plaintiffs suit to proceed not because "a state forum

This is certainly true, where it is in the power of the plaintiff to make
them parties; but if the person who is the real principal, the person who is the
true source of the mischief, by whose power and for whose advantage it is
done, be himself above the law, be exempt from all judicial process, it would
be subversive of the best established principles, to say that the laws could not
afford the same remedies against the agent employed in doing the wrong,
which they would afford against him, could his principal be joined in the
suit .... [T]he appellants acknowledge that an action at law would lie against
the agent, in which full compensation ought to be made for the injury. It being
admitted, then, that the agent is not privileged by his connexion with his
principal, that he is responsible for his own act, to the full extent of the injury,
why should not the preventive power of the Court also be applied to him?
Why may it not restrain him from the commission of a wrong, which it would
punish him for committing? We put out of view the character of the principal
as a sovereign State, because that is made a distinct point, and consider the
question singly as respects the want of parties. Now, if the party before the
Court would be responsible for the whole injury, why may he not be restrained
from its commission, if no other party can be brought before the
Court? .. .[N]o plausible reason suggests itself to us, for the opinion, that an
injunction may not be awarded to restrain the agent, with as much propriety as
it might be awarded to restrain the principal, could the principal be made a
party.
We think it a case in which a Court of equity ought to interpose.
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 842-45.
365. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 315-16 n.12 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
366. 106 U.S. 196 (1882); see Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (describing Lee as "permitting suit for injunctive relief to proceed where
there did not otherwise exist a legal remedy for the alleged trespass").
367. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 218 ("[T]he verdict of the jury finds that [the disputed land] is and
was the private property of the plaintiff, and was taken without any process of law and without any
compensation. ").
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was unavailable," as Justice Kennedy suggested in Coeur d'Alene Tribe,368
but because the Lee Court recognized that a manifest injustice would result if
"the courts cannot give a remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his
property by force, his estate seized and converted [by governmental officers]
to the use of the government without lawful authority, without process of
law, and without compensation."369 Indeed, so removed was the Lee Court
from believing that its decision to permit the plaintiff's suit was compelled
because "a state forum was unavailable" that the Court took pains to reassure
the defendants that the Court's decision would not condemn federal officials
to defending against suits brought in state forums.37 Thus, Lee, like Osborn,
clearly provides no support for the Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe for allowing a federal-law-based injunctive suit against state
officials to proceed to the merits in federal court only when a state forum is
unavailable .371
Similarly misplaced is the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's reliance on
Poindexter v. Greenhow as a precursor for the "unavailability-of-a-stateforum" theory.372 In Poindexter, the plaintiff taxpayer Poindexter brought a
detinue action in state court alleging a violation of the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution against Greenhow, an official charged with
368.
369.
370.
plaintiffs'

See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 220-21; see also supra notes 290-305 and accompanying text.
The Lee Court explained that federal officials, when sued for allegedly violating
federal rights, retained the option of escaping potentially hostile state forums via removal

to federal court:

If it be said that the proposition here established may subject the property,
the officers of the United States, and the performance of their indispensable
functions to hostile proceedings in the State courts, the answer is, that no case
can arise in a State court, where the interests, the property, the rights, or the
authority of the Federal government may come in question, which cannot be
removed into a court of the United States under existing laws. In all cases,
therefore, where such questions can arise, they are to be decided, at the option

of the parties representing the United States, in courts which are the creation of
the Federal government.
From such a (federal] tribunal, no well-founded fear can be entertained of
injustice to the government, or of a purpose to obstruct or diminish its just

authority.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 222-23.
371. For a discussion of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's trivializing of the Lee plaintiff's
Fifth Amendment-based claim as amounting to nothing more than an "alleged trespass," see infra
notes 394-403 and accompanying text.
372. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 272 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 299 (1885))
(describing Poindexter as "explaining that the state-law remedy for Virginia's unconstitutional

refusal to accept its own bond coupons in satisfaction of state taxes was, in fact, 'no remedy'").
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addressing the question of the state official's purported immunity from suit in
state court 380 (with respect to which the Court did not discuss whether an
adequate remedy was available in the state forum, since this was not germane
to the Court's resolution of the sovereign immunity question), and the second
part addressing the merits of the plaintiff's Contract-Clause-based detinue
action (with respect to which the Court explained that the supposed
"remedy" available under a Virginia statute was in fact "no remedy," and
thus did not operate to defeat the plaintiff's claim on the merits). This kind
of conflating of sovereign immunity and merits issues is what makes Justice
Kennedy's reliance on Osborn likewise fatally defective as "support" for the
Kennedy/Rehnquist "unavailability-of-a-state-forum" theory for recognizing
federal jurisdiction over Young suits, as explained above.38 ' Hence, none of
these early cases-Osbom, Lee, Poindexter-cited by Justice Kennedy as
nineteenth century precursors for an "unavailability-of-a-state-forum"
prerequisite for Young relief provides impetus for the dismantling of Ex parte
Young, as advanced by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe.
Moreover, as Justice Souter observed, the Kennedy/Rehnquist position
maintaining that Young relief generally is permitted only where a state forum
is unavailable for resolving a plaintiff's federal-law-based claim for
prospective relief against state officials is essentially an insistence that Young
relief is to be denied in all cases. 382 This follows from two important
380. Professor Vdizquez points out that Poindexter's discussion of the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment is peculiar and somewhat ambiguous, given the fact that Poindexter was a

case that reached the Supreme Court from the state courts:
There are two possible reasons why the [Poindexter] Court thought it necessary
to discuss the Eleventh Amendment in this case . . . . First, the Court may

have believed that the Amendment applied in state court because it conferred
an immunity from liability, not just from federal jurisdiction. Second, the
Court may have believed that the Amendment, when it applies, limits the

Court's appellate jurisdiction. I suggest[ I . . . that these two reasons are
actually one and the same, for a liability against the states that is not
enforceable in the federal courts is, as a practical matter, no liability at all.
That the Court in Poindexter engaged in an extended discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment in a case brought in the state courts without bothering to say why
the Amendment was relevant suggests that the Court, too, regarded the reasons
as identical.
Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1736. But regardless of whether the "sovereign immunity" withheld
from the state official in Poindexter was conceptualized as an alleged immunity from suit in state

court or an alleged immunity from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Poindexter Court
disposed of that "sovereign immunity" issue apartfrom addressing the separate issue of whether
the alleged availability of a state-law remedy defeated the merits of the plaintiff's Contract-Clausebased detinue action. See supra notes 374-78 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 356-65 and accompanying text.
382. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 316-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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observations put forward by Justice Souter: (1) the fact that today, "in all
[fifty] states . . . private plaintiffs may obtain declaratory and injunctive
relief in state court for the acts of state officials in circumstances where relief
would be available in federal court"; 3 13 and (2) the fact that "in every case in
which Ex parte Young supports the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction
against a state officer . . . the declination of state jurisdiction over the same
officer on state immunity grounds" is prohibited under Supreme Court
precedent.3" These observations accentuate the point that, as a practical
matter, the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme in Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a proposal
for eliminating Young relief altogether.385
2. Eviscerating Young by Equating Violations of Federal Law with
Common Law Torts
In destabilizing the Young doctrine generally, the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion presses a comparison between officer suits that allege violations of
383. Id. at 317-18 n.15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 317 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter explained, the observation that state
courts are prohibited from turning away suits that satisfy the traditional criteria for Young relief is
compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). In
Souter's words, General Oil effectively held that "[s]tate law conferring immunity on its officers
[cannot] . . . constitutionally excuse a state court of general jurisdiction from an obligation to hear a
suit brought to enjoin a state official's action as exceeding his authority because unconstitutional."
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 316 (Souter, J., dissenting).
385. In the recently decided case of Alden v. Maine, the Rehnquist Court appears to have
made significant additional strides in dicta toward confining the availability of Young relief to those
practically nonexistent circumstances in which no state forum is available for resolving a plaintiffs
suit against state officials. See 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). In bolstering the Court's decision in Alden
to eliminate the power of Congress to subject States to federal question suits in state courts, see id.
at 2246, Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-member Alden Court, described the doctrine of
Exparte Young as recognizing "that certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state
officers must . . . be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land." Id. at
2263. However, this facial validation of the constitutional significance of the Young doctrine is
undercut by Kennedy's ensuing statement that "[hjad we not understood the States to retain a
constitutional immunity from suit in their own courts, the need for the Ex parte Young rule would
have been less pressing, and the rule would not have formed so essential a part of our sovereign
immunity doctrine." Id. (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270-71 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)). Here, Kennedy essentially repeated the proposition of the "principal"
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, that Young relief is premised on the unavailability of a state
forum - a proposition to which seven Justices objected in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, but which, as
dictum in Alden, nevertheless gains the support of five members of the Court. Alden's dictum
concerning the significance of Young relief thus either reflects a deliberate change of position by
Coeur d'Alene Tribe's concurring Justices-O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas-or else amounts to a
strategic co-opting of those Justices' views on this issue. In either event, one can predict that the
Rehnquist Court in future opinions will be relying on the Alden dictum, inter alia, to support the
Court's dismantling of the Young doctrine.
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law violations, governmental officials were cloaked in the sovereign's
inimunity, according to the Larson Court, so long as those officials acted
within the limits of authority validly delegated by the sovereign. 3' 9 The
Court stated:
The mere allegation that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully
holds property to which the plaintiff has title does not meet [the]
requirement [that the action to be restrained or directed is not an
action of the sovereign]. True, it establishes a wrong to the
plaintiff. But it does not establish that the officer, in committing
that wrong, is not exercising the powers delegated to him by the
sovereign. If he is exercising such powers, the action is the
sovereign's and a suit to enjoin it may not be brought unless the
sovereign has consented.

[I]f the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms
of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the
sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if
they would be regarded as the1 actions of a private principal under
39
the normal rules of agency.
The Larson Court specifically distinguished situations in which the plaintiff's
complaint implicates an alleged violation of federal law rather than merely an
alleged breach of common law:
There was no claim made that the Administrator and his agents,
etc., were acting unconstitutionally or pursuant to an
unconstitutional grant of power.

Under our constitutional system, certain rights are
protected against governmental action and, if such rights are
infringed by the actions of officers of the Government, it is proper
that the courts have the power to grant relief against those
actions.

392

Larson, then, foreclosed the availability of officer suits premised solely on
allegations that governmental officials are acting in breach of plaintiffs'
common law rights, but affirmed the Young principle that ensures that the
390.
391.
392.

See id. at 691-95, 701-02.
Id. at 693, 695.
Id. at 691,704.
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federal rights and officer suits that allege conduct that is tortious or otherwise
in breach of common law."8 6 Both Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
and Justice Souter's dissenting opinion refer to , this comparison only
obliquely, in connection with rejoinders to the Kennedy/Rehnquist view that
in its prior decisions, the Supreme Court implicitly relied on the
unavailability of a state forum when permitting officer suits to proceed to the
merits in federal court. 3n
Nevertheless, this seemingly gratuitous
comparison warrants more extensive analysis, since it appears to embody an
attempt by Kennedy and Rehnquist forcibly to assimilate Young suits to
officer suits that allege only a breach of common law, which, under the rule
38 are barred by
of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,
sovereign immunity.
In Larson, a private corporation brought suit against a federal official, the
head of the War Assets Administration, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief for an alleged breach of contract by the Administrator in refusing to
deliver coal to the plaintiff.389 The Supreme Court held that the suit was
barred by the sovereign immunity of the United States, since the only rights
that the Administrator allegedly had violated were rights that were derived
strictly from common law principles; and with respect to claims of common
386. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272-73 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.).
387. Justice O'Connor presumably was referring to the violation-of-federal-law/breach-ofcommon-law comparison when she noted that "the principal opinion invokes language in the
Court's opinions suggesting that the plaintiff could not secure an adequate remedy at law in a state
forum." Id. at 291-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Likewise, Justice Souter referred to this analogy when he wrote:
Nor did the Young Court hint that some inadequacy of state remedies was
tantamount to the unavailability of a state forum. The opinion in Young and
other cases did indeed include observations that remedies available at law
might provide inadequate relief to an aggrieved plaintiff, and Young itself noted
that the failure to comply with the state statute would result in criminal
penalties and hefty fines. But these remarks about the severity of the sanctions
supported the Court's conviction that an equitable remedy was appropriate, not
that a state forum was unavailable or federal jurisdiction subject to state
preemption [through the provision of an "adequate" state forum].
Id. at 315 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). With these observations, both Justice
O'Connor and Justice Souter properly were suggesting that Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist had confused prior Courf discussions bearing on the propriety of granting injunctive
relief generally with the relevant criteria for granting Young relief specifically. What these
observations fall short of detecting, however, is the instrumental value of this "confusion" for
purposes of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion; for such confusion has utility not only with respect to
the argument that the Court always had relied on the unavailability of a state forum in allowing
Young relief, but also as impetus for equating Young cases with Larson cases, wherein
governmental officers are immunized from suit. See infra notes 388-404 and accompanying text.
388. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
389. See id. at 684.
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federal courts are open and available to adjudicate officer suits premised on
allegations that plaintiffs' federal rights are being violated.393
In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal for displacing
the Young doctrine makes scant reference to Larson by name, 39' and yet
appears to lay the groundwork for nullifying Young by collapsing Young's
rationale into the reasoning of Larson pertaining to the relationship between
sovereign immunity and common law torts. Thus, in describing the genesis
of "the Young fiction,"3 95 the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion posits that-prior
to Larson3 - "where the individual [state official] would have been liable at
common law for his actions, sovereign immunity was no bar regardless of
the person's official position." 3"
The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion then
39
refers the reader to four cases listed in a citation string that includes Lee 1
and Tindal,399 each of which is accompanied by the same cryptic
parenthetical:
"(common-law tort of trespass)."'
By such stealthy
indirection, the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme imparts the implied view
(shared, perhaps, by the three concurring Justices) that Lee and Tindal in
effect were overruled by Larson4°'-notwithstanding Larson's clear
statements to the contrar° 2 -and thus no longer may be relied on as
393. As elaborated supra at note 303, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), enforced a revisionist
interpretation of Larson to foreclose another category of officer suits that Larson specifically had
indicated would remain available for adjudication notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign
immunity-i.e., suits alleging that "[tihe officer is . . . doing [the business of the sovereign] in a
way which the sovereign has forbidden," Larson, 337 U.S. at 689. The majority's decision in
Pennhurst provoked a long and angry dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 126-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
394. Justice Kennedy cited Larson only once, in connection with insisting, as discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 502-47, that the proposed Kennedy/Rehnquist "case-by-case approach to
the Young doctrine has been evident from the start."
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 280
(opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). That brief reference to Larson, however, is
pregnant with significance: "Before Larson, we allowed suits to proceed . . . if the official
committed a tort as defined by the common law. . . .Larson rejected this reliance on the common
law of torts . . . . " Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted).
395. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
396. Justice Kennedy's opinion does not actually mention Larson by name here. See supra
note 394 and accompanying text.
397. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.).
398. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); see supra text accompanying notes 290-312.
399. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897); see supra text accompanying notes 290-312.
400. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
401. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
402. The Larson Court stated that Lee "represents . . .a specific application of the
constitutional exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity," and that the officer suit approved in
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precedents affirming jurisdiction over officer suits in the face of sovereign
immunity challenges to such jurisdiction.
But the intrigue does not end there, for the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme
appears to rely on Larson, sub silentio, for denying by implication not only
the validity of Lee and Tindal, but also the continuing efficacy of Ex parte
Young itself. Thus, after mentioning Lee, Tindal, and other purported
"common-law" cases, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion cites repeatedly to
Young for the following assertions:
Under this line of reasoning, a state official who committed a
common-law tort was said to have been "stripped" of his official or
representative character.
With the growth of statutory and complex regulatory schemes,
this mode of analysis might have been somewhat obscured. Part of
the significance of Young, in this respect, lies in its treatment of a
threatened suit by an official to enforce an unconstitutional state
law as if it were a common-law tort.,.

.

. By employing the

common-law injury framework, the Young Court underscored the
inadequacy of state procedures for vindicating the constitutional
rights at stake. 4°3
The quoted reference in the first sentence of this excerpt is from Young's
instruction that state officials are to be regarded as "stripped" of their official
or representative character when they violate federal law:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be
so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional
act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign
or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks
to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The
Tindal was properly treated as "analogous to a suit to enjoin the officers from enforcing an
unconstitutional statute." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696,
698 n.20; see supra note 303.
403. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272-73 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (citations omitted).
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State has no power to impart to him any immunity4 from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.

By referring to this famous instruction as the product of a "line of reasoning"
and a "mode of analysis" that "employ[ed] the common-law injury
framework," the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion appears to suggest that the
Young instruction no longer is valid, since its supposed reliance on "the
common-law injury framework" has been rendered erroneous and inapposite
by Larson's rejection of the notion that an alleged breach of common law
rights by a governmental official is a legitimate justification for withholding
the shield of sovereign immunity from that official.
Inventive as such a theory for invalidating the Young doctrine may be,
this proposal nevertheless is both fallacy-ridden and injudicious. First, this
forced assimilation of Young cases to Larson cases impliedly disavows
Larson's stated approval of officer suits like those validated in Lee, Tindal
and Young, which allege or implicate violations of federal law as opposed to
mere breaches of common lawA0 5 Second, this theory ignores the crucial
role of Young suits in ensuring the supremacy of federal law within the
In this respect, the
constitutional structure of the United States.i
Kennedy/Rehnquist statement that "[f]or purposes of the Supremacy Clause,
it is simply irrelevant whether [an officer suit alleging an ongoing violation
of federal law] is brought in state or federal court ' 40 7 stands in sharp contrast
to the Court's inspired affirmations in prior cases of the central importance
of the Young doctrine in American constitutional jurisprudence. 4 8
A third major flaw in the Kennedy/Rehnquist's scheme's attempt to
dismiss Young cases as merely Larson-cases-in-disguise is that scheme's
misconstruction of the passages from Ex parte Young which it cites in
forging its Young-negating proposal. For instance, in alluding to the famous
passage from Young, excerpted above, 40 9 Justice Kennedy neglected to
mention that in deciding to withhold the shield of sovereign immunity from a
state official accused of violating federal law, the Young Court addressed and
rejected two interrelated arguments put forward by the defendant Attorney
General of Minnesota that cast crucial light on the significance of the Young

404.
405.
406.
text.
407.
C.J.).
408.
409.

Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
See supra note 402 and accompanying text; supra note 303.
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text; supra notes 166-70 and accompanying
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 404.
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Court's decision to permit the plaintiff railway company stockholders to
proceed to the merits of their officer suit in federal court."'
Attorney General Young had insisted that the stockholders' officer suit
violated the Eleventh Amendment because it would enjoin "his discretionary
official duties"4 11 under a state regulatory scheme fixing railroad freight and
passenger rates.4 2 This argument took the form of two interrelated subarguments. First, the Attorney General argued the he had "a full general
discretion whether to attempt [the regulatory scheme's] enforcement or not,
and the court cannot interfere to control him as Attorney General in the
exercise of his discretion."" 3 Second, the Attorney General argued that he
necessarily "was complained of as an officer, to whose discretion is confided
the use of the name of the State... and that when or how he shall use it is a
matter resting in his discretion. "414 With respect to this latter argument, the
Attorney General elaborated that because the conduct against which the
stockholders sought a federal injunction was their subjection to a "mandamus
[proceeding], which would be commenced by the State in its sovereign and
governmental character," and because "the right to bring such action is a
necessary attribute of a sovereign government" and is not within the power
of "an ordinary individual" to exercise, 1 5 in initiating the proceeding the
Attorney General necessarily would be performing a discretionary rather
than "ministerial" act, for he then would be acting strictly from within a
zone of sovereign power and authority occupied exclusively by the State
41 6
itself.
410. The relevant context-setting discussion from Young that Justice Kennedy ignored appears

in the same paragraph from which the noted excerpt is extracted and the four paragraphs
immediately preceding it. See Ex Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-59 (1908).
411. Id. at 134 (statement of the case).
412. See Id. at 144.
413. Id. at 158.

414. Id. at 159.
415. Id.
416. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan quoted directly from the Attorney General's
petition, as follows:
The petition . . .alleg[ed], among other things: . . . "That neither by statute
nor otherwise is your petitioner charged with any special duty of a ministerial
character in the doing or not doing of which said complainants in the said bill
of complaint . . . had any legal right, and that whatever duties your petitioner

had or has with respect to the several matters complained of in the said bill of
complaint, are of an executive and discretionary nature. That in no case could

your petitioner, even though it was his intention so to do, which it was not,
deprive the said complainants . . . of any property, nor could he trespass upon
their rights in any particular, and that all he could do as Attorney
General... and all that he intended to do or would do, was to commence
formal judicial proceedings in the appropriatecourt of Minnesota against the
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The Young Court rejected these arguments. With respect to the first
argument, the Young Court explained that by enjoining the Attorney General
"from taking any steps towards the enforcement of an unconstitutional
enactment to the injury of complainant," there would be "no interference
with his discretion," since "[a]n injunction to prevent him from doing that
which he has no legal right to do is not an interference with the discretion of
an officer. "11 7 Thus, the Young Court clearly viewed the allegedly illegal
conduct against which the plaintiff stockholders sought an injunction to be
conduct that fell outside the zone of discretionary conduct available to the
Attorney General as an officer of the State of Minnesota.
But more importantly, the Young Court also viewed this allegedly illegal
conduct as falling outside the alternative zone of what might be
conceptualized as "merely ministerial" conduct." 8 As the Court suggested,
this alternative "ministerial" zone is implicated "where the officer having
some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely ministerial in its
nature, refuses or neglects to take such action. In that case the court can
direct the defendant to perform this merely ministerial duty."4" 9 The Young
Court then distinguished such "merely ministerial" conduct-with respect to
which a court "can . . . direct affirmative action" 4 °-from conduct that
violates federal law, such as that threatened by Attorney General Young's
imminent enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional regulatory scheme.
"In such case," the Court asserted, "no affirmative action of any nature is
directed, and the officer is simply prohibited from doing an act which he had
no legal right to do." 42'
For the Young Court, then, the "discretionary/ministerial" dichotomy, as
pressed by the Attorney General in arguing that enforcement of the state
regulatory scheme was within his discretion, was irrelevant to the Court's
determination of whether an officer suit implicating an alleged violation of
federal law was within a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. Rather,
said Northern Pacific Railway Company, its officers, agents and employ~s, to
compel the said company, its agents and servants, to adopt and put in force the
schedule of freight rates, tariffs and charges prescribed by said [statute] of the
State of Minnesota." [The Attorney General] renewed the objection that the

suit instituted by [the stockholders], in so far as the same is against him, was a
suit against the State to prevent his commencing the proposed action in the
name of the State, and was in restraint of the State itself. ...
Id. at 172-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting petition of Minnesota Attorney General Edward T.
Young).

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159.
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what was relevant to that determination-indeed, what was legally
controlling-was simply whether a violation of federal law had been alleged.
For, in the Young Court's view, conduct by a state official in violation of
federal law could not be classified or conceptualized as "discretionary"regardless of whether such conduct could be classified or conceptualized as
"ministerial."
This crucial observation by the Young Court-that state officials never
have "discretion" to violate paramount federal law-was brought into even
sharper focus in the Court's response to the Attorney General's insistence
that his particular conduct of bringing a mandamus proceeding must be
viewed as "discretionary," since no "ordinary individual" could perform
such an act, but only an individual acting essentially as the State itself. 422 In
putting forth this argument, the Attorney General in effect was insisting once
again that his conduct must be understood as "discretionary" precisely
because it could not be understood as "ministerial," since such conduct could
not be conceptualized as falling within a zone of allegedly wrongful acts that
are "merely ministerial in ... nature," such as a "mere" breach of contract
or a "merely" tortious act-i.e., acts which are capable of being performed
by "an ordinary individual." 423
Responding to this recurring implicit reliance by the Attorney General on
the "discretionary/ministerial" dichotomy, the Young Court once again
eschewed the relevance of that dichotomy with respect to the question of
whether a federal court has jurisdiction over an officer suit alleging a
violation of federal law. "The answer to all this," the Court asserted in a
tone approaching exasperation, "is the same as made in every case where an
official claims to be acting under the authority of the State." 424 The Court
then issued its famous instruction, set out at length, above, 4 2 training
attention on the dispositive point that "in attempting by the use of the name
of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional," a state official is "stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct." 426 Again, in stating the necessary contingency for permitting an
officer suit alleging a violation of federal law to proceed to the merits in
federal court, the Young Court placed no reliance whatsoever on whether the
officer's conduct could be thought of as a "ministerial" act, like a common
law tort. Instead, the Young Court insisted that the suit turned exclusively on
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159.
See supra text accompanying note 404.
Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.

31:787]

SANCTIONING A TYRANNY

on Indian Tribes by forcing Tribes to expend their limited litigation resources
fighting to maintain ownership and control of reservation rivers and lakes in
the congenitally biased courts of the Tribes' persistent historic and presentday adversaries.328
What emerges as the combined effect of the opinions of Justice Kennedy
and Justice O'Connor in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, then, is a new, judicially
commentary on the general importance of federal forums for resolving disputes implicating Indian
rights:
[I]n important respects, Indian tribes are "outside" the majoritarian processes
that constitute the state and federal governments. As "dependent sovereigns,"
Indian tribes' abilities to continue to function as quasi-sovereign entities are in
some measure at the mercy of federal legislation. But federal courts have
played some role in providing tribes with a relatively impartial forum in which
to present and resolve their claims to justice. Given the at times oppressive
history of relations between the federal government and the Indian tribes, and
of state governments and tribes and their members, one might think that tribal
claims under federal law are paradigmatic examples of cases that ought to be
decided by the most independent decisionmaker available.
Jackson, supra note 210, at 538-39 n. 162 (citations omitted).
328. Apparently anticipating Tribes' protest to being forced to litigate their submerged-landsrelated officer suits in state courts, Justice Kennedy insisted that "[a] doctrine based on the inherent
inadequacy of state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism." Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
Kennedy then devoted two additional paragraphs to defending the notion that state courts generally
are capable of giving effect to federal law, the supremacy of which state court judges are obligated
by the terms of the United States Constitution to respect. See id. at 275-76 (opinion of Kennedy,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
However, Justice Kennedy's defense of the "adequacy" of state judicial forums-like his
rumination on the history of British and American law relating to submerged lands generally, see
id. at 283-87; supra text accompanying notes 278-82-is beside the point, for it is the impropriety
and injustice of forcing Indian Tribes to submit to state court determinations of Tribes' federally
protected rights vis-A-vis encroachments by state officials that was the precise issue under
consideration in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, not some abstract theory about the "inherent inadequacy of
state forums." Hence, Justice Kennedy once again thrust his sword into a "straw man" when he
defied the "doctrine" of "the inherent inadequacy of state forums," for no such generic "doctrine"
had been invoked, relied on, or even suggested in this case. By focusing on this manufactured issue
of the "inherent inadequacy of state forums," Kennedy and the Court strategically avoided
addressing the Tribe's concerns about the particular injustice of having its officer suit condemned to
be heard only in the courts of the defendant state officials' own State. It is not difficult to guess
why Kennedy refrained from addressing the weighty issues of fairness and justice implicated in this
dispute, for in view of the long history of Tribe-State conflicts in America, there simply is no
credible defense for the belief that committing to the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts any class
of disputes pitting Tribes' federally protected rights to on-reservation lands against States'
"interest" in those lands is, in any sense of the word, "adequate."
Justice Kennedy's steadfast refusal to ground his analysis in Coeur d'Alene Tribe in relevant
principles of federal Indian law bears out the prediction made by Professor Getches that "Kennedy
certainly will not motivate the Court to return to foundational principles [of Indian law]. He has
displayed a profound disinterest in Indian law and should be counted as likely to vote with the other
subjectivist Justices." Getches, supra note 3, at 1645.
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created rule mandating discrimination against a class of officer suits initiated
by Indian Tribes-a rule rooted in the prejudicial and misguided views of
five members of the Supreme Court concerning Indian Tribes' rights to the
navigable lakes, rivers and other waterways located within the boundaries of
Indian reservations. By force of this discrimination mandate, lower federal
courts henceforth are prohibited from hearing such suits brought by Indian
Tribes under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, and Tribes are put on notice
that if they desire to seek justice against state officials who illegally
appropriate the Tribes' on-reservation waterways, they must do so, if at all,
only in the courts of the very States whose officers are being accused of such
conduct. Although both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor engaged in
elaborate posturing in their respective opinions to make it appear as though a
coherent doctrinal rationale underlay the decision to banish the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's officer suit from federal court, that decision is best
understood as an exercise of judicial activism in disregard of fundamental
principles of federal Indian law and in service to the Court's own "States'
rights" ideology. As Justice Souter emphasized repeatedly in dissent, the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe had presented "a perfect example of a suit for relief
cognizable under Ex parte Young," 329 and the majority's doctrinally
inexplicable but ideologically expedient decision to bar the Tribe's suit
"redefme[s] and reduce[s] the substance of federal subject-matter jurisdiction
330
to vindicate federal rights."
The Rehnquist Court's Coeur d'Alene Tribe decision thus represents a
manifestation of profound injustice-the very kind of injustice, in fact, that
the doctrine of Ex parte Young was designed to protect against. However,
due to the controlling influence of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,
the majority rule in Coeur d'Alene Tribe was carefully circumscribed to level
its oppressive effects on Indian Tribes only-at least for now. The next
section of this Article analyzes the proposal in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
subscribed to by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist only, which
would subject parties in addition to Indian Tribes to a contraction of
federally guaranteed liberty through a withdrawal of Young relief under the
banner of "States' rights."

329. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 300 (Souter, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Reeves,342 decided eight years before Young, the Court squarely had rejected
the notion that a State's consent to suit in state court is tantamount to the
State's consent to suit in federal court:
Nothing heretofore said by this court justifies the contention that a
State may not give its consent to be sued in its own courts by
private persons or by corporations, in respect of any cause of
action against it and at the same time exclude the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts ....343
In view of Smith, the Young Court obviously would not have been
"reluctan[t]" to rely on the unavailability of a state forum because of "the
prevalen[t] . . . idea" that a State's consent to state court suits amounted to
consent to federal courts suits. 344 In fact, according to Smith, that "idea" had
never been "prevalen[t]"; and in any event, it could not, after Smith, have
forced the Supreme Court to disguise its "true" rationale for recognizing
federal jurisdiction over the officer suit in Young. 345
Writing for the four dissenting Justices, Justice Souter likewise faulted
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist for substituting a new,
revisionist rationale for that of the Court in permitting the plaintiffs in
Reagan, Smyth and Young to sue state officials in federal court. As Souter
reiterated,
Ex parte Young itself gives no hint that the Court thought the relief
sought in federal court was unavailable in the Minnesota state
courts at the time. Young, indeed, relied on prior cases [Reagan
and Smyth] in which federal courts had entertained suits against
state officers notwithstanding the fact, as the Young Court
expressly noted, that state forums were available in which the
plaintiffs could have vindicated the same claims. 3 "
the
to
objection
the
dissenters'
summarized
Souter
Justice
Kennedy/Rehnquist proposed "unavailability-of-a-state-forum" prerequisite
by observing that the "notion that availability of a state forum should have
as much at odds
some bearing on the applicability of Ex parte Young is .
"347
principles.
jurisdictional
basic
with
as
precedent
with

342. 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
343. Id. at 445.
344. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.); supra text accompanying note 340.
345. See Smith, 178 U.S. at 445; supra text accompanying note 343.
346.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S., at 314 (Souter, J., dissenting).

347. Id. at 315-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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With respect to those "basic jurisdictional principles," both Justice Souter
and Justice O'Connor expressed alarm at the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's
disregard of the importance of the federal courts' federal question
jurisdiction, which the Young doctrine is essential for upholding. Justice
Souter pointed out that "[flederal-question jurisdiction turns on subject
matter, not the need to do some job a state court may wish to avoid; it
addresses not the adequacy of a state judicial system, but the responsibility of
federal courts to vindicate what is supposed to be controlling federal law."'
Justice O'Connor likewise criticized the Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal for
"call[ing] into question the importance of having federal courts interpret
federal rights," pointing out that the Court has "frequently acknowledged the
importance of having federal courts open to enforce and interpret federal
rights." 349

As both Justice

O'Connor and Justice Souter apparently

recognized, by imposing the unprecedented requirement that any plaintiff
seeking Young relief first show that a state forum is unavailable, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme would fatally undermine the core jurisdictional
principles upon which the Young doctrine was built.35
348. Id. at 313 (Souter, J., dissenting).
349. id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
350. In making his proposal for limiting Young relief to cases in which a state forum is
unavailable seem consistent with the framers' understanding of the proper scope of federal court
authority within the framework of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy asserted:
Where there is no available state forum the Young rule has special
significance. In that instance providing a federal forum for a justiciable
controversy is a specific application of the principle that the plan of the
Convention contemplates a regime in which federal guarantees are enforceable
so long as there is a justiciable controversy.
Id. at 271 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). To support this view of the limited
importance of the Young doctrine, Kennedy extracted a brief quote from Alexander Hamilton:
"'[T]here ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional
provisions.'" Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1982) (alteration in original)). Kennedy neglected to explain, however, that Hamilton made
this point to support his explication of the "proper objects" for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
federal courts, in contradistinction to the state courts:
To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature it
will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of
the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all
those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of
their just and constitutional powers of legislation ....
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought
always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional
provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the
State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the
observance of them? ...No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the
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collecting taxes for the State of Virginia, to recover personal property that
Greenhow had seized after Poindexter had tendered payment of state taxes in
state-issued coupons that Greenhow refused to accept.373 On review, the
Supreme Court rejected, inter alia, as unavailing Greenhow's efforts to
defend himself against Poindexter's suit on sovereign immunity grounds.374
The Court explained that Poindexter's suit against Greenhow was not a suit
against the State of Virginia, since the Virginia statute upon which Greenhow
purported to immunize his seizure of Poindexter's property on behalf of the
State was void because it was unconstitutional. 375 The Poindexter Court's
explanation for rejecting the state official's argument that the plaintiff's suit
373. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 273-74.
374. See id. at 292-93.
375. In elaborating, the Poindexter Court provided an important justification for allowing suits
against state officials who violate federal law to proceed to the merits notwithstanding those
officials' claims of sovereign immunity:
That which . . . is unlawful because made so by the supreme law, the
Constitution of the United States, is not the word or deed of the State, but is
the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and
act in its name.
The mandate of the State affords no justification for the invasion of
rights secured by the Constitution of the United States; otherwise, that
Constitution would not be the supreme law of the land. When, therefore, an
individual defendant pleads a statute of a State, which is in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, as his authority for taking or holding
property, to which the citizen asserts title, and for the protection or possession
of which he appeals to the courts, to say that the judicial enforcement of the
supreme law of the land, as between the individual parties, is to coerce the
State, ignores the fundamental principles on which the Constitution
rests ... and, practically, makes the statutes of the States the supreme law of
the land within their respective limits.
. . . [I]nasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States, which is also
the supreme law of Virginia, that contract [binding Virginia to accept its
bonds], when made, became thereby unchangeable and irrepealable by the
State, the subsequent act . . . and all other like acts, which deny the obligation
of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the State of
Virginia. . . . The argument, therefore, which seeks to defeat the present
action, for the reason that it is a suit against the State of Virginia, because the
nominal defendant is merely its officer and agent, acting in its behalf, in its
name, and for its interest, and amenable only to it, falls to the ground, because
its chief postulate fails. The State of Virginia has done none of these things
with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error [Greenhow] is not
her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of, for
he has acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her express
commands.
The plaintiff in error [Poindexter], in fact and in law, is
representing her, as he seeks to establish her law, and vindicates her integrity
as he maintains his own right.
Id. at 290, 292-93.
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should be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds makes no reference to
whether the state-law "remedy" proffered by Virginia was adequate or not,
because the adequacy of that "remedy" had no bearing on the
Court's inquiry
3 76
into whether the State's sovereign immunity barred the suit.
However, in a different part of its opinion addressing the merits of the
plaintiff's suit, the Poindexter Court rejected separately Greenhow's
argument that because a Virginia statute afforded the plaintiff a "remedy" for
vindicating his asserted right to the seized property, Greenhow's conduct had
not infringed Poindexter's rights under the Contract Clause of the federal
Constitution. 377 As the Court explained, the proffered statutory "remedy" of
requiring the plaintiff to "acquiesce in the wrong, pay his taxes in money
which he was entitled to pay in coupons, and bring suit to recover it back" in
fact was "no remedy," since the essence of Poindexter's constitutional right
under the Contract Clause was the "right . . . to have his coupon received
for taxes when offered." 378 Justice Kennedy's suggestion in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe that Poindexter is an "example" of a case where an officer suit was
allowed to proceed because of the Supreme Court's "concern over the lack of
a [state] forum"' 37 9 derives from Kennedy's conflating of language from two
separate and distinct parts of the Poindexter Court's analysis-the first part
376. See id. at 292-93; supra note 375.
377. See id. at 300.
378. Id. at 298, 299-300. The Court elaborated:
It is contended . . . that the [Virginia statute] under which [Greenhow]

justified his refusal of the tender of coupons, does not impair the obligation of
the contract between the coupon-holder and the State of Virginia, inasmuch as
it secures to him a remedy equal in legal value to all that it takes away, and
that consequently, as the State may lawfully legislate by changing remedies so
that it does not destroy rights, the remedy thus provided is exclusive, and must
defeat the plaintiff's action.

[Poindexter] offered [the coupons] and they were refused. He chose
to stand upon the defensive and maintain his rights as they might be assailed.

His right was to have his coupon received for taxes when offered. That was
the contract. To refuse to receive them was an open breach of its obligation.
It is no remedy for this that he may [pursuant to the "remedy" prescribed by

the Virginia statute] acquiesce in the wrong, pay his taxes in money which he
was entitled to pay in coupons, and bring suit to recover it back. . . . He has
the right to say he will not pay the amount a second time, even for the
privilege of recovering it back. And if he chooses to stand upon a lawful
payment once made, he asks no remedy to recover back taxes illegally
collected, but may resist the exaction, and treat as a wrong-doer the officer

who seizes his property to enforce it.
Id.
379. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 272 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
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To dilute the objection that its "unavailability-of-a-state-forum" theory for
granting Young relief is "at odds with precedent, "351 the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion purports to locate additional support for this theory in three Supreme
Court decisions of the nineteenth century 3 52-OsboM v. Bank of United
States;353 United States v. Lee;3' and Poindexter v. Greenhow.35" However,
none of these early decisions intimates any such prerequisite for recognizing
federal jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of federal law by
The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion parenthetically
governmental officials.
alludes to Osborn as
explaining that if it was within the power of the plaintiff to make
the State a party to the suit itwould "certainly [be] true" that a suit
against State officials would be barred, but if the "real principal" is
"exempt from all judicial process" an officer suit could proceed.356
But this heavily edited extract from Osborn, as Justice Souter noted in his
Coeur d'Alene Tribe dissent, "rest[s] on a misreading of Osborn as holding
that the officer suit could proceed only because a suit directly against the
To appreciate Souter's point about the
State was prohibited." 35 7
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's "misreading" of Osborn, a closer examination
of the context in Osborn corresponding to Justice Kennedy's extract is
helpful.
Osborn raised numerous important questions of constitutional, statutory
and common law implicated in a suit for injunctive relief brought in a federal
court by a federally chartered bank against an official of the State of Ohio
and seeking to prevent that official from enforcing a state statute imposing a
heavy tax on all banks transacting business within the State without
authorization from the State. 35 ' Ruling ultimately in the bank's favor on the
government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must
either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal
courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of
the Union. There is no third course that I can imagine.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475-76 (emphases added).
351. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 316 (Souter, J. dissenting); supra text accompanying
note 347.
352. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (positing that "Young was not an isolated example of an instance where a state forum was
unavailable").
353. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
354. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
355. 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
356. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at272 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) at 842-43) (alteration in original).
357. Id. at 315 n.12 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (citation omitted).
358. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) at739-40.
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issue of the federal court's jurisdiction, and substantially affirming the circuit
court's decision in favor of the bank on the merits as well,359 Chief Justice
Marshall divided his examination of what he called "the merits of the cause"
into seven enumerated sections." ° The sixth of these sections addresses the
question of whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction
over the bank's suit against the Ohio official, and concludes that the
" '
Amendment does not prohibit such jurisdiction.36
The fifth of Marshall's enumerated sections does not deal with the
Eleventh Amendment issue at all, but instead addresses the state official's
argument "that the case . . . does not warrant the interference of a Court of
Chancery. 3 62 This fifth section, in other words, deals exclusively with the
question of whether injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy; indeed,
Marshall made it clear that this section of the Court's opinion concerns the
issue of the appropriateness of granting equitable relief entirely apart from
the Eleventh Amendment issue.363 Despite Marshall's clarification that he
was not addressing the state official's Eleventh Amendment-based argument
in this section of Osborn, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe frames its extract from this section so as to convey the impression that
Marshall was addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue therein.36" But as
Justice Souter reiterated:
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See id. at 818, 823, 828, 870-71.
See id. at 828-29.
See id. at 847, 859.
Id. at 838.
Chief Justice Marshall elaborated in the fifth section of Osborn as follows:
We suspend . . . the consideration of the question, whether the interest of the
State of Ohio . . . shows a want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, which
ought to have arrested its proceedings. That question . . . is reserved by the
appellants, and will be subsequently considered. The sole inquiry, for the
present, is, whether, stripping the case of these objections, the plaintiffs below
were entitled to relief in a Court of equity, against the defendants, and to the
protection of an injunction. . . . The question, then, is reduced to the single
inquiry, whether the case is cognizable in a Court of equity.

Id. at 839.
364. See supra text accompanying note 356. When the fragments from this section of Osborn,
as selected and compressed by Justice Kennedy, are restored to the original context which gives
them meaning, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's suggestion that Osborn supports the notion that
Young suits should be disallowed whenever a state forum is available is shown to be erroneous,
since this section of Osborn is restricted to the issue of the propriety of equitable relief:
If the State of Ohio could have been made a party defendant, it can
scarcely be denied, that this would be a strong case for an injunction. The
objection is, that, as the real party cannot be brought before the Court, a suit
cannot be sustained against the agents of that party; and cases have been cited,
to show that a Court of Chancery will not make a decree, unless all those who
are substantially interested, be made parties to the suit.
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whether the defendant officer's conduct allegedly violated federal law.
Hence, in urging that Ex parte Young represents the Supreme Court's
"[t]reatment of a threatened suit to enforce an unconstitutional statute as a
tort,"42 7 the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe imparts a
gross mischaracterization of the core holding and reasoning of the Young
decision.
Moreover, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion attempts to reinforce this
mischaracterization by means of multiple out-of-context and highly selective
references to language from the Young opinion.
For instance, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion alludes to the following language from Young to
support an insistence that the Young Court viewed "a threatened suit by an
official to enforce an unconstitutional state law as if it were a common-law
tort"""- "treating this possibility," as Justice Kennedy parenthetically
suggested, "as a 'specific wrong or trespass'":429
In the course of the opinion in the Fitts case the Reagan and
Smyth cases were referred to (with others) as instances of state
officers specially charged with the execution of a state enactment
alleged to be unconstitutional, and who commit under its authority
some specific wrong or trespass to the injury of plaintiffs rights.
In those cases the only wrong or injury or trespass involved was
the threatened commencement of suits to enforce the statute as to
rates, and the threat of such commencement was in each case
regarded as sufficient to authorize the issuing of an injunction to
prevent the same. The threat to commence those suits under such
circumstances was therefore necessarily held to be equivalent to
any other threatened wrong or injury to the property of a plaintiff
which had theretofore been held sufficient to authorize the suit
against the officer. 430
The Young Court's reference in the first line of this excerpt is to Fitts v.
McGhee,43' in which the Supreme Court held that a suit brought against
officials of the State of Alabama seeking to enjoin enforcement of legislation
fixing the rates for a toll bridge was prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment,
since the legislature had directed that penalties for violating the allegedly

427. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 273 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.); see also supra text accompanying note 403.
428. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 273 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.); supra text accompanying note 401.
429. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 273 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 158).
430. Young, 209 U.S. at 157-58.
431. 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
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unconstitutional statute were to be collected directly by the overcharged
parties.4 32 As the Fitts Court pointed out, "neither of the State officers
named [in the suit] held any special relation to the particular statute alleged
to be unconstitutional. They were not expressly directed to see to its
enforcement.""' The Young Court underscored this observation, pointing
out that with respect to the officer suit in Fitts, "[a] state superintendent of
schools might as well have been made a party. 1434
The Young Court thus endorsed the rule of Fitts that for an officer suit to
be valid, "[the] officer must have some connection with the enforcement of
the [allegedly unconstitutional] act, or else it is merely making him a party as
a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a
party."4 35 But the Young Court then distinguished Fitts by observing that
"[i]t has not . . . been held that it was necessary that [an officer's] duty
should be declared in the same act which is to be enforced."4 36 The Court
elaborated:
The fact that the state officer by virtue of his office has some
connection with the enforcement of the act is the important and
material fact, and whether it arises out of the general law, or is
specially created by the [allegedly unconstitutional] act itself, is not
material so long as it exists.437
It was in the larger context of discussing the impact of Fitts on the
question of the validity of the disputed officer suit in Young that the Young
Court made a passing comparison between "the threatened commencement of
432. See Young, 209 U.S. at 156.
433. Fitts, 172 U.S. at 530, quoted in Young, 209 U.S. at 157.
434. Young, 209 U.S. at 156.
435. Id. at 157.
436. Id.
437. Id. According to the Young Court, then, Fitts could not be construed as closing the
federal courts to officer suits like the one brought against Attorney General Young, since
being specially charged with the duty to enforce [an allegedly unconstitutional]
statute is sufficiently apparent when such duty exists under the general
authority of some law, even though such authority is not to be found in the
particular act. It might exist by reason of the general duties of the officer to
enforce it as a law of the State.
Id. at 158. The Young Court thus clearly recognized that Fitts did not compel dismissal of the
plaintiff stockholders' suit against Attorney General Young:

[I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in
regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are

about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.
Id. at 155-56.
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[a] suit[ ] to enforce [an allegedly unconstitutional] statute" and "some
specific wrong or trespass," 43' as parenthetically invoked by Justice Kennedy
in Coeur d'Alene Tribe.43 9 This context makes it clear, however, that
contrary to the truncated, out-of-context reading urged by the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion, the Young Court suggested this comparison not
to show any reliance on an analogy to common law torts; for, as discussed
previously, there was no such reliance in Young." 0
Rather, Young
analogized enforcement of an unconstitutional railway rate-fixing scheme to
"some specific wrong or trespass" merely to emphasize the existence of a
connection between any such regulatory scheme and the enforcement duties
of those state attorneys general named as defendants in officer suits like the
ones validated in Reagan, Smyth and Young-a connection required by Fitts
and specifically argued (albeit unsuccessfully) to be lacking in Young by
defendant Attorney General Young himself. Justice Kennedy's recurring
insistence that the Young Court viewed violations of federal law by state
officials as different from sovereign acts by virtue of those violations of
federal law being similar to common law torts is an argument without merit
when the isolated language from Young upon which Kennedy purported to
rely is read and appreciated in its original context.
Moreover, in its zeal to equate violations of federal law with common law
torts, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion ignores not only the context of the
fragments it extracts from Young, but also statements from Young that clearly
contradict the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's ideological slant on Young's
meaning.
For instance, according to the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion,
"[t]reatment of a threatened suit to enforce an unconstitutional statute as a
tort found support in Reagan and Smyth" 44 But in the Young Court's view,
federal jurisdiction over the officer suit at issue in Reagan was perfected, as
Reagan itself proclaimed, not because the state attorney general's imminent,
allegedly unlawful conduct resembled a common law tort, but "by virtue of
the statutes of Congress, under the sanction of the Constitution of the United
States "442-i.e., by force of the fact that federal law allegedly was about to be
violated. And, according to Young once again, the officer suit in Smyth was
permitted not because of any similarity in appearance between a threatened
438.
439.
joined by
440.
441.

Id. at 158.
See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 273 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.
Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 158); supra text accompanying note 429.
See supra notes 409-27 and accompanying text.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.at 273 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)

(citations omitted).
442. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 393 (1894), quoted in Young,
209 U.S. at 153.
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enforcement of the rate-fixing scheme at issue there and a common law tort,
but because such enforcement was alleged to be pursuant to "an
unconstitutional enactment" threatening "injury of the rights of the plaintiff,"
thus rendering the officer suit one that "was not a suit against a State within
the meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment."" 3 As the Young Court
elaborated, "[t]he suit [in Smyth] was to enjoin the enforcement of a statute
of Nebraska because it was alleged to be unconstitutional, on account of the
rates being too low to afford some compensation to the company, and
contrary, therefore, to the Fourteenth Amendment."'
By suggesting that
the Young Court relied on Reagan and Smyth because of those cases'
"[treatment of a threatened suit to enforce an unconstitutional statute as a
tort,"" 5 the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe lionizes a
gratuitous comparison that was irrelevant to Young's reliance on those cases,
and ignores the real reason for Young's reliance-the fact that the plaintiffs
in Reagan and Smyth, like the plaintiffs in Young, had alleged an imminent
violation of federal law.' Once again, by examining th relevant context, it
443. Young, 209 U.S. at 154.
444. Id. (emphasis added).
445. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 273 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.); supra text accompanying note 441.
446. Another example of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's out-of-context misappropriation of
language from Young is Justice Kennedy's reference to the following sentence fragment from
Young: "The difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and the
enjoining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature ...."
Young, 209 U.S. at 167, quoted without use of ellipsis in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 273
(opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). The quoted fragment appears in a discussion
at the end of the Young opinion, in which the Court considered Attorney General Young's objection
that "the necessary result of upholding this suit . . . will be to draw to the lower Federal courts a
great flood of litigation of this character, where one Federal judge would have it in his power to
enjoin proceedings by state officials to enforce the legislative acts of the State, either by criminal or
civil actions." Id. In rejecting that argument, the Young Court pointed out that federal courts long
since had proved themselves quite capable of managing their equity jurisdiction, with respect to
suits alleging "direct trespass upon or interference with tangible property" as well as suits of the
sort at issue in Young: "A bill filed to prevent the commencement of suits to enforce an
unconstitutional act

. . .

is no new invention . .

"

Id. at 167.

The Young Court then issued the language excerpted by Justice Kennedy, above, adding at the
end of the same sentence that the minimal "difference" cited between a federal injunction affecting
governmental officials' use of property and a federal injunction affecting governmental officials'
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute "does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts
over the subject matter." Id. The Young Court's elaboration is worth examining carefully:
In the case of the interference with property the person enjoined is assuming to
act in his capacity as an official of the State, and justification for his
interference is claimed by reason of his position as a state official. Such
official cannot so justify when acting under an unconstitutional enactment of
the legislature. So, where the state official, instead of directly interfering with
tangible property, is about to commence suits, which have for their object the
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is evident that notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's multiple citations to Young
as well as to Reagan and Smyth in purporting to discern support for the
Young-negating proposal to which both Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist subscribed in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, in truth that maverick proposal
finds no support at all in the essential teachings of those liberty-affirming,
landmark Supreme Court decisions.
3. Young as an Application of the Doctrine of Comity
Nor does the Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal for dismantling the doctrine of
Ex parte Young find support in the 1930 essay on federal comity by
Professor Charles Warren, 7 from which Justice Kennedy extracted a
fragment, in the following manner:
The enforcement scheme in Young, which raised obstacles to the
vindication of constitutional claims, was not unusual. In many
situations

.

.

.

the exercise of a federal court's equitable

jurisdiction was necessary to avoid "excessive and oppressive
penalties, [the] possibility of [a] multiplicity of suits causing
irreparable damage, or [the] lack of proper opportunities for [state]
review.

""4

enforcement of an act which violates the Federal Constitution, to the great and
irreparable injury of the complainants, he is seeking the same justification from
the authority of the State as in other cases. The sovereignty of the State is, in
reality, no more involved in one case than the other. The State cannot in either
case impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.
Id. (emphases added). When the context is read and appreciated, it is clear that the Young Court
was not-contrary to Justice Kennedy's suggestion-equating violations of federal law with common
law torts, and regarding officer suits premised on such an equation as pro tanto permissible.
Rather, the Young Court simply was pointing out that in cases where officer suits involving what
could be conceptualized as a "trespass" were held to be valid and not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, the justification for such validation was precisely the fact that those suits also
implicated violations of federal law. Hence, the Young Court rejected the suggestion that by
validating an officer suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state regulatory
scheme, the Court in effect would expose the federal judiciary to an unfamiliar species of officer
suits that would overwhelm and incapacitate the federal courts. As the Court noted, the species of
officer suit at issue in Young already was quite familiar to the federal judiciary; it was that species
wherein the gravamen of the complaint was a state official's violation of federal law-not the
commission of a common law tort. Thus, the Young Court confidently could conclude that "[t]here
is nothing in the case before us that ought properly to breed hostility to the customary operation of
Federal courts of justice in cases of this character." Id. at 168.
447. Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930).
448. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 273-74 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (quoting Warren, supra note 447, at 377-78) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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Although Professor Warren was no admirer of the Young doctrine," 9 his
1930 essay in general, and the language quoted by Justice Kennedy in
particular, concern the importance of the exercise of comity by the federal
judiciary strictly in circumstances not involving Young suits at all. Thus,
Professor Warren expressed approval of the Supreme Court's decision in
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,450 issued just eight months after Young,
for its holding, as paraphrased by Professor Warren, that "as a matter of
comity, the federal court ought not to issue an injunction against [a state
commission in the process of establishing railway rates], until the railroad
affected by the commission's allegedly unconstitutional order had exhausted
the right of appeal to the highest court of the state given to it by the state
constitution." 451 Professor Warren immediately clarified, however, that
"[l]ater cases ... have held that this doctrine of comity is ... inapplicable if
the appeal provided for by the state law is of a judicial and not a legislative
nature," 452 and elaborated further, in a footnote, that "[iun such cases, it is
held that comity yields to constitutional right." 453
Clearly, then, Professor Warren was suggesting, via the language
quoted out-of-context by Justice Kennedy, that if state legislatures would be
more careful in drafting "the penal and remedial provisions of state statutes
regulating public utility and other corporations,"4 5 4 they might induce federal
courts to exercise restraint as a matter of comity in the face of complaints
alleging unconstitutionally onerous effects of the States' administrative
ratemaking processes. Professor Warren never suggested that such comity
would be appropriate, or indeed constitutionally permitted,4 5 with respect to
a Young suit as such, alleging a violation of federal law in the operation of a
449. Professor Warren disparaged the Young doctrine in the following terms:
Such a doctrine, in its results, clearly violates the spirit and theory which
inspired the Act of 1793 [authorizing federal courts to issue injunctions, but not
to stay state court proceedings] and . . . evaluates the right of an individual to

resort to the federal court more highly than the right of a state to resort to its
own courts. It authorizes federal interference with the due performance by
state officials of duties which they are sworn to perform, and directly promotes
collisions between the two sovereignties.
Warren, supra note 447, at 375; see also infra note 457.
450. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
451. Warren, supra note 447, at 376.
452. Id. at 376-77.
453. Id. at 377 n. 146.
454. Id. at 378.
455. The Young Court quoted from Chief Justice John Marshall in underscoring the federal
courts' obligation to exercise jurisdiction when Young's criteria are satisfied: "We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), quoted in Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 143 (1908).
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firmly fixed enforcement scheme, the end-product of final legislative
ratemaking.456 Thus, Justice Kennedy's juxtaposition of the fragment from
Professor Warren's discussion about judicial comity with Kennedy's own
efforts at transmogrifying Young suits into a mere projection of "the
common-law injury framework" is, once again, a confounded and essentially
futile attempt to locate support for disassembling the Young doctrine where
no such support exists.457

4. Young as a Vacant Exception to the Unavailability of Young
The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe thus lays the
foundation for dismantling Ex parte Young by insisting that Young relief
generally is precluded whenever a state forum is available to adjudicate an
officer suit alleging an ongoing violation of federal law, which violation is to
be regarded, by judicial fiat, as functionally indistinguishable from a
common law tort.
The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion then ostensibly
contradicts itself by appearing to admit of an exception: "Even if there is a
prompt and effective remedy in a state forum, a second instance in which
Young may serve an important interest is when the case calls for the
interpretation of federal law."458 What is peculiar about this "exception" to
the proposed Kennedy/Rehnquist rule that Young suits generally are not
available is that it is an "exception" that appears to be virtually devoid of
456. The Prentis Court-which, again, was the same Court that decided Ex parte Youngemphasized the appropriateness of applying principles of comity with respect to constitutional
challenges to a State's legislative ratemaking processes, but specifically noted that once allegedly

unconstitutional rates had been firmly fixed, an aggrieved plaintiff could bring an action in federal
court for relief under the Young doctrine. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S., 210,
230-31 (1908) (citing, inter alia, Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

457. As mentioned supra at note 447 and accompanying text, Professor Warren disapproved
of the Young doctrine generally, even though his 1930 essay did not deny the obligatory availability
of Young relief for plaintiffs subjected to state officials' threatened enforcement of allegedly
unconstitutional regulatory schemes. In fact, Professor Warren was a strong proponent of the
Supreme Court's Hans immunity doctrine, and is credited with propagating "the profound shock

theory of the eleventh amendment"-i.e., the theory that, "[in the words of the Hans Court, the
Chisholm [v. Georgia] decision created 'ashock of surprise throughout the country' by departing
from an original understanding that the states would be immune from suit without their consent,"
and that "[tihe amendment merely restored the original understanding that states would be immune
from suit in all circumstances . . . . This 'profound shock' theory, as Professor Charles Warren

later popularized it, was soon enshrined as an irrefutable historical fact." Gibbons, supra note 19,
at 1893-94 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), and citing
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNITED STATES HISTORY 91-96 (rev. ed. 1935)).
458. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 274 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
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content.
For instance, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion seems bent on
canceling this "exception" altogether when it posits the following paradoxical
caveat: "This reasoning [justifying the Young exception] . . . can lead to
expansive application of the Young exception. ""5 The opinion continues:
It is difficult to say States consented to these types of suits in the
plan of the Convention. Neither in theory nor in practice has it
been shown problematic to have federal claims resolved in state
courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity would4 be applicable
in federal court but for an exception based on Young. W
As Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, this "difficulty" bedeviling the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion is easily explained by that opinion's refusal to
embrace Young's core teaching that as sovereigns bound by the "plan of the
Convention," States are conceived as having no power to violate paramount
federal law;6' and hence, "[b]ecause a suit against a state officer to enjoin an
ongoing violation of federal law is not a suit against a State, the scope of
state consent to suit at the founding has no bearing on the availability of
officer suits under Young."'62 Curious, too, is the very protestation that the
Eleventh Amendment would bar certain federal court suits "but for an
exception based on Young." 3 Here, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion seems
to be lamenting the fact that the Eleventh Amendment would apply to Young
suits but for the fact that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to Young
suits!
A further example of how the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion admits of an
essentially vacant "exception" to that opinion's proposed baseline rule of the
general unavailability of Young relief is the manner in which the opinion
illustrates its reluctant concession that "[iln some cases, it is true, the federal
courts play an indispensable role in maintaining the structural integrity of the
Here, the opinion cites only two cases,
constitutional design. "'
South Dakota v. North Carolina 6 and United States v. Texas,' neither of
459. Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
460. Id. at 274-75 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
461. In Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), the Supreme Court explained the core
teaching of Young in the following instructive terms: "[The Young] holding was based on a

determination that an unconstitutional state enactment is void and that any action by a state official
that is purportedly authorized by that enactment cannot be taken in an official capacity since the
state authorization for such action is a nullity." Id. at 276.
462. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 299 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
463.

Id. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); supra text accompanying

note 460.
464.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.).
465. 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
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which involved a suit against governmental officials. 7 As to whether the
Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme would countenance any officer suit, as such,
proceeding to the merits in federal court, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion is
conspicuously silent, admitting only that "we can assume there is a special
role for Article III courts in the interpretation and application of federal law
in other instances as well."4 8
Indeed, as discussed below, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal apparently would revise the rationales and
holdings of those prior Court decisions that validated, directly or indirectly,
officer suits seeking prospective relief for violations of federal lawdecisions which the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion cites as "illustrations" of
that opinion's proffered "case-by-case" balancing approach to the availability
of Young relief. 469 It may not be too far off the mark to suggest that Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist envision a future in which an
"exception" to the general unavailability of Young suits exists as a strictly
theoretical construct, capable of containing, as a practical matter, no "realworld" cases at all.

466. 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
467. In South Dakota v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to suits against States when brought by other States. The Court
maintained that "the clear import of the decisions of this court from the beginning to the present
time is in favor of its jurisdiction over an action brought by one State against another to enforce a
property right." South Dakota, 192 U.S. at 318.
In United States v. Texas, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment likewise does not apply
to suits against States when brought by the United States. The Court reasoned that the framers of
the Constitution
could not have overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial
solution, might arise between the United States and some of the States, and that
the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal was not
entrusted the power to determine them according to the recognized principles
of law ....
. . . The submission to judicial solution of controversies arising between
these two governments, "each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other,"
but both subject to the supreme law of the land, does no violence to the
inherent nature of sovereignty.
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 644-46 (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400, 410 (1819)).
468. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, I., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.).
469. The cases discussed by Justice Kennedy as illustrations of this supposed "balancing
approach" are Edehnan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979),
and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 278-80
(opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); see also infra notes 502-47 and accompanying
text.
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5. Young as an Affront to the Primacy of State Courts in Interpreting
Federal Law
That the elimination of Young relief altogether is the objective toward
which the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme in Coeur d'Alene Tribe effectively
reaches is further evinced by Justice Kennedy's "blind faith" assertions
regarding the ability of state courts to adjudicate federal question disputes
with unassailable disinterestedness. Thus, Justice Kennedy invoked the civil
rights/federal habeas cases of Stone v. Powell 0 and Allen v. McCurry4 7 to
posit "our 'emphatic reaffirmation ... of the constitutional obligation of the
state courts to uphold federal law, and [our] expression of confidence in their
ability to do so.' ,,472 But this remark is little more than a repetition of the
Allen Court's aggrandizement of Stone's meager commentary-confmed to a
single footnote in the lengthy Stone opinion-concerning the ability of state
courts fairly to adjudicate federal constitutional rights. The Stone Court
wrote, "[d]espite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in
years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of
appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts
of the several States. "'7 Obviously, this bare assertion does not comprise
the lofty vote of confidence in state court adjudications of federal
constitutional claims that both Allen and the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe subsequently intimated it to be.
Furthermore, the imprimatur that the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion confers
on Stone's presumption of the integrity of state court criminal proceedings
implicating federal civil rights issues represents an entrenchment of the
Court's disregard of grave criticisms concerning Stone's refusal to allow
state prisoners federal habeas relief when petitions for such relief are
predicated on the introduction at trial of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence.47 4 This refusal prompted a stinging dissent from Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, in which Brennan took the majority to task for its
"denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally mandated
procedures" which "must appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect and
support for their constitutional rights" and which transgressed "this Court's

470. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
471. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
472. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 105) (omission and alteration in original).
473. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.35.
474. See id. at 494.
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sworn duty ..
to uphold that Constitution [forged by the Framers] and not
to frame its own." 475 Justice Brennan continued:
What possible justification then can there be for denying
vindication of [constitutional] rights on federal habeas when state
courts do deny those rights at trial? To sanction disrespect and
disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting society
from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to
subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty
depend. . . . Enforcement of federal constitutional rights that
redress constitutional violations directed against the "guilty" is a
particular function of federal habeas review, lest judges trying the
"morally unworthy" be tempted not to execute the supreme law of
the land. State judges popularly elected may have difficulty
resisting popular pressures not experienced by federal judges given
lifetime tenure designed to immunize them from such
influences .... 476
Clearly, it was Justice Brennan's dissent, not the Court's majority opinion,
which articulated an "emphatic" argument in Stone on the issue of state
courts' ability to enforce federal rights; and Brennan's "emphatic" point was
that the denial of federal habeas review of state court proceedings allegedly
implicating violations of criminal defendants' Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures amounts to an abdication of the
federal judiciary's obligation to safeguard the civil liberties guaranteed by the
federal Constitution.
Similarly, Allen v. McCurry, upon which the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion
in Coeur d'Alene Tribe relies in advocating for the primacy of state courts in
the adjudication of federal rights, is hardly the monolithic endorsement of the
integrity of state court proceedings that it formally purports to be. In Allen,
a six-member Court majority held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applied to prevent a criminal defendant, denied federal habeas relief because
of the Stone ruling, from bringing a federal civil rights claim in federal court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of St. Louis, its police
department and several police officers for allegedly violating his Fourth
Amendment rights.477 The Court's entire position with respect to the
adequacy of state courts in adjudicating federal rights was delineated in two
sentences at the end of the Allen opinion:

475.

Id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

476. Id. at 524-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
477.

See Allen, 449 U.S. at 91-92, 105.
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The only other conceivable basis for finding a universal right
to litigate a federal claim in a federal district court is hardly a legal
basis at all, but rather a general distrust of the capacity of the state
courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues. It is
ironic that Stone v. Powell provided the occasion for the expression
of such an attitude in the present litigation, in view of this Court's
emphatic reaffirmation in that case of the constitutional obligation
of the state courts to uphold federal
law, and its expression of
47
confidence in their ability to do so.
Allen then cites the Stone footnote, discussed above;479 but, again, the
contents of that footnote hardly can be viewed as justifying the pro-statecourts and anti-federal-courts leaning of the Supreme Court majority on the
issue of the exercise of federal question jurisdiction,"' since the Stone
Court's "position" as conveyed in that single footnote is little more than an
adulatory and patently insubstantial gesture, as is the corresponding twosentence "argument" in Allen.
Moreover, it is important to note that Allen, like Stone, gave rise to a
crucial dissenting opinion, written by Justice Blackmun with Justices Brennan
and Marshall joining, which raised objections to the majority's uncritical
embrace of "the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on
constitutional issues. "48' As Justice Blackmun pointed out, in enacting
42 U.S.C. § 1983, "Congress deliberately opened the federal courts to
individual citizens in response to the States' failure to provide justice in their
own courts. .

.

. Congress specifically made a determination that federal

oversight of constitutional determinations through the federal courts was
42
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of constitutional rights." 8
Eschewing the majority's conclusory presumption of the adequacy of state
court adjudications of constitutional claims in both Stone and Allen, Justice
Blackmun made numerous specific references to the legislative history of
§ 1983 showing Congress's justified lack of confidence in state court
proceedings pertaining to federal civil rights. 4 3 Thus, Blackmun pointed
out, one senator supporting the civil rights bill that became § 1983 made the
following statement:

478. Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
479. See supra text accompanying notes 473-76.

480. In his Stone dissent, Justice Brennan referred to the majority's foreclosure of Fourth
Amendment-based federal habeas relief from state court convictions as "a manifestation of this

Court's mistrust for federal judges." Stone, 428 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
481. Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.
482. Id. at 108-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
483.

See id. at 107-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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If the State courts had proven themselves competent to suppress the
local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should not have
been called upon to legislate upon this subject at all. But they have
not done so. We are driven by existing facts to provide for the
several States in the South what they have been unable fully to
provide for themselves; i.e., the full and complete administration
of justice in the courts. 4 4

Another legislator asserted:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence
than the county courts; their judges can act with more
independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their
sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage;
the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they
will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror more
easily. . . .We believe that
we can trust our United States courts,
485
and we propose to do so.
And another supporter of the bill expressed concern that "'the [state] courts
are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to
the impartial administration of law and equity. What benefit would result
from appeal to tribunals whose officers are secretly in sympathy with the
very evil against which we are striving?' ''486 Summarizing the thrust of
congressional concerns supporting the enactment of § 1983, Justice
Blackmun reiterated that
[tihe legislators perceived that justice was not being done in the
States then dominated by the Klan, and it seems senseless to
suppose that they would have intended the federal courts to give
484. Id. at 107 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.

653 (1871) (statement of Sen. Osborn)).
485. Id. at 107 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG.

GLOBE,

App., at 79 (1871) (statement of Rep. Perry) (omission in original)).

42d Cong., 1st Sess.,

Justice Blackmun quoted

further from similar concerns vividly expressed by Senator Osborn:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not;
witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they
might be accomplices. In the presence of these [Klan] gangs all the apparatus
and machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as
if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. Among the most
dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice. Of the
uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is
credibly stated that not one has been punished.
Id. at 108-09 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653
(1871) (statement of Sen. Osborn)).
486. Id. at 109 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
App., at 153 (1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield)).
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full preclusive effect to prior state adjudications. That supposition
would contradict their obvious aim to right the wrongs perpetuated
in those same [state] courts. 487

By relying on nothing more than unsubstantiated avowals in Stone and Allen
concerning state courts' ability faithfully to vindicate federal rights-avowals
weakened by substantial, well documented opposing positions set forth in the
dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, respectivelythe Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe appears effectively to
concede the paucity of any legitimate support for the notion that state courts
can be counted on consistently to operate as disinterested forums for
resolving legal disputes implicating federal rights in general4 8 or federal
Indian rights in particular.489
487. Id. at 109-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also quoted from Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), to underscore the point that in enacting § 1983, Congress "was
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect [federally created] rights; it realized that
state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that
these failings extended to the state courts." Id. at 242, quoted in Allen, 449 U.S. at 112 n.11
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
488. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall articulated
a concern about state court adjudication of federal rights that has as much relevance today as it did
when it first was written:
It would be hazarding too much to assert, that the judicatures of the States will
be exempt from the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are
influenced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals. In many States the
judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature.
The constitution of the United States furnishes no security against the universal
adoption of this principle. When we observe the importance which that
constitution attaches to the independence of judges, we are the less inclined to
suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional questions to
tribunals where this independence may not exist ....
Id. at 386-87. Chief Justice Marshall's concerns about safeguarding the role of federal courts in the
adjudication of federal rights are prescient with respect to modern habeas cases. Reflecting on his
own involvement in such cases as a law clerk for Justice Blackmun, federal prosecutor Edward
Lazarus writes:
The conservatives' habeas revolution

. . .

elevated an ideological passion

for protecting state sovereignty over the plain realities of the judicial process.
Underlying the Court's habeas innovations was the assumption that state judges
were as well suited as federal judges to protect federal constitutional rights.
Such faith in state court systems was simply blind. As practicing lawyers
know, in aggregate, state court judges are just not as good as federal court
judges. They tend to be less well educated and less distinguished in the
profession. Many lack experience with or sophistication about federal
constitutional law. State courts also lack the resources of federal courts,
including top-flight law clerks and even, in some places, the rudiments of a
federal law library.
But even assuming an equality of talent between state and federal judges,
state judges remain intrinsically inferior for the purpose of deciding individual
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6. Young as an Unwanted Impediment to the Saturation of State Law

in Indian Country
Defying further the Young doctrine's affirmation of the indispensability of
federal courts in interpreting federal law when that law allegedly is being
violated by state officials, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe characterizes federal law as "the proprietary concern of state, as well
as federal, courts." 4' In the context of a dispute between an Indian Tribe
and state officials over those officials' appropriation of lakes and rivers
within the boundaries of the Tribe's own reservation, this invocation of state
courts' "proprietary concern" is quite telling, for it unwittingly accentuates
the inevitability of a state court's intrinsic "interestedness," as a functionary
of the State's sovereignty, in the outcome of such a dispute-a dispute which,
of course, implicates the most profound tribalsovereignty concerns.4 9'
claims of constitutional right. The vast majority of state judges do not enjoy
the life tenure that federal judges are guaranteed under the Constitution. And
without life tenure state judges, however well intentioned, are hostages to
passions of their communities. Those passions run particularly hot in high
profile criminal cases, especially the capital cases at which the Court's new
states-friendly habeas corpus regime was aimed. For state judges in many
locales, issuing a pro-defendant ruling in a death penalty case, no matter how
well justified, is tantamount to professional suicide. Even one or two "soft on
crime" rulings can result in a potentially career-ending and always costly recall
campaign; any hope for promotion, by either appointment or election, vanishes
instantly.
EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT, 503-04 (1998) (endnote omitted).
As discussed previously, with respect to the adjudication of federal Indian rights, the concern
about the inability of state courts to adjudicate fairly and dispassionately is even more compelling,
since "[b]ecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where [Indian Tribes] are found are
often their deadliest enemies." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). See supra
notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
489. The irony should be noted once more of the concurring Justices in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
presumably rejecting the Kennedy/Rehnquist view that there is no need for federal courts to
vindicate federal rights generally since state courts are adequate for that task, while presumably
accepting the even more incredible notion that there is no need for federal courts to vindicate the
federally protected rights of Indian Tribes vis-A-vis competing sovereignty claims to on-reservation
submerged lands, a notion likewise proffered on the theory that state courts are adequate for that
task. See supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
490. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
491. Thomas Pacheco has observed:
For the Tribes, many of which are in economic distress, establishing title to
submerged lands may offer some relief in the battle for survival. . . . In
addition to the obvious economic benefits, Tribes are likely to regard the
confirmation of their title to submerged lands as a milestone in the exercise of
tribal sovereignty.
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This implicit endorsement of state courts' "interestedness" in adjudicating
federal-law-based disputes pitting Tribes' interests against States' interests is
carried forward in the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's approval of state courts'
role in facilitating the saturation of state law and state jurisdiction within
state boundaries, even where Indian reservations exist within those
boundaries:
In the States there is an ongoing process by which state courts and
state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law designed to
reflect the State's own rules and traditions concerning the
respective scope of judicial review and administrative discretion.
An important case such as the instant one has features which
instruct and enrich the elaboration of administrative law that is one
of the primary responsibilities of the state judiciary. Where, as
here, the parties invoke federal principles to challenge state
administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong interest
in integrating those sources of law within their own .ystem for the
proper judicial control of state officials. 49
For readers mindful of the ignominious history of state encroachments on the
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and resources of Indian Tribes, this seemingly
technical passage imparts a chilling message. It exposes the willingness of at
least two members of the highest court in the United States to abandon Indian
Tribes to the proven devastating effects of the forced application of state law
in Indian country.493 In effectively promoting the compulsory propagation of
"the State's own rules and traditions" within the boundaries of an Indian
reservation, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
illustrates the Rehnquist Court's signatory tendency to adjudicate disputes
implicating both state and tribal interests in disregard of fundamental tenets
of federal Indian law, in order to "enrich" the States at the expense of the

. ..The creation of an Indian reservation is more than a reservation by
the United States to itself to serve a public purpose, or to a private party.
Rather, such a setting aside of land entails a relationship between sovereigns.
This unique relationship demands that Indian bedlands claims be distinguished
from other cases.
Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian Bedlands Claims: A Need to Clear the Waters, 15 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 4, 44 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
492. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 276 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
493. In this regard, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's advocacy for the "elaboration" of state
law in Indian country is strikingly incompatible with the Supreme Court's historic prerogative of
protecting Indian Tribes and Indian country from the "elaboration" of state law, as represented in
the Marshall Court's landmark decision of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). For
a discussion of Worcester, see supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
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Tribes. 494 And, as all the members of the Rehnquist Court doubtless can
appreciate, the state courts, if given license by a Supreme Court majority
animated by a "States' rights" ideology, can be expected to play a central
and powerful role in this ethnocidal "enrichment" process prescribed in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe.495
7. Reducing Young to a Discretionary Balancing Test
After thus intimating its strong preference for having state courts instead
of federal courts adjudicate federal question disputes generally and federalIndian-law-based disputes in particular, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion once
again tentatively approaches the threshold of a concession: "Our precedents
do teach us, nevertheless, that where prospective relief is sought against state
officers in a federal forum based on a federal right, the Eleventh
Amendment, in most cases, is not a bar. 496
However, the

494. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 276 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.); supra text accompanying note 492. As this portion of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion
appears to hold more directly in view the majority's decision to force Indian Tribes to adjudicate
officer suits implicating federal-Indian-law-based claims to on-reservation navigable waterways only
in the States' own courts (if at all), it presumably reflects the sentiments of the three concurring
Justices as well. This could explain why Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion contains no
criticism of this portion of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion.
495. For a provocative discussion of the role of centralized state power generally in the
imposition of ethnocide on American Indian societies, see PIERRE CLASTRES, ARCHEOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE 43-51 (Jeanine Herman, trans., Semiotext(e) 1994) (1980). Clastres writes:
[E]thnocide results in the dissolution of the multiple into One. Now what
about the State? It is, in essence, a putting into play of centripetal force,
which, when circumstances demand it, tends toward crushing the opposite
centrifugal forces. The State considers itself and proclaims itself the center of
society, the whole of the social body, the absolute master of this body's various
organs. Thus we discover at the very heart of the State's substance the active
power of One, the inclination to refuse the multiple, the fear and horror of
difference. At this formal level we see that ethnocidal practice and the State
machine function in the same way and produce the same effects: the will to
reduce difference and alterity, a sense and taste for the identical and the One
can still be detected in the forms of western civilization and the State.
.. . [E]thnocide, as a more or less authoritarian suppression of
sociocultural differences, is already inscribed in the nature and functioning of
the state machine, which standardizes its rapport with individuals: to the State,
all citizens are equal before the law.
Id. at 48-49. See generally PIERRE CLASTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE (Robert Hurley &
Abe Stein trans., Zone Books 1987) (1974).
496. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 276-77 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) For a discussion of the implications of Justice Kennedy's inclusion of the qualifying phrase
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Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion then promptly backs away from this qualified
concession, laying emphasis not on the validity of that Young-affirming
proposition, but rather on newly devised grounds for doubting that
proposition's validity. Hence, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion stresses the
fact that in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,"' decided in the Term prior to the one
in which Coeur d'Alene Tribe was decided, "we did not allow a suit raising a
federal question to proceed based on Congress's provision of an alternative
review mechanism."498 The Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion then elaborates a
general argument for refusing to recognize the applicability of the Young
doctrine in circumstances where, prior to Coeur d'Alene Tribe, federal
jurisdiction under Young would have been obligatory: 4 .
Whether the presumption in favor of federal-court jurisdiction in
this type of case is controlling will depend upon the particular
context. What is really at stake where a state forum is available is
the desire of the litigant to choose a particular forum versus the
desire of the State to have the dispute resolved in its own courts.
The Eleventh Amendment's background principles of federalism
and comity need not be ignored in resolving these conflicting
preferences. The Young exception may not be applicable if the suit
would "upset the balance of federal and state interests that it
embodies. "500
As Justice Souter suggested in dissent, this expression of a desire to allow or
disallow Young suits strictly according to the Court members' own policy
predilections in situations where Young's requirements of an assertion of an
ongoing violation of federal law and a request for prospective relief clearly
are met ignores the settled understanding that "Young's rule . . itself strikes
the requisite balance between state and federal interests. Where these

"in most cases" in this modification of the Young doctrine, see supra notes 203-10 and
accompanying text.
497. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Justice Kennedy did not actually name or cite Seminole Tribe in this
portion of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion, but he doubtless was referring to that case. See Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 277 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). One reason
that Justice Kennedy may have wished to avoid mentioning Seminole Tribe by name here is that to
do so would draw unwanted attention to the fact that the Rehnquist Court presently is accomplishing
its piecemeal destruction of the Young doctrine by pursuing primarily the task of eliminating the
liberty and sovereignty rights of Indian Tribes, in conformity with the hostile interests of many of
the States in which Indian reservations are located.
498. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 277 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
499. See supra note 455.
500. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 277 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) ) (citation omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)).
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conditions are met, no additional 'balancing' is required or warranted." 50°
And, in view of the majority's decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribe to deny relief
to an Indian Tribe that had satisfied Young's settled criteria, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion's subversion of Young through the
transformation of Young's requirements into a mere "presumption" of
eligibility for Young relief is essentially a fait accompli, having effectively
procured the assenting votes by five members of the Court. 5 °
In the final portion of the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, Justice Kennedy stated the preference of himself and Chief Justice
Rehnquist for replacing the Young doctrine as traditionally understood with a
"case-by-case approach," 0 3 in which the Court would undertake "a careful
balancing and accommodation of state interests when determining whether
the Young exception applies in a given case.""s°
Here, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion does not merely advocate for the adoption of this
novel "balancing" approach to Young; rather, the opinion insists that this
"case-by-case approach" may be seen as operant in "[ojur recent cases"505
and indeed "has been evident from the start." 0 6 As examples of the "recent
cases" which "illustrate" this "case-by-case approach" to Young," 7 the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion cites Edelman v. Jordan,"8 Quern v. Jordan 9
and Milliken v. Bradley.510 But, as both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter
demonstrated in their respective opinions in Coeur d'Alene Tribe,5" an

501. Id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting). It should be noted, too, that contrary to the
implication that might be drawn from Justice Kennedy's invocation of the "balance of federal and
state interests" language from Papasan v. Allain, the Papasan Court did not maintain or suggest
that Young authorizes a discretionary balancing process for federal judges to employ in deciding
whether to permit or deny federal jurisdiction over officer suits, as urged by the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Rather, the Papasan Court simply posited that the "balance of
federal and state interests" as already "embodied" by the Young doctrine necessarily excludes from
the reach of federal jurisdiction pursuant to Young "cases in which [the requested] relief against [a]
state official] is intended indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law through deterrence or
directly to meet third-party interests such as compensation" and not "directly bring an end to [an
ongoing] violation of federal law." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277-78.
502. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
503. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
504. Id. at 278 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
505. Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
506. Id. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
507. Id. at 278, 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
508. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
509. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
510. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
511. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 293-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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examination of these cases reveals that none of them manifests the
Kennedy/Rehnquist "balancing" approach to the applicability of Young.
In Edelman, the Supreme Court addressed an Eleventh Amendment
defense to a class action suit brought against Illinois officials by plaintiffs
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that those officials were
violating federal regulations and denying the plaintiffs equal protection by
not complying with time-limit requirements of federal-state programs of Aid
to the Aged, Blind or Disabled (AABD), under which participating States
were required promptly to process applications and disburse benefits to
applicants determined to be eligible." 2 The Court denied Young relief with
respect to that portion of the class action suit seeking a payment of
retroactive benefits,5" 3 rationalizing this withholding of federal subject matter
jurisdiction by asserting that "a federal court's remedial power, consistent
with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the
payment of funds from the state treasury."5 14 The Court repeatedly
emphasized a distinction between retroactive and prospective relief as
controlling the determination of whether federal jurisdiction over the suit
existed, arguing that here, the plaintiffs' suit would
require[ ] payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence
of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question
determination, but as a form of compensation to those whose
time
slower
on
the
were
processed
applications
schedule ....[Tihis retroactive award of monetary relief. . . is
in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award
of damages against the State. It will to a virtual certainty be paid
from state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state
officials who were the defendants in the action. It is measured in
terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal
duty on the part of the defendant state officials.51 5

512. See Edelnan, 415 U.S. at 653-56.
513. See id. at 658-59.
514. Id. at 677 (citations omitted).
515. Id. at 668. In the follow-up case of Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), discussed
infra at notes 526-33 and accompanying text, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist-the author of the
majority opinions in both Ede/man and Quern-againrepeatedly referred to the decision in Edelman
as turning on a distinction between retroactive and prospective relief:
In Edelnan we held that retroactive welfare benefits awarded by a Federal
District Court to plaintiffs, by reason of wrongful denial of benefits by state
officials prior to the entry of the court's order determining the wrongfulness of
their actions, violated the Eleventh Amendment.

31:787]

SANCTIONING A TYRANNY

Notwithstanding
the
precision
of Edelman's
insistence-albeit
5
16
controversial -that
the Young doctrine countenances requests for
prospective relief only and does not permit an award of retroactive relief, the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe asserts that in Edelman,
"we concluded the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
was not necessary for the vindication of federal rights.",1 7 While this
characterization of Edelman fits with the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's
efforts to "redefine the [Young] doctrine, from a rule recognizing federal
jurisdiction to enjoin state officers from violating federal law to a principle of
equitable discretion," 518 it does not fairly represent what the Supreme Court
"concluded" in Edelman; for there is no discussion in Edelman as to whether
the Court believed recognition of federal jurisdiction for adjudicating the
officer suit was "necessary" or not. In this regard, Justice Souter's critical
observation in dissent is well worth noting:
While the principal opinion suggests [Edelman, Quern and
Milliken] embody a "careful balancing and accommodation of state
interests when determining whether the Young exception applies in
a given case," in fact they simply reflect the Court's effort to
demarcate the line between prospective and retrospective relief.
That Young represents a "balance of federal and state interests"
does not mean the doctrine's application should be balanced against
519
other factors in any given case.
In her concurring opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice O'Connor
addressed another defect in the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's treatment of
S.. The distinction between that relief permissible under the doctrine of
Ex parte Young and that found barred in Edelman was the difference between
prospective relief on one hand and retrospective reliefon the other.

. . . [D]oes the [relief requested by the Quern plaintiffs] constitute
permissible prospective relief or a "retroactive award which requires the
payment of funds from the state treasury"? We think this relief falls on the
Exparte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the
Edelman side.
Quern, 440 U.S. at 333-34, 337, 346-47 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).
516. In a subsequent case, Justice Stevens commented on the controversial nature of the
Court's decision in Edelman: "I have great difficulty with a construction of the Eleventh
Amendment which acknowledges the federal court's jurisdiction of a case and merely restricts the
kind of relief the federal court may grant ....

"

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 459 (1976)

(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
517. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 278 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.) (emphasis added).
518. Id. at 297 (Souter, J. dissenting).
519. Id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Edelman, 2 ° as represented in the following Kennedy/Rehnquist assertion:
"There was no need for the Edelman Court to consider the other relief
granted by the District Court, prospectively enjoining state officials from
failing to abide by federal requirements, since it was conceded that Young
was sufficient for this purpose."52 Here, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion is
referring to Edelman's passing comment that in petitioning the Court, the
state officials had not asked the Court to review the lower federal courts'
decision to grant the plaintiffs prospective relief in the form of "a permanent
injunction requiring [the state officials' future] compliance with the federal
time limits for processing and paying AABD applicants";5"2 for, as the
Edelman Court observed, "Petitioner concedes that Ex parte Young is no bar
to that part of the District Court's judgment that prospectively enjoined [the
state officials] from failing to process applications within the time limits
established by the federal regulations." 523 In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice
O'Connor astutely detected an unsettling "hidden purpose" in the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's reference to the state officials' concession in
Edelman concerning the propriety of granting prospective relief:
The principal opinion appears to suggest that the Court could have
found such [prospective] relief improper in the absence of this
concession. But surely the State conceded this point because the
law was well established. Indeed, Edelman is consistently cited for
the proposition
that prospective injunctive relief is available in a
24
Young suit.5
While this observation is instructive, the irony must be noted once again of
Justice O'Connor chafing at a scheme to close off Young relief to plaintiffs
who seek prospective relief against state officials accused of ongoing
violations of federal law, while delivering the necessary votes to accomplish
that same result when the plaintiff is an Indian Tribe seeking prospective
relief against state officials accused of violating the Tribe's federal rights to
navigable waterways."
In addition to effectively prescribing a change of rationale for the Court's
decision in Edelman, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
also appears to press for a revisionist interpretation of Quern v. Jordan,52 6 as
520. See id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
521. Id. at 278 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
522. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.651, 656 (1974).
523. Id. at 664 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
524. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (citation omitted).
525. See supra notes 314-30 and accompanying text.
526. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion.527 In Quern, the
Court validated an award of "notice relief" to the same class of plaintiffs
implicated in the Edelman litigation; this relief consisted of
"order[ing] ... state officials to send a mere explanatory notice to members
of the plaintiff class advising them that there are state administrative
procedures available by which they may receive a determination of whether
they are entitled to past [AABD] welfare benefits. "528 The Supreme Court
concluded that the district court's "notice relief' order did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment, but instead was permitted under the Young doctrine:
We think this relief falls on the Ex parte Young side of the
Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side....

The notice . . . is more properly viewed as ancillary to the
prospective relief already ordered by the court. The notice in
effect simply informs class members that their federal suit is at an
end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief,
and that there are existing state administrative procedures which
they may wish to pursue. Petitioner raises no objection to the
expense of preparing or sending it. The class members are "given
no more . . . than what they would have gathered by sitting in the
529
courtroom. "

In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's reference to Quern
consists largely of quoting from this passage.53 ° However, as Justice
O'Connor suggested, considering the context of the Kennedy/Rehnquist
argument purporting to discern in "our recent cases" a "balancing" approach
527. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 294-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
528. Quern, 440 U.S. at 334.
529. Id. at 347-49 (citations omitted) (final omission in original) (quoting Jordan v. Trainor,
563 F.2d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1977)).
530. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The second time the Edelman litigation came before the Court, in Quern v.
Jordan, we made a point of saying the relief sought pursuant to the Young
action was a notice "simply inform[ing] class members that their federal suit is
at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and
that there are existing state administrative procedures .

. .

. Petitioner raises no

objection to the expense of preparing or sending it. The class members are
given no more . . . than what they would have gathered by sitting in the

courtroom."
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 278-79 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)
(citations omitted) (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Quern, 440 U.S. at 349).
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to the applicability of Young, this reference to Quern harbors a dubious
implication:
[B]y focusing on the Court's statement in Quern v. Jordan that the
state officials did not object to preparing or sending notice of class
members' possible remedies under state administrative procedures,
the principal opinion implies that the Court upheld the prospective
relief granted there because the relief was not particularly invasive.
But the question in Quern was whether the notice relief was more
like the prospective relief allowed in typical Young suits, or more
like the retrospective relief disallowed in Edelman. The Quern
Court permitted the relief to stand not because53 it was
inconsequential, but because it was adjudged prospective. 1
Indeed, Justice O'Connor may have underestimated the sweep of Justice
Kennedy's implication in quoting from Quern, for the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion may be suggesting that the prospective "notice relief' allowed in
Quern passed muster under the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine not by
virtue of being "inconsequential, "532 but simply because the defendant state
officials "raise[d] no objection to the expense of preparing or sending it. "133
The third of "our recent cases" that the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe invokes to "illustrate" the supposed longstanding
existence of a "balancing" approach in the Court's application of the Young
doctrine is Milliken v. Bradley.534 As mentioned previously,535 the Supreme
Court in Milliken validated a federal district court's award of prospective
relief in the form of remedial education programs, ordered to be funded in
part by the State of Michigan, for schoolchildren long subjected to illegal
racial segregation at the hands of state officials guilty of unconstitutional
racial discrimination. 36 In explaining why the officer suit did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment but instead was valid under Young, the Milliken Court
repeatedly emphasized, as its sole rationale for permitting the suit, the
prospective nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs:
The decree to share the future costs of educational components
in this case fits squarely within the prospective-compliance
531. Id. at 294-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
532. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra
text accompanying note 531.
533. Quern, 440 U.S. at 349; see also supra text accompanying note 529.
534. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). For additional discussion of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe court's
reliance on Milliken, see supra note 204-209 and accompanying text.
535. See supra text accompanying note 206.
536. See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282-83.
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exception reaffirmed by Edelman. That exception, which had its
genesis in Ex pane Young, permits federal courts to enjoin state
officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law,
notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state
treasury.
The order challenged here does no more than
that.... The educational components, which the District Court
ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to wipe out
continuing conditions of inequality produced by the inherently
unequal dual school system long maintained by Detroit.

... That the programs are also "compensatory" in nature does
not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates
prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school
system. We therefore hold that such
prospective relief is not
537
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Despite Milliken's exact focus on the prospectivity of the relief sought,
the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe ignores the Court's
stated rationale for its Eleventh Amendment holding in Milliken. Instead it
places inordinate emphasis, unaccompanied by any citation to Milliken, on
the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's own observation that the Milliken plaintiffs
had sought "to vindicate [their] civil liberties, not to establish ownership over
state resources or funds."5 38 Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter
criticized the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's attempt at replacing Milliken's
stated
rationale
with
one specially
designed
to
support
the
Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal for eviscerating Ex parte Young.539 Justice
O'Connor wrote:
[Tihe principal opinion explains this Court's decision in
Milliken ... by focusing on the fact that the federal interests
implicated by the claim in that case were particularly strong.
Again, however, the Court upheld the relief not because the
complaint sought to vindicate civil liberties, but because the
remedy was prospective rather than retrospective. Our case law
simply does not support the proposition that federal courts must
evaluate the importance of the federal right at stake before
permitting an officer's suit to proceed. 540

537. Id. at 289-90 (citations omitted).
538. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 279 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
539. See infra notes 540-41 and accompanying text.
540. Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 295 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (citations omitted).
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Similarly, Justice Souter observed:
The principal opinion suggests that we held Young to apply in
Milliken v. Bradley because the complaint sought to vindicate civil
liberties and accordingly involved strong federal interest. The
undeniable federal interest in protecting civil liberties, however,
was not the reason we applied the Young remedy in Milliken. The
sole enquiry in this regard was whether the relief sought was fairly
characterized as prospective. 54'
Again, while Justice O'Connor's and Justice Souter's common criticism
concerning the revisionism manifest in the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's
treatment of Milliken is instructive, that criticism falls short, perhaps, of
appreciating the full sweep of the Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal for
diminishing Young. Nowhere does the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion concede
either expressly or by necessary implication that Young relief generally
should be available even where the federal interest at stake in an officer suit
is "strong." Rather, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion appears to tolerate the
Milliken holding only insofar as it implicates relief that Congress, if it chose
to act, would be able in any event to exact from the States themselves, by
expressly abrogating the States' immunity pursuant to Congress's power
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of' that Amendment.542
Thus, in discussing Milliken, Justice Kennedy elaborated the view that
"[iff Congress pursuant to its § 5 remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment may abrogate sovereign immunity, even if the resulting
legislation goes beyond what is constitutionally necessary, it follows that the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment themselves offer a
powerful reason to provide a federal forum." 543 As Justice Souter suggested
in dissent, this statement seems out of place in a discussion of the availability
of Young relief since, "[g]iven that we do not view a suit against a state
officer for prospective relief as a suit against the State, the fact . . .that

Congress may abrogate state immunity from suit in legislation enacted
pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has no bearing on Young's
application." 5' Hence, a likely purpose for Justice Kennedy's inclusion of
this assertion is to suggest that Young relief ought to be limited to that
narrow range of officer suits aimed at redressing civil rights violations and
541. Id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
542. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
543. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 279 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.) (citation omitted).
544. Id. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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theoretically capable of eliciting the creation of private remedies against
offending States by means of the exercise of Congress's circumscribed power
under the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 Such limitation on the availability of
545. That the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion posits only a conditional acceptance of the validity
of officer suits implicating alleged civil rights violations-conditioned on whether Congress
theoretically could make States directly accountable for such violations "even if the resulting
legislation goes beyond what is constitutionally necessary," id. at 279 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); supra text accompanying note 543-would appear to have accreted an
enhanced significance in the aftermath of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), issued two
days after Coeur d'Alene Tribe.
In Flores, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), which Congress enacted in
1993 in a rare showing of near-unanimous approval by both Houses, in response to the Court's
widely criticized decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court voted five to four effectively to eliminate state and federal
courts' use of the longstanding "compelling governmental interest" test in First Amendment Free
Exercise of Religion cases-a test which, prior to Smith, was understood as indispensable to
effectuating "the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent
possible in a pluralistic society." Id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Subsequently, the fractured Flores Court struck down RFRA as unconstitutional insofar as it
purported to require use of the "compelling governmental interest" test in Free Exercise cases
testing the constitutionality of general laws enacted by the States, and held that to that very extent,
Congress had exceeded the limits of its delegated power to effectuate religious freedom values
through the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provision. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532-36.
Read in light of Flores' restrictive view of Congress's power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
values, then, Justice Kennedy's conditional acceptance of the validity of civil-rights-based Young
suits like Milliken would appear to amount to an expression of doubt concerning the validity of such
suits. And, by the same token, Justice Kennedy would appear implicitly to be raising a collateral
doubt concerning the power of Congress to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, by pointedly interjecting in the midst of his discussion of the conditional
validity of Milliken a reference to Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. at 279 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
Fitzpatrick held that Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity pursuant to an
exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power; the Court stated that "Congress may, in
determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. However, the
Fitzpatrick Court expressly reserved consideration of whether any particular purported
congressional abrogation of the States' immunity would be "a proper exercise of congressional
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment," since the defendant state officials had not raised
that issue in the Fitzpatrick litigation. Id. at 456 n. 11.
Since Flores subsequently imposed severe restrictions on what may constitute "a proper
exercise" of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy's reference to
Fitzpatrick in Coeur d'Alene Tribe-penned in knowledge of the yet-to-be-announced Flores
decision-can be read as portending the creation of additional judge-made theories for impeding the
ability of Congress to make States and state officials accountable to the commands of paramount
federal law, even when Congress endeavors to do so by abrogating, pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the States' Eleventh Amendment/Hans immunity. Indeed, the prediction
culled from Coeur d'Alene Tribe that the Rehnquist Court is preparing to diminish the ability of
Congress to abrogate States' sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment appears
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Young relief would exclude, of course, many cases in which the federal
interest at stake in an officer suit seeking prospective relief for an ongoing
violation of federal law is "strong.""'

Thus, it appears that the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe would deny or question the validity of the officer suits declared or
presumed valid in all three of the cases that the opinion invokes to
"illustrate" the "balancing" approach to Young that the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion advocates. Yet, despite the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's apparent
preference for re-deciding the Eleventh Amendment issues in Edelman,
Quern and Milliken, that preference is devoid of any support from the
Court's reasoning in those cases, for on closer inspection, it is clear that
none of those cases employed the Kennedy/Rehnquist "balancing" approach
to Young. Rather each of those cases merely represents, to reiterate Justice
Souter's apt observation, "the Court's effort to demarcate the line between
prospective and retrospective relief.""
8. Young as a Type of Bivens Remedy
As a final contention in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion cites Seminole Tribe v. Florida5 as reflecting "the importance of
case-by-case analysis" under the Young doctrine.49
In making this
now to have come to pass in two recently decided Eleventh Amendment cases. See College Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999) (striking down
a purported congressional abrogation, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, of States' immunity
from federal court suits for false and misleading advertising prohibited by the Trademark Act of
1946); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199
(1999) (striking down a purported congressional abrogation, pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, of States' immunity from federal court suits for patent infringements prohibited by
federal patent protection laws).
546. If the Justices were to develop an appreciation for the importance of the federal
government's obligations to safeguard the rights of Indian Tribes in the field of federal Indian lawobligations dating back to the founding of the United States government-they would be incapable
of lightly denying, as they effectively did in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the strength of the federal interest
at stake in redressing allegations that state officials are appropriating lakes and rivers on an Indian
reservation in ongoing violation of an Indian Tribe's federally protected rights to those waterways.
See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. Yet even this exceptionally strong federal interest,
if ever properly acknowledged as such by the Court, presumably would be insufficient, under the
Kennedy/Rehnquist view, to justify making Young relief available to an Indian Tribe offended by
this type of egregious, unlawful conduct by state officials.
547. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 304 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying note 519.
548. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
549. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
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argument, Justice Kennedy observed that in denying Young relief to an
Indian Tribe offended by state officials' ongoing violation of the Tribe's
rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,55 the Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe posited a reliance on Schweiker v. Chilicky, 5' a case not
involving Eleventh Amendment issues at all, but pertaining instead to the
question of whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights give rise to implied
causes of action for damages against federal officials accused of violating the
constitutional rights of individuals." 2 Since the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion
insists that Seminole Tribe's reliance on Chilicky constitutes evidence of a
longstanding "case-by-case approach" 53 in the Supreme Court's Young
jurisprudence, a brief discussion of Chilicky and its purported connection
with the Young doctrine is called for.
Chilicky followed in a train of decisions originating in the landmark 1971
case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,554 in which the Supreme Court first articulated the importance of
recognizing implied "constitutional tort"555 causes of action against federal
officials in order to effectuate a vindication of the individual rights singled
out for special protection by the text of the Constitution itself.556 Unlike the
550. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
551. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
552. See id. at 414; see also id. at 431 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that despite the
majority's particular holding in the case, "[tihe Court today reaffirms the availability of a federal
action for money damages against federal officials charged with violating constitutional rights").
553. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
554. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
555. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 419 (quoting Chilicky v. Schweiker, 796 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir.
1986)).
556. In justifying recognition of an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers
for an alleged violation of a plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Justice Brennan, writing for the Bivens Court, stated:
[The Fourth Amendment] guarantees to citizens of the United States the
absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out
by virtue of federal authority. And "where federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert
to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted)).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan likewise emphasized the general importance of
such implied causes of action. Responding specifically to the federal officers' argument "that,
where Congress has not expressly" created a cause of action by statute, proper judicial deference to
Congress militates in favor of courts declining to recognize an implied cause of action for alleged
constitutional violations except where "'essential,' or 'indispensable for vindicating constitutional
rights,'" id. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brief for Respondents 19, 24),
Justice Harlan wrote:
[T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional
interests such as those embraced
by
the Fourth
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Court in Bivens, however, the Chilicky Court declined to recognize an
implied cause of action for damages against federal officials for violations of
a constitutional right."5 7 Specifically, the Court in Chilicky refused to
recognize a private cause of action for an alleged Fifth Amendment Due
Process violation by officials responsible for administering the Social
Security disability benefits program," 8 whereas in Bivens, the Court did
recognize a private cause of action for an alleged violation of the Fourth
Amendment by Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents. 59 Writing for the
Chilicky majority, Justice O'Connor concluded that "such a remedy, not
having been included in the elaborate remedial scheme [of the Social Security
disability benefits program] devised by Congress, is unavailable. ""
In explaining Chilicky's refusal to recognize a so-called "Bivens
" ' Justice
remedy," 56
O'Connor invoked language from Bivens employed by
Justice Brennan to justify the Bivens Court's recognition of an implied cause
of action for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. "The present case,"
Brennan stated in Bivens, "involves no special factors counselling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. "562 By contrast, a "special
factor" was discernible in the circumstances of Chilicky, according to Justice
O'Connor, in the form of what O'Connor believed were "indications that
congressional inaction [in not expressly creating the contended damages
remedy when designing or reforming the Social Security disability benefits
program] has not- been inadvertent."5 63 O'Connor elaborated, "When the
design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that
may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional
Bivens remedies. "64 Reading Congress's silence in the statutes that created
and reformed the elaborate Social Security disability benefits program as
bespeaking a clear intent by Congress to preclude the availability of "the

Amendment .. .[I]tmust . . . be recognized that the Bill of Rights is
particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of

the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities ....
Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also infra notes 587-95 and accompanying
text.
557.
558.

See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 414.
See id. at 418-20.

559. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
560. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 414.
561. See id. at 421.

562. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
563.

Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423.

564. Id.
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kind of remedies that respondents seek in this lawsuit," 6 ' Justice O'Connor
concluded that
Congress .
has addressed the problems created by state
agencies' wrongful termination of disability benefits. Whether or
not we believe that its response was the best response, Congress is
the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required
in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program.
Congress has discharged that responsibility to the extent that it
affects the case before us, and
we see no legal basis that would
5
allow us to revise its decision. 6
Justice Brennan-the author of Bivens-registered a stern disapproval of
the Chilicky majority's decision. Dissenting on behalf of himself, Justice
Marshall and Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan pointed out that "Congress
never mentioned, let alone debated, the desirability of providing a statutory
remedy for . . . constitutional wrongs." 567 Brennan reiterated the general
importance-as he first had articulated it in Bivens-of a court considering
whether "'special factors counse[1] hesitation [even] in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress"' before recognizing a Bivens remedy, 6 but
he vigorously maintained that notwithstanding the Court's assertions to the
contrary, no such "special factors" were present in Chilicky:
The mere fact that Congress was aware of the prior injustices
[in the administration of the Social Security disability benefits
program] and failed to provide a form of redress for them [when
enacting reform legislation], standing alone, is simply not a
"special factor counseling hesitation" in the judicial recognition of
a remedy. 569

565.
566.
567.
568.
Unknown
569.

Id. at 426.
Id. at 429 (citation omitted).
Id. at 431 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 435 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Bivens v. Six
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
Id. at 440 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan explained further:
Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of
congressional intent, all the more so where Congress is legislating in the face
of a massive breakdown [in an administrative scheme] calling for prompt and
sweeping corrective measures. In 1984, Congress undertook to resuscitate a
disability review process that had ceased functioning: that the prospective
measures it prescribed to prevent future dislocations included no remedy for
past wrongs in no way suggests a conscious choice to leave those wrongs
unremedied. I therefore think it altogether untenable to conclude, on the basis
of mere legislative silence and inaction, that Congress intended an
administrative scheme that does not even take cognizance of constitutional
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For an understanding of the impropriety of the Supreme Court's reliance
on Chilicky in the Seminole Tribe decision, it is important to take special note
of Justice Brennan's allusion to a narrow zone of apparent "common
ground" shared by the otherwise divergent majority and dissenting views in
Chilicky. Adverting to two prior cases in which the Court unanimously
declined to recognize Bivens remedies ,570 Brennan pointed out that "[iun both
those cases, we declined to legislate in areas in which Congress enjoys a
special expertise that the Judiciary clearly lacks." s ' Brennan went on to
criticize the Chilicky majority for failing to accept in its entirety the rationale
for those unanimous precedents, and for insisting instead that "congressional
authority over a given subject" alone can constitute a "special factor" for
inducing the Court's "hesitation" when deciding whether to recognize a
Bivens remedy. 72 As Brennan emphasized, the Court's decision not to
recognize Bivens actions in those earlier cases rested not merely on
"congressional competence to legislate" in a particular field, but also-and
necessarily-on "our recognition that [the Judiciary] lacked the special
expertise Congress had developed in such matters." 73 But all the Justices in
Chilicky apparently agreed that to justify rejection of a requested Bivens
remedy for an alleged "constitutional tort," at the very least Congress
alternatively must be capable of providing the requested relief by filling, at
its option, the remedial gap left open by the court's decision not to recognize
an implied cause of action out of deference to legislative discretion. As
addressed further below, 74 Seminole Tribe's reliance on Chilicky is
incompatible with Chilicky's tacit acknowledgment of this necessary (if not
finding a "special
sufficient, per Justice Brennan's dissent) prerequisite for
575
determination.
Bivens
a
in
factor counseling hesitation"
claims to displace a damages action for constitutional deprivations that might
arise in the administration of the disability insurance program.
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
570. The cases are Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (declining to recognize a Bivens
remedy for military personnel who had accused their superior officers of injurious and
unconstitutional conduct) and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (declining to recognize a Bivens
remedy for a federal employee who had accused supervising officials of demoting him for engaging
in speech protected by the First Amendment, thereby causing him emotional distress).
571. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
572. Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

573. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
574. See infra notes 582-84 and accompanying text.
575. In Bivens itself, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, distinguished United States v.

Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), a case in which the Court "refused to infer from the
Government-soldier relationship that the United States could recover damages from one who
negligently injured a soldier and thereby caused the Government to pay his medical expenses and

lose his services during the course of his hospitalization." Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed.
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Seminole Tribe's wayward reliance on Chilicky consists of the following
key passage:
Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the
enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against
federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one
created by the judiciary. Schweiker v. Chilicky. Here, of course,
the question is not whether a remedy should be created, but instead
is whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted, as it was
in Ex pare Young, in order to allow a suit against a state officer.
Nevertheless, we think that the same general principle applies:
Therefore, where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created
right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations
and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young. 576
As Justice Souter emphasized in his Seminole Tribe dissent, the majority's
forced importation of Chilicky's rationale for disallowing a Bivens remedy is
inappropriate and misplaced, since "[t]he Bivens issue in Chilicky ... is

different from the Young issue here in every significant respect.,
elaborated:

577

Souter

Young is not an example [like Bivens] of a novel rule that a
proponent has a burden to justify affirmatively on policy grounds
in every context in which it might arguably be recognized; it is a
general principle of federal equity jurisdiction that has been
recognized throughout our history and for centuries before our own
history began. Young does not provide retrospective monetary
relief [like Bivens] but allows prospective enforcement of federal
law that is entitled to prevail under the Supremacy Clause.
[Young] requires not money payments from a government
employee's personal pocket [like Bivens], but lawful conduct by a
public employee acting in his official capacity. Young would not
function here to provide a merely supplementary regime of
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). As Brennan noted, since Standard Oil dealt with
a question of 'federal fiscal policy,'" id. (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 311), it implicated a

domain uniquely within Congress's expertise. Quoting further from Standard Oil, Justice Brennan
was careful to emphasize that the Court in that case included in its justification for deciding not to
recognize an implied cause of action the point that "the United States has power at any time to
create the liability." Id. (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, Bivens itself implicitly recognizes that in declining to create a Bivens remedy, a
court must make sure that Congress itself actually has the power to fill the resulting gap, should it
choose to create an express cause of action for redressing the alleged "constitutional tort.
576. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (citation omitted).
577. Id. at 177 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
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compensation to deter illegal action [like a Bivens remedy], but the
sole jurisdictional basis for an Article III court's enforcement of a
clear federal statutory obligation .

. .

. One cannot intelligibly

generalize from Chilicky's standards for imposing the burden to
justify a supplementary scheme of tort law to the displacement of
Young's traditional and indispensable jurisdictional basis for
ensuring official compliance
with federal law when a State itself is
57 8
immune from suit.
From the vantage point of Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the significance of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's blurring in Seminole Tribe of the distinction between an
inquiry into the availability of a Young suit and a determination whether to
recognize a "supplementary scheme of tort law"5 79 in the form of a Bivens
remedy (a blurring that the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion describes as
"Seminole Tribe's implicit analogy of Young to Bivens") 5 ° is clarified
somewhat. The merging of these disparate doctrines would seem to mesh
well with the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme in Coeur d'Alene Tribe for
destabilizing the Young doctrine by equating state officials' ongoing
violations of federal law-redressable under Young-with mere common law
torts, as discussed above. 58' But aside from this "hindsight" observation, it
was clear even at the time Seminole Tribe was decided that forcing a Bivens
analysis in the context of a Young case is highly injudicious, both for the
reasons stated by Justice Souter, and for the additional reason 5" that in the
Bivens framework, any judicial decision not to recognize an implied
"constitutional tort" necessarily presumes the ability of Congress to provide
such a remedy expressly, by enacting legislation.583 However, as Seminole
Tribe itself dramatically demonstrates, in the context of cases in which
plaintiffs seek relief in federal court for alleged violations of federal law by
States or state officials, any presumption that Congress can provide such
relief simply by expressly "filling the gap" with new legislation has now
been rendered highly doubtful. 584 Hence, a Bivens analysis-even if it were
578. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
579. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 578.
580. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 280 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
581. See supra notes 386-446 and accompanying text.
582. Justice Souter may have been alluding to the concern elaborated here when he observed
that the Seminole Tribe's Young theory constituted "the sole jurisdictional basis for an Article III
court's enforcement of a clear federal statutory obligation." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 177

(Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 577.
583. See supra notes 570-75 and accompanying text.
584. In addition to denying Young relief to the Seminole Tribe of Florida "because Congress
enacted a remedial scheme . . . specifically designed for the enforcement of" the Tribe's rights
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76, Seminole Tribe also
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held-even more dramatically-that Congress has no power under Article I of the Constitution to
abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment/Hans immunity and thereby make States answerable in
federal court for violating plaintiffs' federal rights created pursuant to Congress's legislative power
under that Article. See id. at 47, 66, 72-73, 76 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989)). Thus, in Seminole Tribe the Rehnquist Court, by a five to four vote, struck down
as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment those provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in
which "Congress . . . provided an 'unmistakably clear' statement of its intent to abrogate" the
States' Hans immunity and to require States to be accountable in federal court for violating Tribes'
rights under the Act. Id. at 56 (quoting Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
Notwithstanding Seminole Tribe's drastic curtailment of Congress's power textually to abrogate
the States' Hans immunity and thereby make States accountable for violating federal law, the
Seminole Tribe majority went to some length to insist that it was "not hold[ing] that Congress
cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex pane Young over a cause of action with a limited
remedial scheme," even going so far as inexplicably accusing the dissent of claiming that the Court
had so held. Id. at 75 n. 17. Still, given the Rehnquist Court's burgeoning creativity in
implementing its "States' rights" ideology in the context of Eleventh Amendment cases generally, it
seems doubtful that the Court as presently constituted would allow Congress to authorize Young
suits statutorily in circumstances where Congress clearly is forbidden from making States
themselves directly accountable in federal court for violating federal law.
This fear seems justified, for example, in view of the manner in which the Court framed the
Young issue in Seminole Tribe itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[hiere . . .the question
...is whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted, as it was in Ex pane Young, in order
to allow a suit against a state officer." Id. at 74 (emphasis added); supra text accompanying note
576. This characterization of a Young-authorized suit against a state officer as a "lifting" of a
"bar" imposed by the Constitution reflects the Seminole Tribe Court's refusal to view a suit against
a state officer who violates federal law as anything other than a suit against the State itself,
notwithstanding Young's core instruction to the contrary, supra text accompnaying note 404. It was
a similar tacit refusal to accept the validity of Young's jurisprudential underpinnings that caused
Justice Souter twice to castigate the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe for its
similarly dismissive remarks. See supra text accompanying notes 460-62, 543-44.
The Court's strategic language in Seminole Tribe thus forcing the perception that application of
Ex pane Young entails a "lifting" of "the Eleventh Amendment bar," together with Seminole
Tribe's unprecedented constitutionalizing of that "bar," would seem to suggest that notwithstanding
its apparent protestation to the contrary, the Court now is poised to deprive Congress of the power
to make Young relief available in circumstances where Congress no longer can make the States
themselves accountable for violating federal law. Such an additional curtailment of Congress's
power would be consistent with the proliferation of Rehnquist Court decisions (in addition to
Seminole Tribe) in recent years eviscerating Congress and implementing the Court's "States' rights"
ideology. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (5-4 decision) (striking down
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 purporting to authorize private suits against
States in state courts for violations of the Act as exceeding, in light of the Constitution's
incorporation of state sovereign immunity as implicitly recognized by the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, Congress's Article I powers to enact legislation); College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (5-4 decision) (striking down a
provision of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act that purported textually to abrogate States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and thereby to subject States to federal court suits for false and
misleading advertising prohibited by the 1946 Lanham Act as exceeding Congress's constitutional
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, (1999) (5-4 decision) (striking down a provision of the Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Act that purported textually to abrogate States' Eleventh
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proper to analogize to Bivens in a Young case-certainly would yield no
"special factors counseling hesitation" in the judicial granting of relief under
these newly restrictive conditions, where a court is called upon either to
permit the requested Young relief or else to leave open no conceivable
avenue of federal court relief at all.
It should be clear, then, that the Seminole Tribe Court's reliance on
Chilicky's misapplication of the Bivens doctrine was inapposite and
illogical-but nonetheless instrumental in reaching the result of withholding
Young relief from an Indian Tribe seeking to have its federal rights under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act vindicated in the face of unlawful
obstructionism by state officials. But it also is clear that while Seminole
Tribe's interposition of a Chilicky/Bivens analogy certainly does establish a
new and unprecedented limitation on the scope of Ex parte Young, this
appropriation of Chilicky does not prove that the Supreme Court's Young
jurisprudence now has been reduced to nothing more than the discretionary
"case-by-case analysis" advanced by the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe.5" For Seminole Tribe's novel instruction regarding the
Young inquiry is in the nature of a "bright line" limitation that does not
implicate any judicial "balancing" at all. Thus, according to the Seminole
Tribe command, if Congress provides a detailed remedial scheme for
vindicating a federal right, this, without more, in and of itself necessarily
shows that Congress intended to preclude all supplementary remedies-no
"balancing" is performed at all. With reference to the terminology that
Seminole Tribe implicitly imported from Bivens via Chilicky,"a one could say
that under the Seminole Tribe instruction, the existence of the "special
factor" of a detailed congressional remedial scheme "counsels hesitation" for
the sole purpose of allowing a court to satisfy itself that the scheme contains
no indications that Congress meant anything other than what that scheme
expressly provides.
As soon as this closely managed inquiry into
Amendment immunity and thereby make States accountable in federal court for patent infringements

as exceeding Congress's constitutional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (5-4 decision) (striking down a provision of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act of 1993 as an intrusion upon the Constitution's implicit protection of state
sovereignty); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (6-3 decision) (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,. as applied to state and local law, as exceeding

Congress's constitutional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4 decision) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as

exceeding Congress's constitutional power under the Commerce Clause); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (6-3 decision) (striking down a provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment's
allocation of power between the federal government and state governments).

585. 521 U.S. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
586. See supra text accompanying note 562.
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congressional intent is completed, the court's "hesitation" comes to an abrupt
end, and the court ineluctably declares Young relief to be unavailable.
Again, the crucial point is that Seminole Tribe does not instruct a court to
"hesitate" in order to conduct some sort of discretionary "balancing" test
when determining the availability of Young relief. Rather, Seminole Tribe
simply establishes a new, "bright line" presumption that Congress intended
to foreclose Young relief whenever Congress provides a detailed remedial
scheme for vindicating a federal right.
One other problem should be noted in connection with the
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's attempt in Coeur d'Alene Tribe to portray
Seminole Tribe as illustrating the Court's use of a "balancing" approach to
the Young doctrine.587 Quoting from Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Bivens, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion entreats courts to "consider whether
there are 'special factors counseling hesitation' before allowing a suit to
proceed under either [a Bivens or Young] theory. 588
The
Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion then appends the following comment,
accompanied by a citation to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens:
"The range of concerns to be considered in answering this inquiry is
broad. 5 89 With this juxtaposition, the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion makes it
appear that Justice Harlan in Bivens had been advancing the notion that there
are many reasons why a court might want to "hesitate" when deliberating
whether to recognize a Bivens remedy, and hence that Harlan presumably
would have supported the analogous notion that this kind of judicial
"hesitation" is appropriate in the Young context as well.
But this adroitly crafted appearance 59° masks a reality that is quite to the
contrary; for in the cited passage from the Bivens concurrence, Justice
587. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 278 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C.J.).
588. Id. at 280 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (citation omitted) (quoting
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).

589. Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (citation omitted).
590. For an engaging discussion of the decidedly "mixed" "blessings of adroitness in the field
of American Indian law," see the pertinent discussion in Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in
Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case
ofEberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19, 43-46 (1998). Professor Laurence writes:
[O]f late, such adroitness by the United States Supreme Court has more often
than not been in derogation of tribal sovereignty and Indian rights ...
...[C]onsider the ill-famed Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, perhaps
the most consistently criticized Indian law case of the past half-century. ...
The majority opinion in Oliphant, written by then-Justice Rehnquist,
adroitly constructed what it called an "unspoken assumption," shared by the
three branches of the federal government, that tribes had no criminal
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Harlan, far from "counseling hesitation" for the purpose of pondering a
"broad" "range of concerns" militating againstjudicial recognition of Bivens
" ' was making precisely the opposite point-i.e., that
remedies, 59
judicial
recognition of Bivens remedies properly can be supported by a wide variety
of "policy considerations. "'9 Specifically, Justice Harlan was responding to
the federal government's theory that
where Congress has not expressly authorized a particular remedy,
a federal court should exercise its power to accord a traditional
form of judicial relief at the behest of a litigant, who claims a
constitutionally protected interest has been invaded, only where the
remedy is "essential," or "indispensable for vindicating
constitutional rights. "593
Justice Harlan firmly rejected the government's attempt to restrict by means
of this asserted "'essentiality' test "59 the judiciary's ability to recognize
implied causes of action for violations of constitutional rights by federal
officers:
These arguments for a more stringent test to govern the grant
of damages in constitutional cases seem to be adequately answered
by the point that the judiciary has a particular responsibility to
assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as those
embraced by the Fourth Amendment. .

.

. [T]he Bill of Rights is

particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in
the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at
the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express
congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard
to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by
federal statutes.

jurisdiction over non-Indians. Creatively mixing together a witches' brew of
unpassed legislation, withdrawn Attorney General's opinions, dictum from an
obscure case, and selective quotation from cases and treaties, the Court was
able to find that the Congress, the Executive and the Judiciary had all
implicitly assumed that tribal criminal jurisdiction was so limited.
Id. at 44, 46 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)) (footnotes omitted).
I am indebted to Professor Laurence's "adroitness" discussion for stimulating my analogous
reflections on the Supreme Court Justices' "agility." See infra notes 637-56 and accompanying
text.
591. See supra text accompanying note 589.
592. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
593. Id. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brief for Respondents 19,
24).
594. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The question then, is, as I see it, whether compensatory relief
is "necessary" or "appropriate" to the vindication of the interest
asserted. In resolving that question, it seems to me that the range
of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as
broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with
respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy.
In this regard I agree with the Court that the
appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory relief does not
turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal
official conduct. Damages as a traditional form of compensation
for invasion of a legally protected interest may be entirely
appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on future official
lawlessness might be thought to result. Bivens, after all, has
invoked judicial processes claiming entitlement to compensation for
injuries resulting from allegedly lawless official behavior, if those
injuries are properly compensable in money damages. I do not
think a court of law-vested with the power to accord a remedyshould deny him his relief simply because he cannot show that
future lawless conduct will thereby be deterred. 9
It is understandable that Justice Kennedy would want to garner prestigious
support for his maverick Coeur d'Alene Tribe proposal for diminishing
Young by finding an "approval-in-spirit" in the judicial opinions of the late
Justice Harlan. But it is improper for Kennedy to have inferred such an
endorsement when Harlan's stated position on the propriety of judicial
recognition of remedies against lawbreaking governmental officials clearly
shows a conviction that is opposite Kennedy's.
9. DdjA Vu: Justice O'Connor's Role in Closing the Doors of
Liberty
For her part, Justice O'Connor in her Coeur d'Alene Tribe concurrence
took exception with the Kennedy/Rehnquist opinion's appropriation of
Seminole Tribe's reliance on Chilicky, which O'Connor herself had authored
on behalf of the six-member Chilicky Court.5 ' However, having signed her
name in the first instance to Seminole Tribe's inventive use of Chilicky to
deprive an Indian Tribe of all federal court remedies against state officials'
defiance of the Tribe's federal rights, O'Connor was reduced in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe to objecting only that "[t]he single citation to a Bivens case in
595. Id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnotes and citations omitted).
596. See Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 295-96 (1997) (O'Connor,

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Seminole Tribe by no means establishes that a case-by-case balancing
approach to the Young doctrine is appropriate or consistent with our
jurisprudence."5 97 The relative impotence of O'Connor's objection to this
aspect of the Kennedy/Rehnquist scheme for dismantling the Young doctrine
points up a fundamental truth about Indian law which is reflected in Felix
Cohen's "miner's canary" analogy, cited previously, 98 and which sooner or
later is comprehended by all serious students of the field: that every
destruction of Indian rights in time leads to an erosion of the liberty of all
Americans, and that whenever an American lawmaker authorizes the former,
he or she inevitably becomes an architect of the latter.
This is a truth about which Justice O'Connor, unfortunately, appears to be
in chronic denial; for Coeur d'Alene Tribe is not the first high court
melodrama in which O'Connor has expressed discomfort at seeing her own
acquiescence in the constriction of Indian rights wielded by her colleagues in
a manner that endangers the liberty of all Americans. In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, . Justice O'Connor
expressed great concern6°°-and justifiably so-to witness five members of
the Court " manage virtually to nullify Americans' fundamental right to
religious practice, as putatively guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. 602 In Smith, the Court effectively banished judicial use
of the longstanding "compelling governmental interest" test to resolve Free
Exercise cases, and announced in its place a new, contrary command that
"generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening
a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest.,603 The case involved the issue of whether the First
Amendment protects the Native American Church from being effectively
persecuted by governmental authorities because of the Church's sacramental
use of peyote.6 The Court decided that it does not; 65 and although Justice
O'Connor concurred in that judgment denying religious freedom to the
597. Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
598. See supra text accompanying note 22.
599. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

600. See id. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
601. The majority opinion in Smith was authored by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens and Kennedy. See id. at 873 (syllabus).
602. The Free Exercise Clause states: "Congress shall make no law
exercise [of religion] . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.

. . .

prohibiting the free

603. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
604. See id. at 874-76
605. See id. at 890 (Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon
law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, deny rospondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the
drug.").
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Native American Church,' she wrote a separate opinion to register her
passionate disapproval of the sweeping change of law effectuated by the
majority's decision to cast aside judicial use of the compelling governmental
interest test in Free Exercise cases:
[T]oday's holding dramatically departs from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence . . . and is incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.

The compelling interest test reflects the First
Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest
extent possible in a pluralistic society. For the Court to deem this
command a "luxury" is to denigrate "[tihe very purpose of a Bill
of Rights. "60
While Justice O'Connor thus emerged as a presumptive champion for
religious liberty in her Smith concurrence, the Smith majority's evisceration
of the Free Exercise Clause in fact was built squarely on a foundation that
O'Connor herself had laid as author of the Court's majority opinion in Lyng
606. See id. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor stated:
"I would . ..adhere to our established free exercise jurisprudence and hold that the State in this
case has a compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens and that accommodating
respondents' religiously motivated conduct 'will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the
governmental interest.'" Id. at 907 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment) (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
In his dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
found fault with Justice O'Connor's insistence that if the respondents' religious use of peyote had
been subjected to the compelling governmental interest test, the balance would have weighed in
favor of the State:
The State proclaims an interest in protecting the health and safety of its
citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs. It offers, however, no evidence
that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone.
The carefully circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used
peyote is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use
of unlawful drugs. The Native American Church's internal restrictions on, and
supervision of, its members' use of peyote substantially obviates the State's
health and safety concerns.
...Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of
peyote is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents' right to the free
exercise of their religion.
Id. at 911-13, 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
607. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891, 903 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 888; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
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v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 6 8' handed down two years
before Smith. Like Smith, Lyng involved the question of whether the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause protects the indigenous religious
practices of American Indian people. 6°9 In Lyng, an Indian organization,
several individual Indians, and other plaintiffs sued the Secretary of
Agriculture, the United States Forest Service, and other federal
governmental defendants to prevent the Reagan Administration from
proceeding with plans to construct a logging road through a portion of Six
Rivers National Forest in northern California. 6" The road threatened to
desecrate specific "high country" sacred sites of the Yurok, Karuk and
Tolowa Tribes, thereby destroying three traditional American Indian tribal
religious systems of ancient origin.61 In the proceedings in the lower federal
courts, both the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
government's plan to build the "G-O road" violated the First Amendment
Free Exercise rights of the Indian plaintiffs and therefore must be
permanently enjoined.6 12
In so deciding, both courts conducted a
straightforward application of the compelling governmental interest test, as
was the longstanding convention in Free Exercise cases.
Using this
traditional balancing test, the Ninth Circuit concluded "that the proposed
government operations would virtually destroy the . . .Indians' ability to
practice their religion," 613 and that-as paraphrased by Justice Brennan in his
Lyng dissent-"the Government's interests in building the road and
permitting limited timber harvesting . . . did not justify the destruction of

[the Indians'] religion.

,614

In 1988, the Supreme Court voted five to three to reverse the Ninth
Circuit's decision.6 5 Writing for the Lyng majority, Justice O'Connor
refused to apply the compelling governmental interest test to the Forest
608. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
609. See id. at 441-42.
610. See id.at 443.
611. See id.at 442. For a sensitive judicial description of the "high country" religious
traditions of the Yurok, Karuk and Tolowa Tribes, see id. at 458-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
612. See id. at 443-45. The proposed road acquired the name the "G-O road" because it

would link the northern California timbering towns of Gasquet and Orleans. See id. at 442.
613. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
1986), quoted with emphasis added in Lyng, 485 U.S. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (omission in
original).
614. Lyng, 485.U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
615. The Lyng majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and by Justices White, Stevens, and Scalia. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Kennedy did not participate in considering or deciding the
case. See id. at 441 (syllabus).
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Service's proposed road-building plan, and instead declared that the
government was exempt from having to justify its proposal under the
traditional Free Exercise test:
[lincidental effects of government programs, which may make it
more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs, [do not] require government to bring forward a compelling
justification for its otherwise lawful actions.
Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit's
prediction, according to which the G-O road will "virtually destroy
the ...

Indians' ability to practice their religion," the Constitution

simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding
[the Indians'] legal claims. However much we might wish that it
were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were
required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.

.. . Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the
area

. . .

those rights do not divest the Government of its right to

use what is, after all, its land.6 16

616. Id. at 450-53 (quoting Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693 (omission in original) (citation
omitted)).
In holding that the religious freedom claims of the Indian respondents in Lyng would not be
adjudicated according to the compelling governmental interest test, Justice O'Connor purported to
rely on Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). Roy involved a Free Exercise challenge to the federal
government's use of a social security number to process the plaintiff's infant daughter's food stamps
application; according to plaintiff Roy, the government's use of that computer-generated number
would "prevent [his daughter] from attaining greater spiritual power." Id. at 696. With respect to
this particular challenge to the government's use of information already in the government's
possession, the Court unanimously rejected Roy's Free Exercise claim:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to
require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes
will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The
Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that
appellees engage in any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not
demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by
refraining from using a number to identify their daughter.
As a result, Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the
Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could
on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing
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Justice Brennan issued a strongly-worded reprimand to the Court's
decision effectively to exclude all American Indian religious practices that
take place on governmental lands from the protection conventionally afforded
by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause:
Today, the Court holds that a federal land-use decision that
promises to destroy an entire religion does not burden the practice
of that faith in a manner recognized by the Free Exercise Clause.
Having thus stripped . . . Native Americans of any constitutional

protection against perhaps the most serious threat to their age-old
religious practices, and indeed to their entire way of life, the Court
assures us that nothing in its decision "should be read to encourage
governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen." I
find it difficult, however, to imagine conduct more insensitive to
religious needs than the Government's determination to build a
marginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that
the road will render the practice of [the Indians'] religion
impossible. Nor do I believe that [the Indians] will derive any
solace from the knowledge that although the practice of their
religion will become "more difficult" as a result of the
Government's actions, they remain free to maintain their religious
beliefs. Given today's ruling, that freedom amounts to nothing
more than the right to believe that their religion will be destroyed.
The safeguarding of such a hollow freedom . . . fails utterly to

accord with the dictates of the First Amendment.617
News of the Lyng Court's virtual elimination of First Amendment
protection for all American Indian sacred practices that take place on
governmental lands was received with grievous disbelief by tribal leaders and
traditional Indian religious practitioners in reservation communities across
the United States, and it precipitated a wide-ranging grassroots campaign in
Indian country to obtain Congress's help in the face of this judicial assault on
cabinets. The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a
right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.
Id. at 699-700. In Lyng, Justice O'Connor insisted that the government should be exempted from
having to justify its construction of the G-O road for the same reason that the government was
exempted from having to justify its use of a computer-generated number in Roy, since, in
O'Connor's view, both cases involved nothing more than a challenge to the government's "internal
affairs." See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. But see id. at 470-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding
'altogether remarkable" the Court's "professe[d] ... inability to differentiate Roy from the present
case," and noting "the cruelly surreal result it produces here: governmental action that will
virtually destroy a religion is nevertheless deemed not to 'burden' that religion").
617. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 453)
(citation omitted).
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tribal religions.6 18 However, because Lyng's injurious impact fell on Indian
Tribes only-since only Indian Tribes conduct religious rituals on what are
now government-owned lands-neither the American public generally nor
legal scholars in particular took much notice of the decision.
But when Smith was decided two years after Lyng, and the Court's
destruction of the efficacy of the Constitution's religious freedom guarantee
threatened the religious practices of all Americans, the alarm that had been
sounding loudly in Indian country because of Lyng became audible to nonIndians as well. Smith immediately generated a nationwide outcry from
religious leaders of all faiths and denominations, civil rights groups, First

Amendment scholars and others;" 9 and in response to that outcry, Congress,
with overwhelming approval in both Houses, passed the Religious Freedom
618. See Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal,
Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion
Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 373 (1993). Trope writes:
In 1988, three national organizations, the Native American Rights Fund
of Boulder, Colorado, the National Congress of American Indians in
Washington, D.C., and the Association on American Indian Affairs in
New York City, N.Y., formed the American Indian Religious Freedom
Coalition. Since its inception, the AIRFA Coalition has expanded to include
Indian tribes and other Indian, religious, environmental, and human rights
organizations. The Coalition's purpose is to advocate for the protection of
Native American religious freedom and to educate the American public and
Congress about the devastating effect of the Lyng and Smith decisions upon
traditional Native American communities.
Id. at 384-85 (footnote omitted); see also S. REP. No. 103-411, at 4 (1994) ("Indian Tribes and
Native American organizations established a precedent setting, broad based coalition which includes
leading environmental, human rights and religious organizations committed to supporting the
passage of a measure which would provide protection for the exercise of Native American
religion . .

").

619. See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992). Ryan writes:
Members of the media, academics, members of Congress, and religious
interest groups greeted the [Smith] decision with condemnation and despair. A
lead editorial in the Los Angeles Times denounced the decision as an exercise
of "pure legal adventurism." Of the sixteen law review articles and notes
written on the case, all but one condemned the result. Professors Edward M.
Gaffney, Douglas Laycock and Michael W. McConnell described the decision
as a "sweeping disaster for religious liberty." Congressman Stephen J. Solarz
reaction was even more dramatic: "[W]ith the stroke of a pen, the Supreme
Court has virtually removed religious freedom from the Bill of Rights." Kim
Yelton, director of government relations of Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, concurred with Solarz' description: "[Tihere's really no
such thing as free exercise (of religion) anymore .

. . ."

Finally, Rabbi David

N. Saperstein called the decision "the most dangerous attack on our civil rights
in this country since the Dred Scott decision in the 1850s declared that blacks
were not fully human beings."
Id. at 1409-10 (footnotes omitted).
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Restoration Act (RFRA) 620 in 1993. The Act comprised a federal statutory
mandate directing courts to continue using the compelling governmental
interest test in Free Exercise cases notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
rejection of that test as a constitutional mandate.62 ' In a White House
ceremony, President Clinton signed the bill into law, expressing his own
enthusiastic endorsement of this national campaign to restore to the American
political and legal landscape a high solicitude for the religious freedom
values cherished by the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights and nullified, in effect,
by the Rehnquist Court's Smith decision.'
On June 25, 1997, two days after Coeur d'Alene Tribe was decided, the
Supreme Court issued its six to three decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,6'
striking down RFRA as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power
to the extent of its intended applicability to state law.6" With the Court's
decision in Flores, the severe damage to religious freedom wrought by Lyng
and Smith was exacerbated in the Rehnquist Court's aggrandizement of its
own power at the expense of the other branches of the federal government,
and of "States' rights" at the expense of Americans' fundamental liberties. 6'

620. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). The House of Representatives approved the
proposed RFRA legislation unanimously, and the vote in the Senate was 97-3 in favor of the bill.
See 139 CONG. REc. S14,461-71 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (including results of Senate roll call
vote).
621.

In relevant part, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides that "Government shall

not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability," except that "Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-() is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b). The Act further provides that
"[tihis [Act] applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether
statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [the enactment of this Act]." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-3(a).
622. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at Signing Ceremony for the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Nov. 16, 1993, available in 1993 WL 479632.
623. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
624. On behalf of the Flores majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that RFRA "is a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." Id. at 534.
625. Professor Douglas Laycock, who represented respondent Archbishop Flores in the Flores
litigation, has written that, as a result of the decision,
Congress's power to protect liberty in the states appears to have shrunk
dramatically.
. . . Flores appears to say that [Congress's] power [to protect liberty in
the states] has no independent content, that it is derivative of judicial
interpretation, that there are not three federal branches empowered to protect
liberty in the states, but only one. The Court now asserts unchecked power to
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Dissenting in Flores, Justice O'Connor wrote passionately once again of the
crisis in American religious life created by Smith's virtual annulment of the
Free Exercise Clause:
The [Smith] decision has harmed religious liberty. .

.

. [L]ower

courts applying Smith no longer find necessary a searching judicial
inquiry into the possibility of reasonably accommodating religious
practice.

The Religion Clauses of the Constitution represent a profound
commitment to religious liberty. Our Nation's Founders conceived
of a Republic receptive to voluntary religious expression, not of a
secular society in which religious expression is tolerated only when
it does not conflict with a generally applicable law.... [T]he Free
Exercise Clause is properly understood as an affirmative guarantee
of the right to participate in religious activities without
impermissible governmental interference, even where a believer's
conduct is in tension with a law of general application. . . . Given
the centrality of freedom of. . . religion to the American concept

of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that
[freedom of religion] should be treated with the highest degree of
respect.
...[Tihe rule the Court declared in Smith does not faithfully
serve the purpose of the Constitution. Accordingly, I believe that
it is essential for the Court to reconsider its holding in
Smith ....626

In her Flores dissent, Justice O'Connor was silent about the pivotal role her
Lyng majority opinion played in Smith's evisceration of the Free Exercise
Clause. Because Coeur d'Alene Tribe now bears witness to the emergence of
another serious threat to the liberty of all Americans stemming from the
Supreme Court's experimental destruction of Indian rights via a pattern of
decisions replicating the Lyng/Smith/Flores fiasco in Free Exercise law, it is
shrink the Fourteenth Amendment to as small a scope as it chooses.... [Tihis
decision goes to the core of the constitutional structure for protecting liberty.
Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743,
745, 792 (1998); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a
ConstitutionalExpansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 602 (1998) ("The invalidation
of a federal statute on federalism grounds and the substantial narrowing of the scope of
constitutional rights are obviously conservative victories. Flores, by any measure, is dramatic
conservative judicial activism.").
626. Flores, 521 U.S. at 547, 564-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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instructive to consider how Justice O'Connor's "controlling [view] " 6'l in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe foreshadows and facilitates the dismantling of Ex parte
Young in the same way that her majority opinion in Lyng paved the way for
Smith's cancellation of the people's constitutionally guaranteed religious
liberty.
First, it is important to note just how Smith relied on Lyng. In two key
passages in Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, asserted the
following:
In recent years we have abstained from applying the [compelling
governmental interest] test (outside the unemployment
compensation field) at all ....

In Lyng we declined to apply

[compelling governmental interest] analysis to the Government's
logging and road construction activities on lands used for religious
purposes by several Native American Tribes, even though it was
undisputed that the activities "could have devastating effects on
traditional Indian religious practices. ..

. ..Although . ..we have sometimes used the [compelling

governmental interest] test to analyze free exercise challenges to
[generally applicable criminal] laws, we have never applied the test
to invalidate one. We conclude today that the sounder approach,
and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our
precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects
of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development." To make an individual's obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
is
State's
interest
where
the
except
beliefs,
"compelling[,]" ... contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense.628
627. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 298 (1997) (Souter J., dissenting)

(referring to Justice O'Connor's view as put forth in her concurring opinion in the case as "the
controlling one").
628. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883, 884-85
(1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988)). It should be noted that Justice Scalia was wrong when he asserted that the Court
never had invalidated a generally applicable criminal law under a Free Exercise/compelling
governmental interest analysis. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a
generally applicable Wisconsin statute making it a crime to refuse to send one's children between
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In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor objected to Justice
Scalia's appropriation of the quoted language from Lyng to support the
Court's elimination of the use of the compelling governmental interest test in
Free Exercise cases not involving American Indian religious practices on
governmental lands. O'Connor insisted that Lyng's refusal to apply the
traditional Free Exercise balancing test was justified
on the [exceptional] ground that the First Amendment does not
"require the Government itself to behave in ways that the
individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development ....
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be
understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal
affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens." This distinction makes sense because "the Free Exercise
Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
629
government."
Justice Scalia, in turn (in a footnote) issued an inventive rebuttal to
O'Connor's effort to distinguish Lyng from what O'Connor called "paradigm
free exercise cases. "63 In that footnote,6 3' Scalia exploited the fact that the
quotation at the end of the excerpt, above,632 from O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Smith was from Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Sherbert
v. Verner,633 the landmark 1963 decision in which the Court extracted from
its Free Exercise jurisprudence the first modem articulation of the
compelling governmental interest test, which thereafter became known as the
"Sherbert test." Justice Scalia wrote:
[SIince Justice Douglas voted with the majority in Sherbert, [the
Douglas] quote obviously envisioned that what "the government
the ages of seven and sixteen to private or public schools as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
to the extent of the statute's purported application to adherents of the Old Order Amish faith

convicted of violating the statute); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a
generally applicable Connecticut statute making it a crime to engage in unlicensed religious
solicitations as violating the Free Exercise Clause to the extent of the statute's purported application
to adherents of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith convicted of violating the statute). For an incisive
examination of Justice Scalia's efforts in Smith at distinguishing Yoder and other religious libertyaffirming precedents, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
629. Smith, 494 U.S. at 900 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412

(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
630. Id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
631. Id. at 885 n.2.
632. See supra text accompanying note 629.
633. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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cannot do to the individual" includes not just the prohibition of an
individual's freedom of action through criminal laws but also the
running of its programs (in Sherbert, state unemployment
compensation) in such fashion as to harm the individual's religious
interests. Moreover, it is hard to see any reason in principle or
practicality why the government should have to tailor its health and
safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but
should not have to tailor its management of public lands, [as in]
Lyng .... 634

Here, Justice Scalia presumed to clarify that Justice Douglas, unlike Justice
O'Connor, "envisioned" that the Free Exercise Clause would apply in the
same way in cases like Smith (a Free Exercise challenge to the government's
indirect enforcement of a generally applicable criminal prohibition) and cases
like Lyng (a Free Exercise challenge to the government's operation of an
administrative program), and that O'Connor's reliance on the quote from
Douglas for insisting on a distinction between these two types of cases in
Free Exercise law therefore was mistaken. While this observation is correct,
it serves primarily as a subterfuge for Justice Scalia's even more radical
subversion of what Douglas "envisioned"; for, by concurring in Sherbert,
Justice Douglas demonstrated that what he "envisioned" was widespread
application of the Sherbert test in cases involving religious freedom
challenges to generally applicable laws and governmental programs alike.635

634.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 n.2 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas,

J.,

concurring)).
635. Justice Douglas's robust solicitude for the Constitution's religious freedom values as

mediated by the Sherbert test-a solicitude absent from both Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Smith and Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Lyng-is evident in Douglas's Sherbert
concurrence:
[Miany people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society-beliefs that are
protected by the First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under
the guise of "police" or "health" regulations reflecting the majority's views.

• ..[South Carolina] asks us to hold that when it comes to a day of rest a
Sabbatarian must conform with the scruples of the majority in order to obtain
unemployment benefits.

, * . The harm is the interference with the individual's scruples or
conscience-an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences
off from government ...
This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of

government, but solely in terms of what government may not do to an
individual in violation of his religious scruples. The fact that government
cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not,

of course, mean that I can demand of government a sum of money, the better
to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
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Justice Scalia, on the other hand, would (and did) "resolve" the dilemma
created by the lack of "any reason in principle or practicality" 636 to
distinguish between Free Exercise challenges to generally applicable laws
and Free Exercise challenges to governmental programs by denying
Clearly, the
application of the Sherbert test in both types of cases.
elimination of the Sherbert test that Justice Scalia "envisioned," and that was
made manifest by the Smith decision, is a far cry from what Justice
Douglas-or the modem Supreme Court as a whole, prior to Smith"envisioned" concerning the scope of religious liberty afforded by the First
Amendment.
What is instructive about Justice Scalia's response to Justice O'Connor's
concerns regarding the Smith Court's reliance on Lyng is the agility with
which Scalia took a doctrinal denial of religious liberty-which O'Connor
would have confined to the context of land-centered American Indian
religious practices-and generalized it to abolish the fundamental religious
liberty of all Americans. Agility of this sort is a hallmark of the Rehnquist
Court, and it animates the dynamic identified by Felix Cohen whereby the
erosion of Indian rights "marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our
political atmosphere. 637 The prevalence of this kind of agility on the high
court gives fair warning of the danger posed by Coeur d'Alene Tribe's
elimination of Indian Tribes' Ex parte Young rights with respect to onreservation submerged lands. And so, while some observers, including
Justice O'Connor, might have been shocked when the Smith Court
harmonized Lyng with "paradigm Free Exercise cases"-not by extending the
Free Exercise franchise to include Indian religions, but by abruptly
withdrawing the franchise from all other religions as well-it should come as
a surprise to no one, given the many signs of Young's bleak future, when the
Court follows suit in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and relies on
language from the "principal" and "controlling" views in Coeur d'Alene
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
cannot exact from the government.
Those considerations, however, are not relevant here. .

.

. [T]his case

does not involve the problems of direct or indirect state assistance to a religious
organization - matters relevant to the Establishment Clause, not in issue here.
This longer excerpt from Justice
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Douglas's concurrence suggests that Douglas "envisioned" that the Sherbert test would be
applicable in all cases of governmental infringement of private religious practice in which
governmental accommodation would not violate the Establishment Clause. This expansive "vision"

of constitutional religious liberty obviously is one that is incompatible with the restrictive "visions"
manifested in both Smith and Lyng.
636. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 n.2; supra text accompanying note 634.
637. Cohen, supra note 22, at 390; see also text accompanying supra note 22.
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Tribe to implement a general constriction of the people's liberty through the
denial of Young relief to all Americans-not just Indian Tribes.
This objective could be accomplished by any of the agile members of the
Court, and in a variety of predictable ways. For instance, an agile Justice
might point out that since five members of the Court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
agreed that the presence of "special sovereignty interests" in a Young suitsuch as a State's "sovereign interest" in possessing the lakes and rivers on an
Indian reservation-is a factor that weighs in favor of withholding federal
jurisdiction from that suit," the Court's Young doctrine must now be
understood as requiring a discretionary "case-by-case" factor analysis to
allow the Court to inspect every Young suit for the presence or absence of
this type (or any other type) of disqualifying characteristic.639
Or, an agile Justice might point out that since there was basically no
objection by the concurring or dissenting Justices in Coeur d'Alene Tribe to
the comparison pressed by Justice Kennedy between violations of federal law
and common law torts,640 all the Justices must have agreed "implicitly" that
Young cases are really Larson cases in disguise; hence, federal jurisdiction
over such cases is "barred" by the Eleventh Amendment absent a State's
consent,6" unless some exceptional factor is present in the suit that makes it
"necessary" for the case to be heard by a federal court rather than a state
court. 2 This factor presumably would have to be far more exceptional than
the "mere" fact that a plaintiff suing the state officials happens to be an
Indian Tribe whose sovereign interest in exclusive tribal dominion over the
lakes and rivers within the boundaries of the Tribe's own reservation is
directly adverse to the deciding state court's own sovereign interest in
facilitating state dominion over those lakes and rivers." 3
Or, an agile Justice might, in a future case, extract from the concurring
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe the single concern that "[t]he parties have not
briefed whether ... a shift in the Young doctrine is warranted,"' and point
out that that concern now has been obviated by a regular submission of
briefs. In any event, the agile Justice could insist that the stated concern was
mooted when the "shift in the Young doctrine" occurred as a result of the
638. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) ("We must examine the
effect of the Tribe's suit and its impact on these special sovereignty interests in order to decide

whether the Ex parte Young fiction is applicable.").
639. See supra notes 500-02 and accompanying text.
640. See supra notes 386-88 and accompanying text.
641.

See supra notes 388-404 and accompanying text.

642. See supra text accompanying notes 516-18.
643.
644.

See supra notes 321-28, 490-95, 546 and accompanying text.
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 291 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in

the judgment).
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Court's decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribe-or Deep Sea Research, 5 or
Seminole Tribe,646 or Chilicky, 647 or Pennhurst,6"8 or Quern,649 or Milliken,65
or Edelman,65' or Bivens,652 or Larson,5 3 or almost any other randomly
selected case, dealing with officer suits or not, "from the start" 654 onward
(and perhaps before).655 The list of cases from which a Supreme Court
member might extract "support" for neutralizing the Young doctrine could be
as expansive as that jurist's agility. Clearly, the opportunities for doctrinal
revisionism and nullification flowing from unbridled judicial agility are
legion. And when the agility of the Justices themselves is supplemented with
that of the Justices' law clerks,656 there can be little doubt that many roads
645. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998); see supra notes 234-74 and
accompanying text.
646. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see supra notes 210, 497-98, 548-95 and
accompanying text.
647. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); see supra notes 548-95 and accompanying
text.
648. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); see supra notes 228233, 303 and accompanying text.
649. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); see supra notes 526-33 and accompanying text.
650. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see supra notes 204-09, 534-46 and
accompanying text.
651. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 512-525 and accompanying
text.
652. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); see supra notes 548-95 and accompanying text.
653. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); see supra notes
386-405 and accompanying text.
654. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 280 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.) (asserting that a "case-by-case approach to the Young doctrine has been evident
from the start"); supra text accompanying note 506.
655. See supra notes 351-81 and accompanying text.
656. For criticism of the increasingly prominent role of the Supreme Court Justices' law clerks
in the production of the Rehnquist Court's opinions, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 369-72 (1993). Professor Schwartz writes:
It may be doubted that Justices such as Holmes or Brandeis used their clerks as
more than research assistants. In fact . . . Justice Hughes worried at the time
that if the clerks were used too much, "it might be thought that they were
writing our opinions." That, indeed, is what happened. In recent years the
Justices have given their clerks an ever-larger share of responsibility, including
even the writing of opinions.
There is all the difference in the world between writing one's own
opinions and reviewing opinions written by someone else. It is hard to see
how an editor can be a great judge. Can we really visualize a Holmes
coordinating a team of law clerks and editing their drafts?
According to a federal appellate judge, "We need to reduce our
dependence on the system of judicial apprenticeships and on a mass production
model that will soon swallow us up." In the Supreme Court, as in most
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indeed are now available for conveying the Rehnquist Court on its
prospective journey from Coeur d'Alene Tribe to the annihilation of Ex parte
Young.
Should the Court finally succeed in doing away with the Young doctrine
through any combination of the Young-negating theories proffered in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, Justice O'Connor can be expected to respond with passionate
disapproval, just as she did when the Court abolished Americans'
constitutional right to religious freedom in Smith. However, it will be
evident to discerning observers that O'Connor will have played as strategic a
role in the dismantling of Young as she did in the nullification of the Free
Exercise Clause, her sincere words in defense of liberty notwithstanding.
For, in both the Free Exercise context and the Ex parte Young context,
Justice O'Connor will have made the tragic mistake of devising and
deploying a rationale for depriving Indian Tribes of essential aspects of
liberty available to all other Americans, in the expectation that such doctrinal
repression can be contained within the limited arena of Indian rights.
But history shows that such an expectation is dangerously naive; for-as
must be repeated-the destruction of Indian rights always reveals itself in
time as a precursor to the destruction of American liberty generally. That is
the harsh and undeniable truth to be learned about the law's treatment of
Indian Tribes in the historic and continuing story of "the rise and fall in our
democratic faith," 657 as Felix Cohen understood so well. For the sake of
restoring "our democratic faith," it is essential that the lawmakers entrusted
with upholding the people's liberty on our nation's highest court likewise
begin taking seriously this fundamental truth.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe is
compelling evidence that the Rehnquist Court is proceeding apace with its
mission of expediting the destruction of tribal sovereignty and the
dispossession of tribal lands, jurisdiction, and resources, in disregard of
fundamental principles of federal Indian law, and in service to the Court's
own "States' rights" ideology. The decision bars Indian Tribes from
institutions, the balance of power has shifted increasingly to the bureaucrats
and away from the nominal heads. The Justice have become the managers of a
growing corps of law clerks, who increasingly write the opinions even in the
most important cases. The swelling system of judicial apprenticeships
threatens to repeat the story of the Sorcerer'sApprentice.
Id. at 370, 372 (endnotes omitted).
657. Cohen, supra note 22, at 390; see also supra text accompanying note 22.
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accessing the federal courts, via the doctrine of Ex parte Young, for the

purpose of obtaining relief against the ongoing, illegal appropriation of onreservation submerged lands by state officials.
The decision thus is
tantamount to the sanctioning of a "tyranny" against Tribes, as Justice Souter
intimated in dissent, 658 for it comes perilously close to leaving Tribes within the prophetic words of Chief Justice John Marshall-"no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right."65 9
Until Coeur d'Alene Tribe is overruled, Indian Tribes will have to rely on
the United States to bring suit in federal court, as the Tribes' trustee,
whenever state officials "presume" to appropriate the submerged lands
located within reservation boundaries. 660 At a time in American history
when federal Indian policy ostensibly is one of supporting tribal selfdetermination and autonomy,"' it is ironic, to say the least, that the Supreme

658. Justice Souter observed:
[An issue of property title is no different from any other legal or constitutional
matter that may have to be resolved in deciding whether the officer of an
immune government is so acting beyond his authority as to be amenable to suit
without necessarily implicating his government. Indeed, the decisions of this
Court have so held or assumed as far back as the time of Chief Justice
Marshall's statement in United States v. Peters that "itcertainly can never be
alleged, that a mere suggestion of title in a state to property, in possession of
an individual, must arrest the proceedings of the court, and prevent their
looking into the suggestion, and examining the validity of the title." The
contrary rule, Lee later explained, would "sanctio[n] a tyranny which has no
existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has
a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights."
Thus did the Chief Justice foresee that governmental officials are not any the
less amenable to suit for relying on their government's claim to property title,
and no decision before today's would have turned the envious eyes of the old
monarchs toward Idaho.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 302-03 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139-40 (1809); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 221 (1882)).
659. Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
660. Reliance on litigation theories developed by the United States may entail certain risks for
Tribes. For criticism of the United States' strategy in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981), discussed supra at notes 86-128 and accompanying text, see Barsh and Henderson, supra
note 111, at 682-84.
661. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 2 § F, at 180 (1982

ed.):
The federal government has gradually moved away from the policies that
guided federal Indian policy during the termination era . .

.

. [N]ew programs

evolved in response to the demands of Indians and to the officially expressed
support of five presidents for self-determination by Indian people.
The self-determination era is premised on the notion that Indian tribes are
the basic governmental units of Indian policy. . . .Self-determination has
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Court is forcing Tribes into a position of dependency on the United States for
protecting the lifeblood of tribal homelands-the lakes, rivers, and other
bodies of water located on Indian reservations. This ironic state of affairs
lends credence to the perception that the Rehnquist Court is taking federal
Indian policy out of the hands of Congress and the Executive Branch, and
effectively placing Tribes in the path of invasive forces emanating from the
States. 2
As a profound and sweeping denial of the federally protected rights of
Indian Tribes, Coeur d'Alene Tribe also portends future incursions on the
constitutional liberty of all Americans. Some observers may believe that the
case is little more than an isolated, anomalous exception to the Court's
"ordinary" recognition of the applicability of Exparte Young when a plaintiff
seeks prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law by state
officials. But readers familiar with the role that the repression of Indian
rights has played historically in American political life will discern in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe many signs and portents warning of an impending paradigm
shift 1 3 in the Young doctrine that promises to afford States and state officials
unprecedented "enjoyment" in ignoring people's rights and violating federal
law, unhampered by the prospect of federal court accountability. For these
readers, the only uncertainty lies in anticipating which pathway to the
annihilation of Ex parte Young the "States' rights" Rehnquist Court
eventually will take, and when the Court will take it.
In the meantime, Indian Tribes, and the defenders of Indian rights, will
need to do everything possible to counteract the harmful effects of the
Rehnquist Court's formal rhetoric equating the States' "dignity and status"'
operated on a number of fronts to promote the practical exercise of inherent
sovereign powers possessed by Indian tribes.
Id.
662. See supra notes 3, 7-12 and accompanying text; infra note 665.
663. Cf. Jackson, supra note 13:
The apparent anomaly of construing the judicial power not to extend to
cases to enforce particular federal laws against state officials, nominally on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, may be explained in part by a shift in paradigm
about the substantive scope of congressional power. . . . Seminole Tribe may
be simply an "advance guard" for an even broader set of restrictions on federal

legislative power to impose substantive regulation on the states.
Id. at 304-05 n. 16.
664. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997); supra text accompanying note

199; cf. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 268 (adverting to "the dignity and respect afforded a
State, which [Hans] immunity is designed to protect"); supra text accompanying note 182. In the
recently decided case of Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), the same five-member majority
that decided Coeur d'Alene Tribe invoked the "dignity and respect" language from Coeur d'Alene
Tribe to support Alden's dramatic holding "that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of

the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private
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with the latitude to violate Tribes' federally protected rights and invade
sovereign tribal lands. As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is a

sobering commentary on the integrity of the American legal system that the
survival of Indian Nations seems hardly more assured than it was at the close
of the nineteenth century.'
To the extent that Indian people today are

forced to continue wondering whether America's "real," unspoken Indian
policy is one of exterminating Tribes from the face of the earth, the
suits for damages in state court." Id. at 2246, 2263 (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 268,
as "recognizing 'the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to
protect'"). Writing in dissent, Justice Souter criticized the Alden majority for equating States'
"dignity" with the power to violate federal law with impunity, as newly conferred on States by the
Rehnquist Court:
It is symptomatic of the weakness of the structural notion proffered by the
Court that it seeks to buttress the argument by relying on "the dignity and
respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to
protect".
Apparently beguiled by Gilded Era language desribing private
suits against States as "'neither becoming nor convenient,'" the Court calls
"immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity," and assumes that
this "dignity" is a quality easily translated from the person of the King to the
participatory abstraction of a republican State. . . . It would be hard to imagine
anything more inimical to the republican conception, which rests on the
understanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above them,
but of them, its actions being governed by law just like their own. Whatever
justification there may be for an American government's immunity from
private suit, it is not dignity.
Id. at 2289 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In a footnote, Justice Souter added, "[T]he
very idea of dignity ought also to imply that the State should be subject to, and not outside of, the
law." Id. at 2289 n.35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
665. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court has been criticized for continually breathing new life into the
failed allotment and assimilation policy of the late nineteenth century, which Congress repudiated in
1934. See Getches, supra note 3, at 1622-26 ("In many of its recent cases, the Court has used the
short-lived allotment policy as the touchstone for deciding how much governmental authority the
tribes should exercise."); see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1
(1995). Professor Royster writes:
[Allotment's] legacy lingers on, and in recent years has been revived by the
Court in a series of cases that give present effect to the discredited policy of
allotment and assimilation. In the process, the Court has chosen to diminish
tribal territories and to restrict tribal sovereign control over the territory that
remains. By deciding cases in accord with the assimilation policy, the Court
has undercut the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indian nations.
Shall we . . . continue to give effect to the policy of allotment,

recognized as a failure and a disaster for the tribes, officially repudiated by
Congress, and contrary to every manifestation of current Indian policy?
Unfortunately, the answer from the Supreme Court appears to be yes. It not
only persists in giving effect to a policy that has failed, but does so in ways that
disrespect the branch of government charged with authority over Indian affairs
and mock the Court's own precedents in the field.
Id. at 6-7.
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United States appears.to have "progressed" morally and politically no farther
than from one "Century of Dishonor"' to the next. For ensuring that the
last two decades of the twentieth century will be looked upon by future
generations of American Indian people as an era of governmental dishonor,
duplicity and betrayal, the Rehnquist Court's anti-tribal, "States' rights"
decisionmaking in the field of federal Indian law will bear the brunt of the
blame.

666.

See generally HELEN JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR:

A SKETCH OF THE UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT'S DEALINGS WITH SOME OF THE INDIAN TRIBES (1885) (series of historical
accounts "show[ing] our causes for national shame in the matter of our treatment of the Indians").

